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1. THE INTERACTION OF LEGAL SYSTEMS
This work deals with the relationship between 
legal systems. It looks for and at the evidence 
that the legal system of the European 
Communities, as developed by the European Court 
of Justice, has. influenced and shaped the 
internal order of the English and Scottish legal 
systems, particularly in the spheres of 
constitutional and administrative law.
First of all, it might be appropriate to give a 
note on methodology. The approach which is 
adopted to clarify the relationship between these 
bodies of law is primarily one of case-law 
analysis. Cases from the European Court of 
Justice and from the national courts of the 
United Kingdom are examined and their judgments 
subjected to close scrutiny.
Judicial pronouncements of particular interest 
because, under Common law systems (among which I 
would, for these purposes, group Scots Law ) it 
is what judges say when on the Bench that has 
normative weight. The doctrinal writings of 




























































































referred to in or by the courts and even then 
they have, at most, persuasive force. *
Thus, questions as to the extent to which 
Community law has been taken into the legal 
systems of Scotland and England will be resolved 
by examining the judgments of the courts of those 
countries rather than by looking at the writings 
of legal academics. In common law systems the 
latter are of interest in predicting or 
advocating how the law might be developed, but 
the only authoritative pronouncements as to the 
present state of the law are made by judges when 
acting as judges and deciding cases.
Such a concentration on judicial activity might 
tend to give the impression that legal 
hierarchies form elements in a closed system 
whose frame of reference is and should be only to 
those norms which have validity within that 
system.  ̂ However such a strict positivist 
analysis would give no clear explanation for 
change and development in a legal system in the 
absence of formal legislative enactments, 12
1. See Van Caenegem Judges, Legislators and Professors: 
Chapters in European Legal History, 1987 in particular 
"Jurists are dispensable" at 53-67
2. See Kelsen "The Pure Theory of Law: its methods and 
fundamental concepts" translated with an introduction by 































































































specifically in the acceptance by judges and 
lawyers of standards, tests and values which have 
their origins outside the formal parameters of 
their own legal system.  ̂ When these borrowed 
standards were formed in the context of another 
"foreign" legal system this phenomenon may be 
termed the "reception" of law.
2. LEGAL RECEPTIONS AND TRANSPLANTATIONS
(i) Examples of the reception of law
The general definition of "reception of law" as 
the penetration of one system of laws into other 
legal systems is, however, insufficiently 
precise. It could mean simply the partial
reception of law by way of individual legal 
borrowings or transplants of individual legal 
concepts from other systems, an example of this 
would perhaps be the statutory introduction of 
the law relating to trusts (an English concept) 
into Scots law. 3 4 What I am interested, however, 
is the model of full reception whereby a whole 
new body of authoritative doctrine is taken up by 
one legal system from another and that other
3. For an attempt to develop a theory of such legal 
change see Watson The Evolution of Law, 1985.




























































































system is accepted to be a source of "higher 
law".
The primary exemplar of this phenomenon is
clearly the reception of Roman law into the
various systems of customary law which applied in 
mediaeval mainland Europe and in Scotland. With 
the re-discovery of Justinian's Corpus Iuris 
Civilis in the West and the development of legal 
studies within the emerging universities of 
Europe, Roman law, as interpreted over the
centuries by the Glossators, the Commentators and 
Humanists, was accepted as an authoritative 
source of law. Roman law was seen, throughout 
Western Continental Europe and Scotland, to be a 
higher law which supplemented gaps in the 
prevailing customary laws, and in some cases, 
came to replace customary law fully. ®
In England, however, Roman law was not received 
as an authoritative source. In England customary 
law was taught, developed and defended not in the 
universities but in the Inns of Court, the 
schools of the barristers who practised before 
the courts. English legal education was
accordingly isolated from the academic 5
5. For a general outline of the reception of Roman law 
in Western Europe see Robinson, Fergus, Gordon An 




























































































developments taking place in the universities 
throughout Europe. Thus, English law developed 
outside the trends of European legal history. ®
However, in its own history English law mirrored 
Roman law in becoming an authoritative source and 
model for other legal systems. English law was 
exported and received into other jurisdictions 
with the growth of the British colonialism. The 
United States, Canada, (including Quebec), 
Australia, India, Ceylon, the West Indies, Hong 
Kong and Singapore, South Africa, Israel, and 
Scotland since its political union with England 
in 1707, were all subject to the influence of 
English law and their legal systems have been 
marked as a result. 6 7
The reception of laws continues in the present 
day. A more recent example of partial reception 
is the export of certain aspects of United States 
law, particularly those laws relating to cartels 
and to anti-competitive practices to certain 
American trading partners, notably Japan, in the 
interests of ensuring fair and free trade between 
the countries.
6. See Milsom Historical Foundations of the Common Law 
(2nd edn) 1981 at Chapter 2
7. See generally Hooker Legal Pluralism: an



























































































Free trade is also the apparent driving force 
behind the most recent example of full-scale 
reception of laws, namely the reception of 
European Community law within the municipal legal 
systems of the Member States. Thus, while the 
English legal system may have succeeding in 
developing outside the trends of European legal 
history, with the accession of the United Kingdom 
to the European Community the Scottish and 
English legal systems have become dependent upon 
a system of laws being developed by the European 
Court of Justice.
(ii) Two modes of legal reception
As well as partial and full reception, one might 
distinguish two modes by which foreign law is 
received: directly and indirectly. Direct
reception would be the formal imposition of 
another system's standards and approaches on to 
the receiving legal system; indirect reception is 
rather a process of legal osmosis, whereby 
foreign legal concepts spillover into the
workings of the other legal system, 
notwithstanding the absence of any formal legal 





























































































I will look at the manner and pace of this 
reception of the new body of Community law into 
the legal systems of the United Kingdom. The 
evidence for both direct and indirect reception 
of Community law concepts into the municipal law 
of the United Kingdom will be looked at and its 
significance considered. This empirical study is 
ultimately aimed at assessing the possibilities 
for and likelihood of the development of a 
"European Common Law" 8 formed from a marriage, 
sealed by the European Court of Justice, between 
the civilian systems of the Continent and the 
common law systems found in the British Isles.
3. SCHEMATIC OUTLINE
In Chapter 1 we consider the gradual 
transformation of the foundation Treaties of the 
European Communities into "constitutional 
documents" which form the basis for an 
independent legal order. This is a process 
which began almost immediately the Court of
8. On this theme see generally Schwarze "Tendencies 
towards a Common Administrative Law in Europe" [1991] 
European Law Review 3; Koopmans "European Public Law: 
Reality and Prospects" [1991] Public Law 53; Koopmans 
"The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of Legal 
Traditions” (1991) 39 American Journal of Comparative Law 
493; Grossfeld "The Internal Dynamics of European 




























































































Justice of the European Communities was set up in 
1957 . It has been continuing to the present 
day, most recently with the apparent development 
by the Court of the idea that certain provisions 
of the foundations Treaties of the European 
Communities are entrenched and may no longer be 
amended.
By the time of the United Kingdom's accession to 
the European Communities in 1972 it was clear 
that Community law formed a distinct legal system 
which was capable of creating directly effective 
rights for the nationals of Member States which 
were not only independent of national laws but 
were to be regarded as superior to them. In 
Chapter 2 we look at the way in which the 
doctrine of the superiority of Community law was 
gradually taken up by the courts of the United 
Kingdom, a process which culminated in Factortame 
2 in which the House of Lords unequivocally 
accepted their duty under Community law to 
disapply Acts of Parliament which they considered 
to be contrary to rights guaranteed under 
Community law. The acceptance by the courts of 
the supremacy of Community law is the pre­





























































































In Chapter 3 we examine one of the consequences 
of the United Kingdom courts' acceptance of the 
doctrine of the supremacy of Community law, 
namely the growth of the judicial review of 
national legislation for its conformity with 
Community law. Of particular importance in this 
regard is the principle of proportionality which 
Community law requires to be applied, in a number 
of instance, in the assessment of the "validity" 
of national legislation. The application of the 
doctrine of proportionality in the context of the 
judicial review of legislation is seen as an 
example of the direct reception of a Community 
law doctrines into the legal systems of the 
United Kingdom. It is an example of reception, 
because proportionality is a concept which has 
been developed in non-U.K. legal systems and, in 
some ways, runs counter to the native tradition. 
It is direct because its application in the 
national review of legislation is a specific 
requirement of Community law.
In Chapter 4 we look for evidence supporting the 
"indirect" reception of the doctrine of 
proportionality by seeing if that doctrine, as 
developed in Community law, has been applied by 
United Kingdom courts in areas of national 
administrative law outside the scope of Community 




























































































indirect reception exists, but that judicial 
hostility to the concept has thus far prevented 
the unequivocal acceptance of proportionality.
In the concluding chapter we suggest that if 
there is reception of Community law doctrines and 
general principles only in those areas of 
national law which directly relate to matters 
also covered by Community law, this will have the 
effect of creating two paradigms of law and legal 
reasoning. It is suggested that such a situation 
is an inherently unstable one, and that the 
tendency will be for political and legal pressure 
to increase to allow for the application of 
Community law concepts across the full range of 
national law, in the interests of consistency in 
the application of the law.
It is suggested that the much discussed common 
European law can only develop if Community law is 
fully received beyond the areas of its immediate 
application into areas of national law which, as 
yet, fall outside the scope of Community law. 
With the phenomenon of indirect reception there 
will be a growing together of the legal systems 
of the member states and the emergence of truly 
European Common law, under the aegis of the 














































































































































































































































































































































































THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE "EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTION"
Be you never so high yet the law is above you" I
1. A EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
A supra-national European Court was first set up 
under article 7 the 1951 Treaty of Paris which 
created the European Coal and Steel Community. 
The duty of this Court of the Coal and Steel 
Community was to ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of that Treaty the 
law was observed. To this end the Court was 
given jurisdiction to review the legality of acts 
of the High Authority, the executive of the Coal 
and Steel Community, as well as, in certain 
circumstances, the acts of enterprises engaged in 
the coal and steel industry. 2
In 1957 the European Economic Community was 
formed by the Treaty of Rome. This Treaty also 
envisaged a role for a Court to ensure that the 
law was observed by the various institutions and 
member states in applying and interpreting the
1. Lord Denning commenting on Tameside Borough Council 
v. Secretary of State for Education [1977] AC 1014




























































































Treaty.  ̂ A new Court of Justice was formed to 
replace the earlier Court of the Coal and Steel 
Community, while continuing to exercise that 
Court's jurisdiction conferred under the Treaty 
of Paris. 3 4
This notion of a special tribunal entrusted with 
the task of controlling or checking the acts of 
administrative authorities, particularly insofar 
as their decisions affect individual interests, 
derived from the notion of a complete separation 
between judicial and executive functions as 
developed in post-Revolutionary France and spread 
throughout continental Europe during the 
Napoleonic adventure. The French developed a 
system of two distinct legal orders, public or 
administrative law and private law. The law as 
regards relations between the state and the 
individual was seen to be sui generis and so 
distinct from the law governing relations between 
fellow private citizens as to require a quite 
separate hierarchy of courts - the administrative 
courts headed by the Conseil d'Etat; the
3. See article 164 of the Treaty of Rome
4. See the Annex to the Treaty of Rome Convention on 





























































































private" courts headed by the Cour de Cassation•
The European Court of Justice was set up under 
the foundation treaties of the European 
Communities to control the administrative acts of 
the new executive institutions set up under the 
treaties. The Court of Justice seems to have 
been intended to be an administrative law court 
on the model of the Conseil d'Etat with the task 
of ensuring that the institutions of the 
Community respected the Community treaties. Its 
purpose was to ensure the proper administration 
of the Community order within a legal framework. 
Reflecting on the reasons for the framers of 
Treaty of Rome providing for the existence of a 
Court of Justice, Lord Mackenzie-Stuart has 
stated: 6
"[H]aving once created an administrative 
authority with power to take 
administrative decisions affecting 
individual interests, the concept of 
such an authority not being controlled 
by an independent tribunal would be
5. See generally Brown and Garner French Administrative 
Law (1973) and Guy Braibant Le droit administratif 
francais (1984).
6. see Lord Mackenzie-Stuart The European Communities 
and the Rule of Law London 1977 at page 7. See also 
generally Lord Slynn of Hadley Introducing a European 




























































































sufficiently outrageous as to be 
positively offensive"
The setting up of a Court of Justice under the 
Treaty of Rome ensured that those bodies which 
acted under and with reference to the Treaties of 
Paris and Rome did so within a legal order. 
Acting within a legal order meant, for the Court, 
that the acts of such bodies were subject to 
judicial review and, if found wanting, were 
liable to be struck down as invalid because not 
in conformity with the Treaties.
It is interesting to note that on the French 
model of courts on which the European Court was 
originally based there is no possibility for the 
judicial review of legislation once formally 
enacted. The separation of powers as understood 
in post-revolutionary France (given the 
experience during the Ancien Regime of judicial 
review of laws by the Parlements) meant that the 
duty of judges was seen to be one of applying the 
law, rather than questioning it.  ̂7*
7. Since the adoption of the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic in 1958 there has a limited form of 
constitutional review of draft legislation, prior to its 
formal enactment, which may be carried out by the Conseil 
Constitutionnel. See Beardsley "Constitutional Review in
France (1975) Supreme Court Review 189 at 204; Davis "The 
Law/Politics Distinction, the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel, and the U.S. Supreme Court (1986) 




























































































2. TRANSFORMING THE TREATIES
In a judgement of 1986 the European Court 
asserted its jurisdiction to review the legality 
of acts of the European Parliament, 
notwithstanding the failure of the original
draftsmen explicitly to grant the Court any such 
power under the Treaties. The Court stated: 8 
"[The Community] is based on the rule of 
law, inasmuch as neither the Member 
States nor its institutions can avoid a 
review of the question whether the 
measures adopted by them are in 
conformity with the basic constitutional 
charter, the Treaty."
The history of the European Court of Justice 
shows a development of the role of the Court from 
being a purely administrative court modelled on 
the French Conseil d'Etat into a Constitutional 
court, apparently inspired by the activism of the 
American Supreme Court. 8 This development is
8. Parti Ecoloqiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament 
(C-294/83) [1986] 1339 at 1365 9
9. See Lord Mackenzie-Stuart "Problems of the European
Community - Transatlantic parallels" (1987) 36
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 183;_Temple
Lang, "European Community Constitutional Law: the
division of powers between the Community and Member 
States" (1988) 39 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 209;




























































































not one which was specifically envisaged in the 
Treaties, 10 but is the result simply of the 
Court making ever growing claims about its own 
role in promoting "an ever closer union of the 
peoples of Europe" 11 12 and ensuring that "in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty the 
law is observed".
This transformation in the Court's role has 
occurred as a result of case by case developments 
by the Court. 13 * One technique used by the Court 
in introducing innovations and fundamentally new 
principles into the text of the Treaty has been
Federalism" (1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative Law 
205
10. See Petersmann "Constitutionalism, Constitutional 
Law and European Integration" (1991) 46 Aussenwirtschaft 
247 at 256:
"The EEC Treaty was concluded as an 
international agreement among government and 
was carefully placed into the then existing 
framework of world-wide monetary and trade 
agreements, such as the IMF agreement and Gatt 
whose provisions served as a model for the 
customs union rules of the EEC.”
11. See the first preamble to the Treaty of Rome: 
"Determined to lay the foundations of an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe"
12. Article 164 of the Treaty of Rome:
"The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of this Treaty 
the law is observed."
13. For an overview of these developments see Mancini
"The Making of a Constitution for Europe" (1989) 26
Common Market Law Review 595. For suggestions for
further developments in the Court's constitutional role 
see Mischo "Un role nouveau pour la Cour de Justice ?" 




























































































to introduce the broad principle by way of obiter 
remarks in a case, but not immediately applying 
the new principle to the facts of the case before 
it. Thereafter, however, the case in which the 
principle was first enunciated, although not 
applied, is referred to as authority for the 
existence of the new principle of law. 14 The 
Court is obviously assisted in this technique by 
the fact that it is a Court of Final Instance and 
there is no appeal against its ruling and its 
general development of doctrine, even where such 
development is a result of reading provisions 
into the Treaty, 15 * rendering other provisions of
14. For an example of this technique in the development 
of the notion of the direct effect of directives compare 
Van Duyn v. Home Office (41/74) [1974] ECR 1337 to Ursula 
Becker v. Finanzamt Muenster (8/81) [1982] ECR 53. On 
the development of the claim by the European Court to 
have jurisdiction to give rulings on the meaning to be 
attributed to provisions of national law which make 
reference to Community law compare Dzodzi v. Belgian 
State (C-297/88, 197/89) [1990] ECR 3763 with Gmurzynska- 
Bscher v. Oberfinanzdirektion Koeln (C-231/89) 1990 ECR 
4003.
15. See, for example, the series of cases relating to 
the involvement of the European Parliament in the 
Community legislative and judicial processes: Maizena v. 
Commission (C-139/79) [1980] ECR 3393 on Parliament's 
right to intervene in cases before the Court; Parliament 
v. Council (Transport Policy) (C-13/83) [1985] ECR 3333 
on Parliament's locus standi to raise actions under
article 175; Les Verts, v. European Parliament (C-294/83) 
[1986] ECR 1339 on the possibility of the Court reviewing 
the legality of Parliament's acts under article 173, 
confirmed in Council v. Parliament (Budget) (C-34/86) 
[1986] 3 CMLR 94; Parliament v. Commission (Chernobyl) 
(C-70/88) [1990] ECR 2041 on Parliament's competence to





























































































the Treaty otiose and ineffective 16 or, indeed, 
contradicting the plain wording of the Treaty. 17
The Treaty does not, in terms, apply directly or 
generally to private citizens in their relations 
to Member States. The Treaty does allow any 
natural or legal person to institute proceedings 
against executive decisions of the Council and 
Commission either directly addressed to that 
person or of direct and individual concern to 
them. 18 However, failure by a Member State 
properly to fulfil an obligation laid on it by
16. See Commission v. Council (Titanium Dioxide) (C-
300/89) [1991] ECR 2867 which effectively renders
ineffective article 130S procedure on the adoption of 
environmental protection measures by subordinating it to 
article 100A on the completion of the internal market. 
The rationale for this decision appears to be that the 
latter procedure allows for greater participation by the 
European Parliament in the legislative process and 
permits measures to be passed by way of majority voting 
rather than by unanimity in the Council of Ministers. 
For commentary on this judgment see Crosby "The Single 
Market and the Rule of Law" 1991 European Law Review 451; 
Barnard "Where politicians fear to tread ?" [1992]
European Law Review 127; Somsen (1992) 29 Common Market
Law Review 140
17. See Firma Foto-Frost (C-314/85) ECR [1987], [1988]
CMLR 57 and Zuckerfabrik v. Suederithmarschen AG v. 
Hauptzollamt Itzehoe (C-143/88; C-92/89) [1991] ECR 415
restricting the competence of national courts to declare 
a Community provision invalid, contrary to the plain 
wording of article 177 which clearly envisages national 
courts acting in this area. For an analysis of the 
latter case see Schermers (1992) 29 Common Market Law
Review 133.
18. See article 173 of the Treaty of Rome. Article 
175 of that Treaty also allows any natural or legal 
person to complain to the Court of Justice that a 
Community institution has failed to address to that 




























































































the Treaty laid that State open to legal action 
brought only by the Commission or by another 
member state before the Court of Justice. 19
There was and is no provision for private parties 
to challenge Member State's actions in relation 
to their (non-) conformity with the Treaty or to 
pray in aid, before their national courts, 
provisions of the Treaty against national laws. 
Further, there was and is no provision in the 
Treaty to the effect that Community law would 
prevail over national laws in the courts of 
Member States. The Treaty specifies only that 
Community regulations should be binding in their 
entirety and directly applicable in Member States 
while Community directives should be binding as 
to the results to be achieved, but should leave 
to national authorities the choice of forms and 
methods to that result. 20 Finally there was 
and is no provision allowing the Court of Justice 
to rule on the compatibility of Member States1 
legislation with Community law.
19.
20.
See articles 169 and 170 of the Treaty of Rome 




























































































All of these supposed "shortcomings" in the 
Treaty have since been remedied by the activism 
of the judges of the European Court. 2*
(i) Direct Effect of Treaty Articles
The first of these matters was addressed in a 
judgment of 5 February 1963, some five years 
after the setting up of the Court of Justice. 
In Van Gend en Loos 22 the Court proclaimed that 
the spirit of the Treaty of Rome which referred 
in its preamble to a union of peoples and not 
simply of governments, together with the fact 
that the peoples of Europe were involved in the 
functioning of the Community through the European 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Committee 
showed that the Treaty was more than an agreement 
creating mutual obligations between the 
contracting states, but was a new legal order of 
international law which imposed obligation and 
conferred rights on individuals independently of
21. For a useful summary of the development of the 
European Court's case law in this area see Deirdre Curtin 
"The decentralised enforcement of Community Law Rights: 
judicial snakes and ladders" in Curtin and O'Keefe (eds) 
Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and 
National Law, 1992.
22. Van Gend en Loos v. Neederlandse Tarief Commissie 
[1963] ECR 1. For an extended analysis of the competing 
arguments for and against the direct effectiveness of the 
Treaty provisions see Stein ""Lawyers, Judges and the 
making of a Transnational Constitution" (1981) 75 




























































































national legislation. These rights of
individuals could be created expressly in the 
Treaty or could follow as a direct corollaries 
from the fact that Member States have particular 
obligations under the Treaty, such as the 
obligation in the instant case not to introduce 
new customs duties or to increase existing ones. 
By this decision the European Court established 
that the Treaty could be "directly effective" in 
the sense that it was capable of creating for 
individuals rights enforceable before their 
national courts, independently of national 
legislatures.
(ii) Supremacy
The precise relationship between national law and
the law of the Community was not spelled out in
the provisions of the Treaty. This matter was
addressed in a case decided one year after Van
Gend en Loos. In Costa v. ENEL, ^3 the
European Court held that obligations undertaken
by Member States under the Treaty of Rome could
not be called into question by subsequent
legislative acts of those Member States. If this
were the case Community obligations would be
contingent, rather than unconditional; the law
23. Costa V. ENEL (6/64) [1964] ECR 585.




























































































stemming from the Treaty would accordingly be 
deprived of its character as Community law; and 
the legal basis of the Community would therefore 
be called into question. The Court stated that 
in entering the Community, Member States had 
permanently limited their sovereignty to extent 
that their subsequent unilateral legislative acts 
could not prevail against Community obligations. 
Community law is to be regarded as supreme over 
national law.
(iii) Directives and direct effect
The Court has built upon these principles of 
direct effect and supremacy. It has extended the 
notion of direct effect as applying not only to 
Treaty provision, but at least, as against the 
State and its institutions, 24 to directives 
which have not been timeously implemented by 
Member States. 2^
Marshall would appear to be authority for the 
proposition that private parties, as opposed to 
"emanations of the State" will not be found to 
have acted contrary to law if they failed to
24. See Marshall v. Southampton and S.W. Hampshire Area 
Health Authority (C-152/84) [1986] ECR 723 25
25. See Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein [1970 ECR 




























































































respect the provisions of a directive which had 
not (properly) been implemented. This is the 
distinction between vertical and horizontal 
direct effect. However, with the drive toward 
the implementation of the Single European Market, 
there has been a clear shift in the approach 
taken in the way in which directives are being 
used, and consequently drafted, by the 
Commission. While the earlier directives were 
addressed unequivocally to the Member States and 
set out duties which were incumbent upon those 
States, some of the "post single market" 
generation of directives set out duties which are 
said to be incumbent directly upon private 
parties. A clear example of this new generation 
of directives is the 1989 second framework 
directive on Health and Safety 26 which is 
concerned with the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health 
of workers at work and which lists duties 
incumbent upon employers and employees.
In the light of the changing uses to which 
directives are put, it is interesting to note the 
approach of Advocate General Van Gerven in 
Marshall II, 27 the second Article 177 reference
26. Council Directive 89/391/EEC (12 June 1989)
27. Marshall v. Southampton and S.W, Hampshire Area 




























































































in this case where he suggests that the 
distinction between the horizontal and vertical 
direct effect of directives which was affirmed in 
Marshall I be now abandoned by the European Court 
of Justice on the grounds that such a distinction 
militates against the coherence and uniformity in 
application of Community law.
In any event in the absence of vertical direct 
effect, the Court of Justice has held that, even 
in cases involving only private parties, national 
courts have an obligation to interpret national 
law in the light and purpose of any relevant 
directives, 28 29 whether or not the national law 
originated before or after adoption of the 
directive. 28
(iv) The Principle of Effectiveness
The obligation on Member States and their courts
under Article 5 of the Treaty to facilitate the
achievement of the Community's tasks, to ensure
fulfilment of the obligations arising from the
Treaty or resulting from action by Community
the text of the Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven 
delivered on 26 January 1993 at para 12.
28. Von Colson v. Land Nordhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 
1891
29. Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de
Alimentacion SA (C-106/89) [1990] ECR 4153 also reported




























































































institutions and to abstain from any measures 
which might jeopardize the attainment of the 
Treaty's objectives has also become a fruitful 
source for the Court to construct specific legal 
duties. 3® From this article the Court has 
deduced the principle that a Member State is 
liable to individuals for damages resulting from 
that State's failure to implement Community 
provisions which provide for individual rights 
within its national territory. 31
(v) The judicial review of Member States' 
legislation
Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome allows the 
Court of Justice only to give preliminary rulings 
concerning the interpretation of the Treaty, the 
interpretation of statutes founding Community 
bodies and the validity and interpretation of 
acts of the institutions of the Community.
30. See Temple Lang, "Community Constitutional Law: 
Article 5 EEC Treaty" (1990) 27 Common Market Law Review 
645 for a survey of European Court jurisprudence in this 
area.
31. See Francovich and Boniface v. Italian State, (C- 
6,9/90) EC J .19 November 1991, not yet reported at para
36. For an analysis of this case see Duffy, "Damages 
against the State: a new remedy for failure to implement 
Community obligations" 1992 European Law Review 133. 
The possibility of Francovich damages being claimable not 
simply for non-implementation of a directive but for all 
and every Member State breach of Community law which 
resulted in damage to an individual was canvassed by Lord 
Goff of Chievely in Kirklees Borough Council v. Wickes 




























































































However the Court of Justice has, over the years, 
used Article 177 as if it permitted it to give 
rulings directly on the validity of national law. 
32 The current Italian appointee to the European 
Court has stated: 33
"[T]he Court does not confine itself to 
interpreting the Community rule; instead 
it enters into the heart of the conflict 
submitted to its attention, but it takes 
the precaution of rendering it abstract, 
that is to say that it presents it as a 
conflict between Community law and a 
hypothetical national provision having 
the nature of the provision in issue 
before the national court. The 
technique just described . . . results in 
the Court of Justice acquiring a power 
of review which is analogous to - though 
of course narrower than - that routinely 
exercised by the Supreme Court of the 
United States and the constitutional 
courts of some Member States."
32. See Chapter 2, infra, for an history of this 
development.
33. See Federico Mancini and David Keeling "From CILFIT 
to ERT: the Constitutional Challenge facing the European 



























































































As one commentator has stated: 34
"[T]he European Community has already 
acquired many of the features one would 
expect to find in a federation. This 
is largely due to the efforts of the 
European Court, which has not hesitated 
to remodel the law even when this has 
entailed adopting a solution different 
from that envisaged in the Treaties."
3. THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER AS A TRANSNATIONAL 
CONSTITUTION
The original formulation of the status of 
European Community law by the European Court was 
that the Treaty of Rome was "more than an 
agreement which merely created mutual obligations 
between the contracting states" but instead 
constituted "a new legal order of international 
law" 35. The Court soon altered this
formulation to emphasise that Community law was 
sui generis and should not be seen as simply 
another part of general international law. As 
the Court stated in Costa v. ENEL: 36
34. See Hartley "Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems: 
the Emerging Constitution of the European Community" 
(1986) 34 American Journal of Comparative Law 229 at 247
35. See Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 at 12




























































































"By contrast with ordinary international 
treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its 
own legal system which, on the entry 
into force of the Treaty, became an 
integral part of the legal systems of 
the Member States and which their courts 
are bound to apply."
(i) Obligations assumed under International
Treaties
It is not only in its direct effectiveness within 
Member States that Community law is to be 
distinguished from general international law. 
The European Court has not been slow to emphasize 
the distinctiveness of the Community legal order 
from general law of international treaties. 
Treaty obligations assumed under classic (post- 
Westphalian) public international law might be 
seen as analogous to contract law in depending 
for their existence on the brute fact of 
continuing agreement of the parties involved. 
Both contract and international law involve the 
creation of mutual obligations by the agreement 
of two or more sovereign individuals. The 
mutuality principle whereby the default of one 
party in carrying out his obligations might have 




























































































obligations of the other party would appear to 
apply both to contract and public international 
law. 37 Obligations under a contract are assumed 
by the free act of the parties and the parties 
retain the radical capacity to repudiate the 
obligations assumed under the contract, although 
repudiation of these obligations may give rise to 
certain consequences under the general legal 
order under which the contract is created, for 
example damages for breach of contract. 3®
In comparison to the obligations of citizens 
under municipal law systems, public international 
law may also be described as relatively 
normatively weak. Not only are the 
international norms subject to variation by 
mutual agreement of the parties and new norms may 
be created by simple customary practice, but 
states can choose to refuse to submit to or to 
renounce the jurisdiction of international 
courts. It might be said, somewhat cynically, 
that the normative strength of international law 
appears to be in inverse proportion to the
37. See Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties for the conditions of applicability of this 
principle in public international law 38
38. For a general account of the Law of Treaties see 





























































































political strength of the sovereign states in 
question.
(ii) Community membership analogous to
citizenship ?
The Community legal order, at least according to 
the European Court's aspirations, is entirely 
different from classic public international law 
in these aspects of the role of continuing 
consensus, the possibility of contrary customary 
practice overriding formal written norms, and 
even in the permissibility of the variation of 
obligations by explicit agreement of the 
contracting parties. It is, or should be 
regarded as, normatively strong.
For the European Court, Community law constitutes 
an overarching legal order which is greater than 
the continuing consensus which originally created 
it. For a state to become part of the European 
Community is, in the eyes of the European Court, 
more akin to an individual taking on the 
citizenship of a country, rather than one 
individual making a contract with another. Once 
citizenship has been taken up, the citizen cannot 
pick and choose among the obligations which apply 
to her. Citizenship involves a package of



























































































fellow citizens and as regards the central 
authority. Further, like citizenship, in the 
view of the European Court membership of the 
Community cannot be renounced unilaterally by one 
member state. The Treaty of Rome was created 
for "an unlimited period" 39 and contains no 
provisions for the secession of states from the 
Community. It would appear to be from these 
facts that the Court felt able to make the 
following claim: 41
"The transfer by the State from their 
domestic legal system to the Community 
legal system of the rights and 
obligations arising under the Treaty 
carries with it a permanent limitation 
of their sovereign rights against which 
a subsequent unilateral act incompatible 
with the concept of the Community cannot 
prevail."
39. See article 240 of the Treaty of Rome
40. Although secession from the Community was effected 
by Greenland by formal amendment of the Treaty in 1985 in 
accord with the provisions of article 236




























































































(iv) Community law as a supra-national legal
system
Community law is seen by the European court to be 
a new supra-national legal hierarchy, superior to 
the legal orders of individual Member States. 
This new legal order draws its legitimacy from a 
particular political vision of a what constitutes 
"an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe". 
Member States are regarded not as having 
delegated power to the Community but actually to 
have transferred their sovereignty thereto, at 
least in certain areas. Thus in Van Gend en 
Loos the European Court spoke of the institutions 
of the Community as being "endowed with sovereign 
rights" and that the Member States "had limited 
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited 
fields" 42 The European Court's model appear to 
be one in which Community law is seen as 
constituting a new sovereign order of law, which 
although initially brought into being by the 
consensus of the governments of Member States, 
does not depend on but transcends any such 
consensus for its continued existence and binding 
force on both the Member States and their 
citizens.




























































































The ideal appears to something almost Hobbesian: 
namely the creation of a new (pooled) sovereign 
power to which individual national member state 
governments have irrevocably subordinated 
themselves. Developments in Community law are 
justified insofar as they make for the fuller 
realization of this vision. This vision
obviously has profound implications for questions 
such as the possibility of national derogations 
from the requirements of Community law, the idea 
of continuing national sovereignty and the 
possibility of (unilateral) secession from the 
European Union. As one commentator has put it: 
"The Member States, although originally 
the creators of the Communities, are no 
longer the independent masters of the 
Treaties but are bound by them."
This high vision of Community law becomes clear 
when the question as to whether or not there can 
be said to be limits on the powers of the Member 
States acting with the Community institutions to 
make substantive amendments to the foundation 
Treaty of the European Community is addressed. 43*
43. See Schwarze The role of the European Court of
Justice in the Interpretation of Uniform Law among the




























































































4. ARE THERE LIMITS ON THE POWER OF MEMBER 
STATES TO AMEND THE TREATIES ?
One of the characteristics of written 
constitutions is that they are regarded as in 
some sense a higher law, existing on a different 
order to the general run of legislation. One 
common feature of this difference is that special 
procedures are required to be followed before a 
constitution can be amended. Thus, in the
United States, constitutional amendment normally 
requires the votes of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, together with 
ratification by at least three quarters of the 
states of the Union. 44 Certain constitutions 
even provide that some features of the
constitution cannot be altered. Thus the French 
and Italian Constitutions both hold a republican 
form of government to be unchangeable 4®, while 
the German Grundgesetz provides that its 
provisions relating to fundamental rights
protection, a democratic form of government and 
the division of the country into Laender cannot 
be amended. 4®
44. Article 5 of the United States Constitution. See 
Gunther Constitutional Law (12th edn.) 1991 at 201
45. See article 139 of the Italian Constitution, and 
article 89 of the French Constitution 46
46. See Doehring "The Limits of Constitutional Law" in 



























































































The Treaty of Rome provides a procedure under 
article 236 for its amendment whereby the 
Government of any Member State or the Commission 
may submit proposals to the Council for 
amendments of the Treaty. The Council, after 
consultation with the Parliament and, where 
appropriate, the Commission, may then deliver an 
opinion in favour of calling a conference of the 
representatives of the Member States Governments. 
The President of the Council shall then convene 
such an Inter-Governmental Conference so that the 
amendments to be made to the Treaty should be 
determined by common accord. Once such accord 
has been reached, the amendments shall enter into 
force only if and when they are ratified by all 
of the Member States in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements. It 
should be noted that there is nothing in the 
wording of the Treaty of Rome to indicate that 
any provisions of the Treaty might be entrenched 
against this procedure of amendment. *
and Public International Law, 1986. Article 79(3) of 
the Grundqesetz provides that :
"Amendments of this Basic Law affecting the 
division of the Federation into Laender, the 
participation on principle of the Laender in
legislation, or the basic principles laid down 




























































































(i) ECJ v. EEA 47
The question of the non-alterability of certain 
provisions or aspects of the Treaty has, however, 
recently arisen. In August 1991 the European 
Court was requested by the Commission to give its 
Opinion 48 on the legality of a draft Treaty 
concluded between the European Community and the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 48 The 
Court delivered its Opinion on 14 December 1991. 
50 The view of the Court was that the tenor of 
the agreement reached with EFTA was incompatible 
with the Treaty of Rome.
The grounds on which the Court found the EFTA 
agreement to be incompatible with the EC Treaty 
indicate unequivocally how far the European Court 
considers the European Community system to 
constitute an entirely new legal order, distinct 
from both municipal law and the general order of 
international law. The Opinion also shows the
47. See generally Barbara Brandtner "The 'Drama' of the 
EEA: comments on Opinions 1/91 and 1/92" (1992) 3 
European Journal of International Law 300.
48. Under article 228(1) of the Treaty of Rome.
49. For an account of the negotiations leading to this 
first draft Treaty see Jacot-Guillarmond "Droit 
international et droit communautaire dans le futur Traite 
institutant 1'EEE" (19910 46 Aussenwirtschaft 317. 50
50. See Re the Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area 
(Opinion 1/91) European Court of Justice 14 December 1991 



























































































extent to which the Court sees that it is its 
duty is to protect the Community legal order in 
all its distinctiveness.
39
The EFTA agreement was seen by the Court to be 
simply an agreement under general public 
international law, involving no transfer of 
legislative sovereignty by the parties to it. 51 
The Court looked at the details of the EFTA 
agreement critically, with a view to determining 
whether or not conclusion of this agreement by 
the Community might in any way compromise the 
characteristics of the Community legal order as 
this has been developed in the jurisprudence of 
the Court since the Court was first set up in 
1957 .
This agreement was intended to create a European 
Economic Area (EEA) between the Community and 
EFTA in which rules on free trade and competition 
identical to those existing within the Community 
were to be applied. As part of the procedures 
to ensure that the same rules were applied within
51. Protocol 35 of the EEA Agreement, contained the 
following preamble:
"Whereas the Agreement aims at achieving a 
homogeneous European Economic Area, based on 
common rules, without requiring any Contracting 
Party to transfer legislative powers to any 
institution of the European Economic Area; and 
whereas this consequently will have to be 




























































































the Community and in the new European Economic 
Area, the draft Treaty provided for the 
establishment of an EEA court hierarchy to 
provide a system of judicial supervision within 
the European Economic Area. The proposed new 
hierarchy consisted of an independent EEA Court, 
functionally integrated with the European Court 
of Justice, and an EEA Court of First Instance. 
The new courts were to consist of a number of 
judges from the European Court of Justice and the 
Court of First Instance sitting together with 
judges appointed from the various EFTA Member 
States.
The European Court found that the system of 
judicial supervision proposed under the EEA 
Treaty was incompatible with the EEC Treaty on a 
number of grounds. In particular the Court 
asserted that the European Community differed in 
its essentials from the proposed European 
Economic Area. The latter was no more than a 
free trade area with a common competition policy 
while the objective of European Community 
Treaties was "to contribute together to making 
concrete progress towards European unity." 52 and 
its free trade rules and competition policy were 
simply means to achieving that objective rather




























































































than final ends in themselves. 53 54 Further, the 
Court asserted that the EEA was established on 
the basis of an international Treaty, creating 
rights and obligations among the contracting 
parties but providing for no transfer of
sovereignty to the inter-governmental
institutions which the Treaty sets up. By
contrast, the Court stated that the European 
Community Treaty was the constitutional charter 
of a Community based on the rule of law, which 
law was supreme over the law of Member States and 
directly applicable to the nationals of the 
Member States.
(ii) Same words, different meanings.
The "essential differences" perceived by the 
European Court between the European Community and 
the proposed European Economic Area rest simply 
on repeated judicial assertions rather than from 
any particular differences in the wording of the 
two treaties. As we have seen, the doctrines of 
Community law's supremacy and direct 
applicability together with the claim that entry 
into the Community involves (an irreversible ?) 
transfer of sovereignty result from the case law
53. See para 18 of the Court's Opinion




























































































of the Court of Justice and are not to be found 
in any provision of the Treaty of Rome. 
Notwithstanding that the provisions of the EEA 
and the Treaty of Rome on free movement and 
competition are identically worded, the Court 
appears to consider them essentially different. 
The Court stated: 55
"[H]omogeneity of rules of law 
throughout the European Economic Area is 
not secured by the fact the provisions 
of Community law and those of the 
corresponding provisions of the 
agreement are identical in their content 
or wording."
The Court once again emphasises the idea that the 
actual wording of a provision is not its 
paramount interest; rather, what it considers of 
primary importance is divining the spirit and 
then reflecting on the general scheme of the 
Treaty in which the provision is found. In this 
way the same words can be made to mean different 
things. As has been observed: 56
"[F]or the European Court, the 
teleological method frequently precedes
55. Ibid. para. 22
56. Slynn, "The Court of Justice of the European 
Communities" (1984)33 International and Comparative Law 




























































































and conditions the textual method of 
interpretation."
In its Opinion, the European Court went on to 
note that the proposed EEA court would be called 
upon to decide on the interpretation of rules 
which will have been adopted wholesale from 
Community law and which go to the fundamentals of 
the Community legal order. It would seem that 
identity of wording is of some relevance there. 
Further, in determining the locus standi of the 
parties appearing before it, the EEA court might 
require to come to a decision as to the 
respective competences of the Commission and the 
Member States of the Community.
In addition, the draft Treaty provided that the 
European Court of Justice was to be required to 
pay due account to the decisions of the EEA court 
and the national courts of the EFTA states when 
applying and interpreting the EEA agreement or 
provisions of the EC Treaties which were 
identical in substance to the EEA provisions.
All of these matters, in the Opinion of the 
Court, represented an encroachment on the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
under the Treaty of Rome and undermined the 




























































































its own particular objectives. Consequently the 
proposed system of judicial supervision in the 
EEA was found to be contrary to article 164 of 
the Treaty of Rome. ^7
(iii) Are there entrenched provisions in the 
Treaty of Rome ?
The Court concluded its first opinion on the 
Treaty with the question posed by the Commission 
as to whether or not Article 238 of the Treaty of 
Rome dealing with conclusion of association 
agreements between the Community and certain 
third parties permitted the establishment of the 
system of courts provided for in the agreement. 
In the event of the incompatibility of article 
238 with such a system the Commission proposed 
that that article might be suitably amended so as 
to allow for a system of courts functionally 
integrated with the Court of Justice and 
guaranteeing the specific nature and integrity of 
Community law. However the Court stated: 5®
57. In response to the judicial objections to the first 
draft EEA Treaty, the Treaty was revised and a reference 
was made to the European Court for a further Opinion in 
February 1992. The Court delivered its Opinion in 
favour of the revised Treaty, which no longer sought to 






























































































"Article 238 of the EEC Treaty does not 
provide any basis for setting up a 
system of courts which conflicts with 
Article 164 of the EEC Treaty and, more 
generally, with the very foundations of 
Community law.
For the same reasons, an amendment of 
Article 238 in the way indicated by the 
Commission could not cure the 
incompatibility with Community law of 
the system of courts to be set up by the 
agreement."
This is a statement of extraordinary 
implications. The Court appears to be 
suggesting that the Member States of the 
Community, even when acting collectively in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in the 
Treaty, cannot amend the Treaty in any way which 
compromises the provision that "the Court of 
Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation 
of this Treaty the law is observed" or, indeed, 
any other provision which might be regarded by 
the Court as constituting part of the "very 
foundations of Community law". Such a purported 
amendment would appear to be, in some sense, 
"illegal". But what does this mean ? The 




























































































contains certain entrenched provisions which are 
unalterable.
5. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE TREATIES
The outcome of the European Court's creative
interpretation of the Treaties has been the
creation within the territory of the Communities
of a federal legal system, in the sense that
Community law constitutes a separate legal
system, distinct from the municipal legal orders
of the Member States (Community law cannot, for
instance, be amended by the legislatures of the
Member States) but differing from classic
international law in that it falls to be applied
by the courts of the Member States to any cases
brought before them, when the European Court has
declared a particular provision of Community law
to be directly effective or applicable. 59 This
federal development in the law has not, however,
been matched by any clear political development
of a federal nature. Even after the conclusion
(but not yet the ratification) of the Maastricht
Treaty on European Political Union, there remains
59. On the characteristics of a federal legal system 
see Lenaerts "Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of 





























































































a clear disjunction between the legal and 
political regimes which apply within the 
Communities. 60 This disjunction has come about 
as a result of judicial activism
The Treaty of Rome did not convert itself into a 
federal constitutional document, it was and is 
consciously and consistently re-interpreted and 
re-written by the European Court so as to take on 
federal constitutional characteristics. As one 
author has stated, by way of apologia for the 
Court's approach:
"If you do not admit that you are 
writing a constitution, you fail to say 
certain things which you would otherwise 
certainly include. This means that the 
courts have to decide whether the things 
you have omitted are there or not."
Once the assumption is made that the Treaties 
were always intended to be a constitution, and 
that the Court is therefore simply fulfilling its 
role in drawing out the implications of that 
unfinished Treaty, the approach of the Court
60. On this disjunction see Weiler "The Community
System: the dual character of supranationalism" 1981 1
Yearbook of European Law 267 61
61. Temple Lang "The Development of European Community





























































































becomes clear. The European Court appears to 
see itself as sole guarding of the vision of the 
original framers of the Treaty and imposes that 
view over even the views of all the Member States 
Governments. The Court appears to regard itself 
the proper guardian of the values of the (yet to 
be fully realized) European polity.
The legal key to the Court's approach appears to 
be article 164. In the face of silence in the 
Treaty regarding "constitutional foundations" the 
Court has had recourse to article 164 which 
enjoins it to ensure that the law is observed in 
the interpretation and application of the Treaty. 
The Court uses this provision in a substantive 
way and not simply as a formal injunction 
relating to the need to apply general procedural 
norms of consistency and universality in the 
reaching of decisions. Rather, the provision is 
seen as allowing the court to refer to some 
higher, unwritten natural law. The European 
Court uses article 164 as a carte blanche for it 
to assume new grounds of jurisdiction, to 62
62. See the Opinion of the then Advocate-General Mancini 
in Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339 at 1350:
"[T]he obligation to observe the law takes 
precedence over the strict terms of the written 
law. Whenever required in the interests of
judicial protection, the Court is prepared to 
correct or complete rules which limit its 




























































































incorporate into Community law references to 
fundamental rights 63 or to more general 
principles of law, 64 65 and it would appear from 
the first EEA opinion, to declare the 
fundamentals of the Treaty to be unalterable. 
Article 164 places an absolute duty on the Court 
to ensure that the law is observed and contains 
no reference to any limits on the power or 
jurisdiction of the European Court. Thus, every 
innovation is justifiable by reference to article 
164.
In the case law of the European Court there 
appears to be little discussion of these 
problems. As one former President of the Court 
has stated:
For a general discussion of the court's case law in this 
area see Armili, "Does the Court of Justice have inherent 
jurisdiction ?" (1990) 27 Common Market Law Review 683.
63. For a recent example of this see Elleniki 
Radiophonia Tileorasi v. Dimotiki Etairia Plirofoissis 
(260/89) [1991] ECR 2925. See Coppel and O'Neill "The 
European Court of Justice: taking rights seriously?" 
(1992) Common Market Law Review for a critical survey of 
the Court's case law on the matter of human rights 
protection
64. See for example Internationale Handelsqesellschaft 
(11/70) [1970] ECR 1125 applying the principle of 
proportionality. Generally see Akehurst "The 
Application of General Principles of Law by the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities" [1981] British 
Yearbook of International Law 29 and Michele Vacca: 
"L'integrazione dell'ordinamento communitario col diritto 
degli stati membri e con i principi generali di diritto" 
Rivista di Diritto Europeo 1991, 339
65. Robert Lecourt in Le juqe devant le Marche Commun 




























































































"Once the idea of a court of arbitration 
was abandoned and a judge was charged 
with ensuring the respect for the law 
which the Treaties were instituting, 
that judge could not ignore the very 
aims of that law. ... Thus, within the 
Community, the judge is the repository 
of the will of the Treaties' authors who 
disappeared on the day the Treaties were 
signed, only reappearing on the rare 
occasions when new agreements are 
concluded. They have made the judge
the guardian of their joint work, which 
is to say of its objectives, its 
institutions and of its law."
The Court concentrates on realizing the preambles 
of the Treaties. The Court assumes that the 
preambles embody the real hidden spirit of the 
Treaty. They further assume that it is their 
duty to uncover the true nature of the Treaty, 
particularly in the face of a lack of political 
will in the Member States. Accordingly the
Court feels itself justified in departing, 
wherever necessary to achieve the objectives of 
the Community, from any strict or literal reading 
of the provisions of the Treaty. 66 Collins puts 
it thus: 67




























































































”[T]he outstanding characteristic of the 
Court's method of interpretation is that 
it has regard to the principles and 
objectives of the Treaties, even when no 
ambiguity is involved. The Court sees 
its role as essentially a dynamic one, 
to contribute to the development of the 
Communities." 88
The intention of the Treaty as gleaned from its 
formal preamble is given a normative status 
higher than the text of the operative provisions 
of the Treaty itself. Indeed, as part of the 
process of carrying out of a dynamic role, it 
would appear that the Court is committed to 
promoting the intention (of the promoters) of the 
Treaty over and against the understanding or 
intention of those who actually ratified or 
acceded to the Treaty, namely the Member States.
"He [the judge] can add nothing to the
Treaties, but he must give them their full
meaning and interpret their provisions so as to 
completely realize the consequences, implicit 
or explicit, required by the letter and the 
spirit of the Treaties."
[Author’s translation]
67. Collins European Community Law in the United 
Kingdom, 4th edn. 1990 at 238
68. For a brief survey of the European Court's role in
promoting integration see Koopmans "The Role of Law in 
the next stage of European Integration" (1986) 35





























































































6. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
TREATIES
The assertion is often made that the Treaty of 
Rome was really a Constitution for a European 
Federation, which political expediency required 
to be left inchoate. The assumption is made 
that it is entirely legitimate, and may indeed be 
required of those applying and interpreting the 
"intensely political text" 70 of the Treaty to 
complete the Treaty and to realize the vision of 
the civil servants and politicians (elevated to 
the status of "Founding Fathers) who were 
responsible for conceiving of the Treaty. 71 
This approach raises a number of issues, neatly 
summarised by Weiler: 72
69. See Temple Lang "The Development of European 
Community Constitutional Law" (1991) 25 The International 
Lawyer 455 at 456:
"The European Founding Fathers knew that what 
they wanted had to be done gradually. Jean 
Monnet wrote that economic integration and 
setting up a Community institution with binding 
legal powers over States would be "the first 
practical foundations of a European federation 
indispensable for the preservation of peace.'"
70. As described by Lord Mackenzie-Stuart in The 
European Communities and the Rule of Law 1977 at 79
71. For an brief account of the differing visions of
Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer and Alberto Spinelli see 
Peter Sutherland "Joining the Threads: the influences
creating a European Union" in Curtin and O ’Keefe (eds) 
Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and 
National Law, 1992.
72. Weiler "The Court of Justice on Trial" (1987) 24




























































































"Who are the elusive "Founders" ? Are
they Jean Monnet and the others, or are
they the Member State negotiators
How do we, and how should the Court,
elucidate their intentions in the
absence of a legislative history of the 
negotiations of the Treaties ? How do 
we determine their intention in relation 
to issues which they did not 
contemplate, or which they deliberately 
left vague or over which they
compromised or disagreed ? What do we 
do in the case of conflict between text 
and intention? Should we interpret the 
text with the purpose of elucidating the 
intention, or should we seek the 
intention in order to elucidate the text 
? ... [ I ] s it so clear in legal theory 
that the intention of the Founders 
should continue to govern years and 
generations after their demise ?"
The political implications of the Court's
activism are rarely addressed. 73 The Court
of the role of the American Supreme Court in relation to 
the American Constitution see Freeman "Original Meaning, 
Democratic Interpretation and the Constitution" (1992) 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 3
73. See however Rasmussen On Law on Policy in the
European Court of Justice, 1986 for a sustained attack on 




























































































relies on an unwritten law to find provisions of 
the fundamentals of the Community to be 
unalterable even by formal Treaty amendment. 
The Court limits the powers of the Member States 
and the central Community institutions, but 
leaves itself unlimited and unlimitable. The 
Court is unlimited because only it would appear 
to have access to the higher law which allows it 
to expand and alter express Treaty provisions. 
It can therefore read anything it deems fitting 
or appropriate into the Treaty, but never is 
there any explicit indication as to the criteria 
which guide the Court in completing the inchoate 
Treaty.
In asserting that certain unspecified 
foundational provisions of Community law are 
entrenched, the Court is maintaining that the 
sovereignty of the Member States of the Community 
has not simply been pooled when entering the 
Community, but has been lost. The supra­
national body which the Member States constitute 
together appears to be fundamentally limited, in 
a way in which most of the individual States were 
not limited prior to entering the Community. 
The whole is less than the sum of its parts. 
The Court does not appear to consider whether or
which stands as an almost lone exception to the body of 



























































































not such a result was ever agreed to intended or 
understood by the Member States when they created 
and/or acceded to the Communities.
55
Further, on the basis of this doctrine developed 
by the Court, the Court is unlimitable because 
any attempt by the Member States even acting 
together with the Community institutions to limit 
the Court may be claimed by the Court to be void 
as contrary to article 164. 74 The reliance by 
the Court on article 164 and natural law stands 
without justification or challenge. The Court's 
case law, culminating in the first EEA opinion 
shows a tendency toward creeping infallibility. 
We might be said to be witnessing the development 
of "judicial papalism".
This argument rests on the assumption that 
judicial law making by the European Court is to 
be regarded as objectionable because it is law 
making without any direct democratic mandate. 
One commentator, sympathetic to the Court's 
expansionist policies, has gone as far as
74. For an attempt by the Member States to involve 
themselves in specific court judgments, see the protocol 
to the Maastricht Treaty relating to the retrospective 
effect of the Court's judgment in Barber v. Guardian 
Royal Exchange Group [1990] ECR 1889. For the possible 
implications of this protocol see Coppel "The 
Retrospective Effect of Barber and the Maastricht Treaty" 
1992 Benefits and Compensation International 26; Hudson 
"Some reflections on the implications of the Barber 




























































































suggesting that such lack of democratic 
legitimacy need be of no concern to the Court of 
Justice. On this vision the judges of the Court 
of Justice appear to have been elevated to the 
status of Platonic guardians or philosopher kings 
- paternalistic, wise, independent, far-sighted, 
and always benevolent 75 However the judges of 
the Court are neither politically nor legally 
accountable for their decisions. It is the 
extensive law-making by judicial activism in the 
European Court of Justice which is the very 
source of the oft-lamented democracy deficit 
within the Community.
Further, the suggestion by the Court of the 
existence of entrenched provisions in Community 
law which cannot be altered even by Treaty 
amendment places the Court above the Treaties and
75. Deirdre Curtin "The constitutional structure of the 
Union: a Europe of bits and pieces" (1993) Common Market 
Law Review 17 at 65-66:
"[T]he guarantee of judicial control by a Court 
concerned to protect the rights of individuals 
and their fundamental freedoms may be essential 
to fulfil the characteristics of the EC treaty 
as a "constitutional charter based on the rule 
of law". It is also much too simplistic to 
believe that the only valid form of legitimacy 
in the context of the Community is that of the 
democratic system. The rule of law and the 
protection of individual rights, which 
constitute fundamental elements of any 
political legitimacy do not emanate from 
democracy as such, but from the independence of 
the judiciary. It is precisely the function 
of an independent judiciary to guard the unique 




























































































Thethus, it might be said, above the law. 
insinuation of a category of entrenched 
provisions into the corpus of Community law 
fundamentally alters the institutional balance 
within the Community - as envisaged by the 
Founding Fathers ? - in that the Court holds
itself to stand supreme even against the 
collective action of the Member States together 
with the other central institutions of the 
Community in seeking to amend the Treaty.
7. ARE NATIONAL COURTS BOUND BY THE EUROPEAN 
COURT'S VISION FOR EUROPE ?
Much has been made, by commentators sympathetic 
to the project of the Court of Justice, of the 
fact that the European Court has no sanctions 
open to it to compel the national courts of 
Member States to apply Community law as developed 
by the European Court. 76 It is possible for 
national courts to refuse to refer a matter to 
the European Court 77 and to refuse to apply a
76. See Federico Mancini and David Keeling "From CILFIT 
to ERT: the Constitutional Challenge facing the European 
Court" (1991) 11 Yearbook of European Law 1 at 7, note 21 
where the case law of the French Conseil d'Etat 
dissenting from the approach of the European Court of 
Justice in the matter of the direct effect of directives 
is described as "objectionable".
77. See in particular the Cohn-Bendit case, Conseil 
d'Etat, 22 December 1978, Dalloz 1979 p. 155; ( 1986) 27 




























































































ruling of the European Court once a reference has 
been returned to it 78 79 Thus the French Conseil 
d'Etat has refused to accept the doctrine of the 
direct effectiveness of directives and the German 
79 and Italian Constitutional Courts 80 both have 
expressed certain reservation regarding the 
compatibility of the doctrine of the supremacy of 
Community law over national law with those 
courts' duties to protect the fundamental rights
Justice see Gerhard Bebr "The Rambling Ghost of 'Cohn- 
Bendit': Acte Clair and the Court of Justice" 20 Common 
Market Law Review (1983) 439; also Tatham "Effect of 
European Community Directives in France: the development 
of the Cohn-Bendit jurisprudence" (1991) 40 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 907. The Cohn-Bendit 
rejection of the direct effective of directives was 
followed by one German court, the Federal Tax Court. 
See the Bundesfinanzhof decision of 1981 Re Value Added 
Tax Directives reported in [1982] 33 CMLR 527
78. For an example of this see Hartley "Federalism, 
Courts and Legal Systems" (1986) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 229 at 237
79. See the 1974 Bundesverfassunqsgericht decision in 
Internationale Handelsqesellschaft mbh v, Einfuhr- und 
Vorratstelle fuer Getreide und Futtermittel reported in 
[1974] 2 CMLR 540. This case has since been modified by 
the Federal Constitutional Court decision in Wuensche 
Handeslgesellschaft (Case 2 BvR 197/83) reported in
[1987] 3 CMLR 225. For commentary on this case see 
Lanier "Solange, farewell: the Federal German 
Constitutional Court and the recognition of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities as Lawful Judges in
(1988) 11 Boston College International and Comparative 
Law Review 1.
80. See Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze Case 183 of 
27/12/73 reported in [1974] 2 CMLR 383-9 and Spa Fraqd v. 
Amministrazione delle Finanze (Decision 232 of 21 April 
1989) reported in (1989) 72 Rivista di Diritto 
Internazionale 103. For a commentary in these cases see 
Gaja "New Developments in a continuing story: the 
relationship between Italian and EEC law" (1990) 27 




























































































guaranteed in their respective national 
constitutions.
When national court's accept and apply the 
European Court's innovations in the law, this is 
understood to be an acceptance by the national 
judiciary of the correctness of the European 
Court's approach such as to confer retrospective 
legitimacy on the development and to justify 
further development on the same principles. The 
application by national courts of Community law 
as developed by the European Court is seen as 
victory of the European Court and the acceptance 
of their vision of law.
In point of fact, the application by national 
courts of European Court jurisprudence need imply 
neither approbation nor legitimation of the 
European Court’s approach. National courts 
might apply Community law as interpreted by the 
European Court simply because they have been so 
instructed by their national Parliaments, and not 
because they accept the natural law vision which 
appears to drive the European Court. 81
81. For an analysis of, inter alia, the Italian and 
German constitutional case law see Schermers "The Scales 
in Balance: National Constitutional Court v. Court of 




























































































Thus, in the United Kingdom, at least, the 
acceptance of the acquis communautaire and the 
application by the courts of Community law 
doctrines can be seen as a consequence not of the 
acceptance of some idee d'Europe involving the 
subordination of national State sovereignty to 
the central Community institutions but rather as 
a a result of their healthy respect for the 
notion of national Parliamentary supremacy. It 
is the United Kingdom Parliament which has 
instructed the United Kingdom courts to apply 
Community law. When and if that Parliament 
instructs those courts to cease to apply 
Community law, then Community law will no longer 
be applied within the United Kingdom. 82 This 
attitude might be characterised as one which sees 
the European Community resting on the base of a 
continuing consensus and provisional self­
limitation on the part of the Member States of
82. Thus Lord Denning in Macarthys Ltd, v. Smith [1979] 
3 AllER 325 at 329:
"If the time should come when our Parliament 
deliberately passes an Act with the intention 
of repudiating the Treaty or any provision of 
it or intentionally of acting inconsistently 
with it and says so in express terms then I 
should have thought that it would be the duty 
of our courts to follow the statute of our 
Parliament."
In the same case Lawton LJ stated at 334:
"Parliament's recognition of European Community 




























































































their sovereign powers. It is a vision inspired 
more by Locke rather than Hobbes.
61
8. CONCLUSION
Effectively what we end up with are radically 
different lines of legitimacy and of 
justification. Can these differing lines of 
justification and legitimacy co-exist? One 
tendency of the European Court's jurisprudence 
has been to make it almost impossible to define 
what limits there might be to Community 
competences vis a vis Member States. It has 
become clear that Community law, as interpreted 
by the European Court, requires national courts 
to interpret and apply Community law in 
accordance with the principles developed by that 
Court with a view to contributing to the
83. See Weiler "Problems of legitimacy in post-1992 
Europe" (1991) 46 Aussenwirtschaft 411 at 425-6:
"Sooner or later "Supreme" courts in the Member 
States would realize that the "socio-legal 
contract" announced by the [European] Court in 
its major constitutionalizing decisions, namely 
that ' the Community constitutes a new legal 
order ... for the benefit of which states have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields' ... has been shattered, that 
although they (the ’Supreme" courts) have 
accepted the principles of the new legal order 
- supremacy and direct effect - the fields do 
not seem any more to be limited, and that in 
the absence of Community legislative or legal 
checks it will fall on them to draw the 





























































































development of the Community, often at the 
expense of Member State powers. 84
In the United Kingdom context a conflict between 
the two lines of legitimation will necessarily 
arise when and if the United Kingdom courts are 
required to apply Community law over and against 
provisions of national law. Such a course brings 
into question the cornerstone principle of United 
Kingdom constitution, namely the sovereignty of 
Parliament.
The one time legal adviser to the Commission's 
Legal Service has rather disingenuously attempted 
to dismiss or disguise the enormity of the 
constitutional change brought about by the 
application of Community law by national courts 
in the United Kingdom. He states: 85
[T]his new approach is particularly 
necessary in sphere where the Community 
law is judge-made case law, both because 
in those sphere there is no Treaty text
84. For a survey of specifically "European" modes of
interpretation of law in comparison to those prevailing 
in the United Kingdom and Ireland see Millett Rules of 
Interpretation of EEC Legislation (1989) 11 Statute Law
Review 163.
85. Temple Lang "The duties of national courts under 
the Constitutional law of the European Community" The 
Dominik Lasok Lecture in European Community law. 





























































































to point to, and because it is the case- 
law which is developing the implications 
of the Community. . . . English lawyers 
should have no difficulty dealing with 
case law, even when it develops 
constitutional principles of far 
reaching importance. After all, your 
doctrine of the sovereignty of 
Parliament was developed by lawyers, not 
by Parliament itself."
The European Court asserted in Simmenthal 86 
”[I]n accordance with, the principle of 
the precedence of Community law, the 
relationship between provisions of the 
Treaty and directly applicable measures 
of the institutions on the one hand and 
national law of the Member States on the 
other is such that these provisions not 
only by their entry into force render 
automatically inapplicable any
conflicting p r o vision of current 
national l a w but . . . also p r e c l u d e  the 
valid adoption of n e w  national 
legislative measures to the extent to 
which they would be incompatible with 
Community provisions."
86. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v.




























































































Simmenthal echoes the approach arrived at two 
hundred years earlier in the United States of 
America in Marbury v. Madison, , which laid the 
foundation for the judicial review of legislation 
in that country:
"The Constitution is either a superior 
paramount law, unchallangeable by 
ordinary means, or it is on a level with 
ordinary legislative acts, and, like 
other acts, is alterable when the 
legislature shall be pleased to alter 
it. If the former part of the 
alternative is true, then a legislative 
act contrary to the constitution is not 
law; if the latter part be true, then 
written constitutions are absurd 
attempts, on the part of the people, to 
limit a power in its own nature 
illimitable."
In the following chapter we shall look at how 
this doctrine set out in Simmenthal doctrine was 
received by the Courts of the United Kingdom. 5

























































































































































































SIMMENTHAL AND FACTORTAME; A SEA CHANGE IN THE 
BRITISH CONSTITUTION
Full fathom five thy father lies;
O f  his bones are coral made;
Those are n o w  pea r l s  that were his eyes; 
N o t h i n g  of him that doth fade 
But doth suffer a sea-change . 
Into something rich and strange. 1
1. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MEMBER STATES'
LEGISLATION
The Treaty of Rome gave no power to the European 
Court to review the validity of Member State 
legislation. However, Articles 169 and 170 of 
the Treaty allow the European Court, in direct 
actions brought against one Member State by the 
Commission or by another Member State, to declare 
that a Member State has failed to fulfil an 
obligation under the Treaty, by for example 
enacting or failing to repeal a contentious 
provision of national law. If the Court makes 
such a judgment article 171 of the Treaty obliges 
the Member State to take such measures as are 
necessary to comply with the Court's judgment. 
The Maastricht Treaty contains an amendment to 
article 171 to the effect that the Court also be




























































































given the power to fine any Member State which 
fails to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty.
Of far greater importance in the development of 
the judicial review of Member States' legislation 
has been the preliminary reference procedure 
provided under Article 177. When questions
relating to the interpretation of the Treaty or 
to the validity and/or interpretation of the acts 
of Community institutions are raised before 
Member State courts, and the Member State court 
considers that a decision on the question is 
necessary to enable that court to give judgment 
in the case, the national court may, (or if it is 
a court against whose decision there is no remedy 
under national law, must) request the European 
Court to give a ruling on the question of 
Community law. An additional reason for making 
an Article 177 reference, not expressly mentioned 
in the Treaty as it is a consequence of the 
European Court's jurisprudence since Van Gend en 
Loos, is to determine whether or not a provision 
of Community law is directly effective within the 
Member State.
Article 177 procedure would seem to have been 




























































































of Community law throughout the Member States. 2 
However, given the European Court's declaration 
of the doctrine of the supremacy of Community law 
over inconsistent national laws, questions then 
arise before national courts as to the 
compatibility of provisions of national law with 
Treaty provisions and with secondary Community 
legislation. The resolution of this question 
may require reference to the European Court in 
order for the national court to ascertain the 
correct interpretation to be given to the
relevant provisions of Community law.
The European Court's remit under article 177
procedure is simply to set out the correct
interpretation of Community law and it has no
power to interpret or to rule on the validity of
provisions of national law. In point of fact
Article 177 procedure has been used by the
European Court to highlight inconsistencies
between national legal provisions and the rules
of Community law, thereby requiring the national
courts, in fulfilment of their duty under Article
5 of the Treaty and as a consequence of the
doctrine of supremacy of Community law, not to
apply the inconsistent national law.
2. See Mashaw "Ensuring the observance of law in the 
interpretation and application of the EEC Treaty: the
role and functioning of the renvoi d 'interpretation under 




























































































Thus, in the context of an article 177 reference 
in Simmenthal, the European Court stated: ?
"[E]very national court must, in a case 
within its jurisdiction, apply Community 
law in its entirety and must accordingly 
set aside any p r o vision of national law 
which m a y  conflict with it, whether 
p r i o r  or subsequent to the Community 
rule. ... [A]ny provision of a national 
legal system and legislative,
administrative or judicial practice 
which might impair the effectiveness of 
Community law by withholding from the 
national court having jurisdiction to 
apply such law the power to do 
everything necessary at the moment of 
its application to set aside national 
legislative provisions which might 
prevent Community rules from having full 
force and effect are incompatible with 
those requirements which are the very 
essence of Community law"
In its judgment in Simmenthal the European Court 
made it clear that the application of Community 3
3. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. 





























































































law over and against the provisions of national 
law was not a matter which concerned only the 
Constitutional courts of the Member States. 
Rather, the provisions of Community law were held 
to so completely permeate the legal system of the 
Member States that Community law fell to be 
applied by all courts within the national 
hierarchy. Community law laid on every judge in 
a national legal order the duty to give 
precedence to the provisions of Community law 
over all and any conflicting national laws.
The trinity of Van Gend en Loos, Costa v. ENEL 
and Simmenthal established the three essential 
characteristics of the Community legal order: its 
creation of directly effective rights for the 
citizens of member states; its supremacy over the 
national legal orders of the member states; and 
its universal applicability, by and within all 
courts of the member states. The application of 
Community law over and against the provisions of 
national law was laid squarely at the door of 
national courts.
The problem for the United Kingdom courts is that 
their absolute duty to accord supremacy to 
Community law could, potentially, conflict with 
their equally absolute duty to apply the laws 




























































































2. PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The prevailing constitutional orthodoxy in the 
United Kingdom, as expressed from Dicey 4 on, was 
that the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, 
which had been established in the constitutional 
settlement which followed the expulsion of James 
II and VII in 1688-89, meant that there were and 
could be no legal limits (in contrast to 
political or practical ones) on the power of 
Parliament to pass whatever laws it wished. 5 As 
a corollary of this it was seen as the duty of 
the courts simply to apply the laws passed by 
Parliament. There was no possibility of any
development of the higher constitutional review 
of legislation because there existed no higher 
legal standard against which such legislation 
might be judged.
This approach to Parliamentary supremacy remained 
the dominant English consensus 6 notwithstanding
4. See Dicey The Law of the Constitution (10th edition 
1959) 39-40.
5. For a critical account of this orthodoxy see P.P. 
Craig "Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after 
Factortame" (1991) 11 Year-book of European Law 221
6. See Winterton, "The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary
Supremacy Re-examined, (1975) 92 Law Quarterly Review
591; Allan "The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty" 




























































































certain academic arguments advanced by Scots 7 to 
the effect that the Acts of Union of 1707 between 
England and Scotland created a new basic law 
(Grundgesetz) of the United Kingdom and set 
limits on the power of the new Parliamentary body 
created on the abolition of the separate 
Parliaments of England and Scotland. Judges in 
Scotland have, however, never struck down any 
provisions of a post-Union Act of Parliament on 
the grounds of their contravention of articles of 
the Acts of Union. The judges in Scotland have 
studiously avoided giving an unequivocal answer 
to the question as to whether or not they indeed 
have any such power. 8
The constitutional position was recently 
summarised by Lord Donaldson MR as follows: ®
"Our unwritten constitution rests upon a 
separation of powers. It also rests
upon a mutual recognition of those 
powers. It is for Parliament to make
7. See, for example J.D.B. Mitchell "What happened to 
the Constitution on 1 January 1973 ?" (1980) 11 Cambrian 
Law Review 69; D.N. MacCormick "Does the United Kingdom 
have a Constitution ?" [1978] 21 Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 1; Walker & Himsworth "The Poll Tax and 
Fundamental Law" [1991] 36 Juridical Review 45
8. See MacCormick v. Lord Advocate 1953 SC 396, 411-2; 
Gibson v. Lord Advocate 1975 SLT 134; [1975] 1 CMLR 563; 
Re Pringle, petitioner 1991 SLT 330; Murray v . Rogers 
1992 SLT 221.




























































































new laws and to amend old laws, 
including the common law. It is for 
the courts to interpret and enforce the 
law. It is for the government to 
govern within the law. Each within its 
own sphere is supreme. Ultimate 
supremacy lies with Parliament, but only 
to the extent that it can control the 
government by its votes and that it can 
control the courts by using the full 
legislative procedure for changing the 
law, either generally or with a view to 
reversing a particular decision by the 
courts."
The accession of the United Kingdom to the 
European Communities in 1972 resulted in the 
incorporation of the legal systems of the United 
Kingdom into the Community legal order. By 
Sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 
1972 the courts of the United Kingdom were 
required to apply law in the United Kingdom as 
interpreted by that Court. 10
10. See Allan "Parliamentary Sovereignty: Lord Denning's 
Dextrous Revolution" (1983) 3 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 22; McCaffrey "Parliamentary Sovereignty and the 
Primacy of European Law: a matter of construction ?" 




























































































As we have seen, the European Court's 
interpretation of Community law requires 
national courts to give superiority to the 
provisions of Community law over and against 
those provisions of national law. However, while 
the Community doctrines of superiority, direct 
effect and permeability might have been 
unequivocally established in the jurisprudence of 
the European Court within six years of the 
acceptance of the United Kingdom's legal systems 
into the Community legal order, the actual 
reception of those doctrines in the practice of 
the courts in the United Kingdom has required 
more time. ^  There has been a time lag between 
European constitutional theory and United Kingdom 
court practice.
3. JUDGES AND PARLIAMENT; THE INSTITUTIONAL 
BALANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Writing in 1980, Mauro Cappeletti stated the 
following: 1 2 *
11. See Lester "The Influence of European Law on 
English Administrative Law" 1991 1 Rivista Italiana di 
Diritto Pubblico Comunitario 921, 923-6
12. Cappeletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative





























































































"If ... the United Kingdom accepts the 
doctrine [of the supremacy of European 
Community law], a novel form of judicial 
review of legislation will have been 
adopted by a nation which, even more 
rigourously than France, has purported 
to reject all forms of judicial review 
since, at least, its Glorious Revolution 
of 1688."
While the superiority of European law and the 
competence of the European Court definitively to 
expound the requirements of European law in 
relation to national laws was generally accepted 
in obiter remarks by the United Kingdom judges 
from the time of the accession of the United 
Kingdom to the European Communities ^  the courts 
of the United Kingdom rarely disapplied 
provisions of Acts of Parliament on their own 
initiative. 14 *
13. See eg Lord Denning in Macarthys Ltd, v. Smith 
[1981] 1 All ER 111 at 120:
"It is important now to declare, and it must be 
made plain that the provisions of article 119 
of the EEC Treaty take priority over anything 
in our English statute. That priority is given 
in our own law. It is given by the European 
Communities Act 1972 itself. Community law is 
now part of our law; and whenever there is any 
inconsistency, Community law has priority."
14. See Gormley "The Application of Community Law in
the United Kingdom, 1976-1985" (1986) 23 Common Market
Law Review 287 at 307; Usher "The Impact of EEC 
legislation on the United Kingdom Courts" (1989) 10




























































































There is evidence of a greater readiness among 
lower level administrative tribunals and quasi­
judicial bodies to take it upon themselves to 
disapply provisions of primary and secondary 
national legislation as being contrary to 
Community law. 15 However, Costa v. ENEL, the 
locus classicus of the doctrine of the supremacy 
of Community law over national law was cited or 
referred to in only four cases 16 before the 
United Kingdom courts prior to the European Court 
judgment in Factortame 2 of 19 June 199 0 17 * and
15. See the decision of the National Insurance 
Commissioner, 14 June 1977, Case number CS 2/77 reported 
as Re Medical Expenses Incurred in France 2 0 CMLR 317; 
the decision of the National Insurance Commissioner 23 
September 1976, CS 7/76 Re an absence in Ireland [1977] 1 
CMLR 5, 9-10; the decision of the Deputy Comptroller of 
the Patent Office in Hauq v. Registrar of Patent Agents 
[1976] 1 CMLR 491; the decision of the Resident 
Magistrate in Pigs Marketing Board (Northern Ireland) v. 
Redmond [1979] 3 CMLR 118; the decision of the VAT 
tribunal in Merseyside Cablevision Ltd. v. The 
Commissioners [1987] 3 CMLR 290; the decision of the 
Industrial Tribunal in Marshall v. Southampton and South 
West Hants. Health Authority [1988] 3 CMLR 389, overruled 
on this point by the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
16. This is the result of a "Lexis search". The cases 
which referred to Costa v. ENEL were Blackburn v. 
Attorney General [1971] 2 All ER 1380, decided on 10 May 
1971 prior to the accession of the United Kingdom to the 
European Communities; R v. Attorney General, ex parte 
ICI, Queen's Bench Division, 60 Tax Cases 25 January 
1985; Sun International v. Sun Oil Trading Company and 
Another Queen's Bench Division, unreported judgment of 30 
July 1986; R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex 
parte Factortame and others (Factortame 1) in both the 
Court of Appeal (reported in [1989] 2 CMLR 353) and the 
House of Lords (reported in [1990] 2 AC 85).
17. R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte
Factortame and others (C—213/89) [1990] ECR reported in 




























































































in none of these cases was any national law
"disapplied" in favour of Community law. And in
the period up to 19 June 1990 Simmenthal has been
cited or referred to by the United Kingdom courts
in twelve separate cases of which only three
1 Q involved the national court actually 
disapplying provisions of an Act of Parliament 
which were seen to be inconsistent with Community 
law.
Where it was felt that no reference needed to be 
made to the European Court, on the grounds that
18. This is a result of a "Lexis" search. The cases 
referred to are: W.H Smith Do-it-all v Peterborough City 
Council [1991] 1 QB 304, 4 June 1990; Factortame Ltd, 
and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport [1990] 2 
AC 85, 18 May 1989; Merseyside Cablevision Ltd v The 
Commissioners, Manchester VAT Tribunal, [1987] VAT Rep 
134, [ 1987] 3 CMLR 290, 30 January 1987; R v Secretary 
of State for Social Services ex parte Scherinq Chemicals 
Limited [1987] 1 CMLR 277, 10 July 1986; Bourqoin SA and 
others v Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, 
[1986] 1 QB 716, 29 July 1985; R v Attorney General (ex 
parte Imperial Chemical Industries Pic) 60 Tax Cas 1, 25 
January 1985; Allen & Hanburys Ltd v Generics (UK) Ltd, 
Chancery Division (Patents Court), [1985] FSR 229, [1985] 
1 CMLR 619, 7 December 1984; Bulk Oil (Zuq) A.G. V. Sun 
International Ltd, and Another [1984] 1 WLR 147 30 
September 1983; R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Santillo [1981] QB 778 19 December 
1990; R v Henn; R v Darby [1981] AC 850, 27 March 1980; 
Macarthys Ltd v Smith [ 1979] ICR 785, 25 July 1979; 
Shields v E Coomes (Holdings) Ltd [1978] ICR 1159, 27 
April 1978 19*
19. W.H Smith Do-it-all v Peterborough City Council 
[1991] 1 QB 304, 4 June 1990; R v. Secretary of State
for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. (Queen's Bench 
Division) [1989] 2 CMLR 353, overruled by both the Court 
of Appeal and the House of Lords on the question of 
Misapplication" (see infra); Merseyside Cablevision Ltd 
v The Commissioners, Manchester VAT Tribunal, [1987] VAT 




























































































the applicable Community law was unequivocal, 
rather than directly overrule inconsistent 
provisions of national law new canons of 
interpretation for national legislation and 
regulations intended to implement, or at least 
conform to, Community law were developed,in 
particular, by the House of Lords. Rather than 
exegesis of the plain language of the text, the 
Lords adopted an eisegetical approach to the 
national provisions which should be read in 
conformity with Community obligations, even to 
the extent of reading into the national 
regulations such words and phrases as were 
necessary to ensure their harmony with Community 
law. 2® iphe justification for such a novel
approach to legislative interpretation appeared 
to be that if the intention of Parliament was 
indeed to implement Community law, then it was 
the duty of the courts in carrying out
Parliament's intention to re-cast the relevant 
regulations to ensure this conformity with
Community law as this was developed over time by 
the European Court. 21
20. See Garland v. British Rail Engineering [1983] AC
751 at 771, [1982] 2 CMLR 174 AT 178-9; Pickstone v.
Freemans [1989] AC 66, [ 1988] 3 CMLR 221; Litster v.
Forth Dry Dock Engineering Co. Ltd. [1990] A.C. 546
21. Compare the approach taken to legislation not
intended to implement Community obligations in Duke v. 
G.E.C. Reliance [1988] AC 618, [1988] 1 CMLR 719;
affirmed in Finnegan v. Clowney Youth Training Programme 
[1990] 2 CMLR 859. These two cases should perhaps be re­




























































































However, the general practice of the United 
Kingdom courts continued to be to regard Acts of 
Parliament as the final word on the law. Thus 
Lord Donaldson M.R. was able to state in earlier 
stages of the Factortame litigation: 22
"[I]t is fundamental to our Constitution 
that it is for Parliament to legislate 
and for the judiciary to interpret and 
apply the fruits of Parliament's labour.
Any attempt to interfere with primary 
legislation would be wholly
unconstitutional."
Indeed a presumption developed that Acts of
Parliament were to be regarded as valid and
compatible with Community law, unless and until
that matter had been finally and unequivocally
ruled upon by the European Court of Justice.
Thus the first judgment of the House of Lords in
Factortame, 23 prior to the ruling of the
recent affirmation in Marleasinq SA v. La Comercial 
Internacional de Alimentacion SA (C-106/89) [1990] ECR
4135, [1992] 1 CMLR 305 of the duty of national courts to 
interpret provisions of national law in the light of the 
wording and purpose of Community directives, whether the 
latter pre- or post-date the former. See Mead "The 
obligation to apply European law: is Duke dead" [1991]
European Law Review 490.
22. Factortame 1 (Court of Appeal) r19891 2 CMLR 353 at 
397.
23. R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 




























































































European Court, was interpreted by the Scottish 
Inner House as wholly confirming the proposition 
that
"a statute passed by the United Kingdom 
Parliament must be presumed to be valid, 
until such time as the Act has been 
declared to be invalid by a court of 
competent jurisdiction." 2^
It is not clear from the judgment of the Scottish 
court which national courts, if any, they 
considered to be competent to declare an Act of 
Parliament invalid.
The institutional balance as between the United 
Kingdom courts and Parliament reflected in this 
presumption as to the validity of acts of 
Parliament was to be challenged in the Factortame 
litigation which followed legislation by the 
United Kingdom aiming at putting an end to the 
practice of "quota-hopping” whereby non-U.K. 
nationals were able to benefit from the fishing 
quota allocated to the United Kingdom under the 
Common Fisheries Policy by registering their 
vessels in the British Register of Shipping. 24 5
24. See Murray v. Rogers 1992 SLT 221 at 225, 228.
25. For a survey of subsequent European Court decisions 
on the problem of quota-hopping see Churchill in (1992) 




























































































4. FACTORTAME - THE FACTS 26
In 1988 the U.K. Parliament passed the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1988 in order, it was claimed, to 
implement and enforce the quota system 
established by the common fisheries policy. The 
Merchant Shipping (Registration of Fishing 
Vessels) Regulations 1988 were brought in under 
this Act. These regulations required all 
vessels previously registered under the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 to re-register under new
26. The litigation in Factortame is somewhat 
complicated, involving as it does one judgement in the 
High Court ([1987] 1 CMLR 277) and in the Court of Appeal 
([ 1989] 2 CMLR 353) two judgments in the House of Lords 
([1990] 2 AC 85; [1990] 3 WLR 818 at 856) and two rulings 
by the European Court on two separate article 177 
references made by the English High Court and the House 
of Lords respectively ([1991] 1 AC 603 and [1991] 3 All 
ER 769). For convenience I shall refer to all stages of 
the litigation prior to the first European Court judgment 
of 19 June 1990 (Case 213/89) as Factortame 1. The 
European Court judgment of 19 June 1990 together with the 
House of Lords second judgment applying the European 
Court's ruling will be referred to as Factortame 2. The 
European Court judgment of 25 July 1991 in Case 246/89 
(reported in [1991] 3 All ER 769] will be referred to as 
Factortame 3 . In November 1992 an application was made 
to the High Court in England by the Factortame fishermen 
for damages to be awarded them under Francovich 
principles for the losses suffered by them as a 
consequence of their having been barred from fishing for 
the period from the implementation new shipping register 
under the Merchant Shipping Act 1989 until the dis- 
application of the relevant provisions by the House of 
Lords in 1990. This application R v Secretary of State 
for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd & Others, Queen's 
Bench Division (Crown Office List), CO/1735/88, not yet 
reported, 16 November 1992 was made the subject of an 
Article 177 reference to the European Court of Justice. 
This stage in the litigation will henceforth be referred 




























































































conditions which were designed to exclude non- 
British vessels, specifically Spanish, from 
eligibility for registration. Registration was 
the pre-requisite to obtaining a licence to fish 
under the quota permitted the U.K. under the 
Community's Common Fisheries Policy. The Act 
came into force on 1 December 198 8 and it was 
provided that the validity of registrations under 
the previous Act would expire on 31 March 1989.
(i) The High Court
The validity of the new Merchant Shipping Act and 
of the regulations made thereunder was 
immediately challenged as contrary to Community 
law by the owners of fishing vessels which had 
been refused registration under the new regime. 
The court at first instance, holding that the 
matter raised substantive questions of Community 
law, ordered that a reference be made to the 
European Court of Justice under article 177 for a 
preliminary ruling on those matters of Community 
law which had been raised in the proceedings. 
Pending the decision of the European Court on 
these substantive matters, the Divisional Court 
made an interim order purporting to "disapply" 
the operation of both the principal Act and the 
disputed regulations made under it and forbidding 




























































































regulations as against the parties to the case, 
thereby allowing their previous registrations 
under the 1894 Act to continue until the final 
determination of the cause.
(ii) The Court of Appeal
The Secretary of State appealed only against the 
interim orders and not the article 177 reference 
which continued to the European Court of Justice. 
The decision of the Divisional Court to grant 
interim relief in the above terms was reversed by 
the Court of Appeal on 22 March 1989. This
judgement of the Court of Appeal was itself 
appealed against by the trawler owners. Thus, by 
the time the case reached the House of Lords the 
matter at issue was one concerned with procedural 
law regarding the availability of interim relief 
pending the determination of the substantive 
issues raised by the passing of the 1988 Act.
(iii) The House of Lords 1
The Court of Appeal decision to reverse the order 
to disapply the Act and regulations ad interim 
was upheld by the House of Lords on 18 May 1989 
on two grounds of national law: (i) that the
courts in England had no power to grant 




























































































was a presumption in English law that Acts of 
Parliament were valid and compatible with 
Community law unless and until the matter was 
finally and authoritatively decided by the 
European Court of Justice. 27 Thus, standing the 
traditional theory of the sovereignty of 
Parliament, the national courts in the United 
Kingdom could have no power to "disapply" an Act 
of Parliament pending a decision from the 
European Court as to the compatibility of the Act 
with Community law.
(iv) The European Court of Justice 1
Notwithstanding the apparently unequivocal 
position in domestic law, the House of Lords was 
persuaded that it was necessary to make a 
reference to the European Court in order to 
determine whether or not there existed some 
overriding principle derived from the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice 
which compels national courts of Member States, 
whatever their own law may provide, to assert 
and, in appropriate circumstances to exercise, a 
power to provide an effective interlocutory 
remedy to protect putative rights in law.




























































































Relying on the principle of co-operation of 
national courts to ensure the full and effective 
protection of rights acquired under Community law 
in every member state, the European court held in 
the House of Lords Factortame reference that : 
"Community law must be interpreted as 
meaning that a national court which, in 
a case before it concerning law, 
considers that the sole obstacle which 
prevents it from granting interim relief 
is a rule of national law must set aside 
that rule."
(v) The House of Lords 2
On receiving this ruling back from the European 
Court, the Lords granted an order restraining the 
Secretary of State "from withholding or 
withdrawing registration in the register of 
British fishing vessels maintained by him 
pursuant to the Merchant Shipping (Registration 
of Fishing Vessels) Regulations 1988."
28. R. v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte 
Factortame Ltd, and Others (C-213/89) E.C.J. judgement 19 
June 1990. 29
29. See R. v. Sec, of State for Transport, ex parte 




























































































5. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FACTORTAME
It is submitted that the decision of the European 
Court in Factortame 2 has brought about a 
fundamental change in the attitude of United 
Kingdom courts as regards their role within the 
constitutional order of the United Kingdom. As 
the practice of the courts change, so too does 
the unwritten constitution. One consequence of 
the European Court's decision in Factortame 2 has 
been to effect a significant constitutional 
change in the United Kingdom by fundamentally 
weakening the presumption of the validity of an 
Act of Parliament in relation to Community law 
and by making it clear to the United Kingdom 
courts that the question of the judicial review 
of national legislation for its conformity with 
Community law is primarily a duty laid upon 
national courts.
The acceptance of a new vision and the consequent
rejection of the heretofore traditional
understanding of Parliamentary sovereignty is
clear from two statements of Lord Bridge of
Harwich made at various stages in the Factortame
litigation. When the matter was first before
the House of Lords Lord Bridge stated: ^0
30. Factortame Ltd, and Others v. Secretary of State 




























































































"If the applicants fail to establish the 
rights they claim before the E.C.J. the 
effect of the interim relief granted 
would be to have conferred upon them 
rights directly contrary to Parliament's 
sovereign will ... I am clearly of the 
opinion that as a matter of English law, 
the court has no power to make an order 
which has these consequences.
However in his second judgment in the case 
following the European Court’s ruling Lord Bridge 
expressed the view that the United Kingdom's 
accession to the European Communities in 1972 
meant that the courts of the United Kingdom had 
fully accepted the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice with all that implied, including 
acceptance of the Simmenthal decision. He 
stated:
"Under the terms of the Act of 1972 it 
has always been clear that it was the 
duty of a United Kingdom Court, when 
delivering final judgement, to override 
any rule of national law found to be in 
conflict with any directly enforceable 
rule of law ... Thus there is nothing in 
any way novel in according supremacy to 31




























































































rules of law in those areas in which 
they apply and to insist that, in the 
protection of rights under law, national 
courts should not be inhibited by rules 
of  national law from granting interim 
relief in appropriate cases is no more 
than a logical recognition of that 
s u p r e m a c y."
This is somewhat disingenuous of Lord Bridge.
If the matter were so clear in European law, what
need then was there for a reference by the House
of Lords to the European Court when the doctrine
of acte clair could have been be applied interim
relief granted immediately ? 22 Factortame 2
might well mark the "logical recognition" of the
supremacy, but it is the first unequivocal
recognition by the highest court in the United
Kingdom of the implications of that supremacy for
the practice of all courts of the United Kingdom.
Lord Bridge attempts to disguise the extent of
the change brought about by Factortame 2, by
presenting it simply as a case where the national
courts were granted rights to suspend Acts of
Parliament temporarily, to supplement the power
32. For criticism of the "parochialism" of the Lords in 
making a reference to the European Court rather than 
themselves applying clear principles of Community law see 
Gravells "Disapplying an Act of Parliament pending a 
preliminary ruling: Constitutional enormity or Community 




























































































they have had since 1972 to "disapply" them 
permanently. As we have seen, however, the
power to disapply Acts of Parliament was rarely 
used and barely acknowledged.
In fact, the creation of a power to grant interim 
relief in these circumstances means that
henceforth it is the judgment of the national 
courts alone which results in the suspension of 
Acts of Parliament, rather than the judgment of 
the European Court.
The fact that the judgment of the European Court 
was seen to be saying something new and altering 
the traditional constitutional understanding is 
made clear from certain remarks made by the head 
of the Court of Appeal two weeks after the 
European Court's judgment in Factortame 2. Lord 
Donaldson MR modified his statement as to the 
proper relationship between courts and 
legislature in the United Kingdom to the 
following effect: 33
"The constitutional position is clear.
Subject only to a recent pronouncement
by the European Court in R. v. Secretary
of State for Transport, ex parte
33. See R v. Secretary of State for the Environment, ex 





























































































Factortame (No. 2) (C-213/89) [1990] 3
WLR 818, the significance of which has 
yet to be worked out, Parliament has a 
limitless right to alter or add to the 
law by means of primary legislation, 
enacted by the full constitutional 
process of debate and decision in both 
Houses on first and second readings of 
the Bill, committee and report stages 
and third readings followed by Royal 
Assent. The result is a statute and in
relation to statutes the only duty of 
the judiciary is to interpret and apply 
them."
6. FACTORTAME AND THE RECEPTION OF SIMMENTHAL
Simmenthal has been cited in twenty separate 
cases in the fourteen years from the beginning of 
1979 to the end of 1992. 34
The year refers to the year of the decision in 
which Simmenthal was first cited in that case, 
rather than necessarily the year in which the 
case was concluded or reported. If one includes 
different stages in the same cases in these same 
years, Simmenthal was cited on a total of twenty




























































































six occasions. The distribution was as follows 
(the figure in brackets includes the total of 
multiple citations at different stages in the 
same case:
SIMMENTHAL YEAR OF DECISION NUMBER OF CITATIONS
1978 35 2 (2)
1979 36 1 (1)
1980 37 1 (2)
1981 0 (0)
1982 0 (0)
1983 38 1 (1)
1984 39 2 (2)
1985 40 1 (2)
1986 41 * 1 (1)
35. Shields y E Coomes (Holdings) Ltd [1978] ICR 1159, 
27 April 1978; R y Henn, R v Darby, Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division [1978] 3 All ER 1190, 7 July 1978
36. Macarthys Ltd v Smith [1979] ICR 785, 25 July 1979
37. R v Henn; R v Darby [1981] AC 850, 27 March 1980, 
HL; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Santillo [1981] QB 778, CA, 19 December 1980
38. Bulk Oil (Zuq) A .G ■ v. Sun International Ltd, and 
Another [1984] 1 WLR 147 30 September 1983
39. Bourqoin SA and others v Ministry of Agriculture 
Fisheries and Food [1986] 1 QB 716, 1 October 1984, QBD; 
Allen & Hanburys Ltd v Generics (UK) Ltd, Chancery 
Division (Patents Court), [1985] FSR 229, [1985] 1 CMLR 
619, 7 December 1984;
40. Bourqoin SA and others v Ministry of Agriculture 
Fisheries and Food, [1986] 1 QB 716, 29 July 1985, CA; R 
v Attorney General (ex parte Imperial Chemical Industries 
Pic) 60 Tax Cas 1, 25 January 1985
41. R v Secretary of State for Social Services ex parte




























































































1987 42 1 (1)
1988 0 (
post-Factortame 1
1989 43 1 (3)
1990 44 1 (2)
post-Factortame 2
199145 4 (5)
1992 46 4 (4)
42. Merseyside Cablevision Ltd v The Commissioners,
Manchester VAT Tribunal, [1987] VAT Rep 134, [1987] 3
CMLR 290, 30 January 1987
43. R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte
Factortame Limited & Others, Queens Bench Division (Crown 
Office List), CO/1735/88, [1989] 2 CMLR 353; R v
Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame 
Limited & Others, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 
[1989] 2 CMLR 353, 22 March 1989; Factortame Ltd, and
others v. Secretary of State for Transport (on appeal 
from R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte 
Factortame Limited & Others), [1990] 2 AC 85 18 May 1989, 
HL
44. W.H Smith Do-it-all v Peterborough City Council
[1991] 1 QB 304, 4 June 1990; Factortame Ltd and others v 
Secretary of State for Transport (No 2), [1991] 1 All ER
70 11 October 1990, HL
45. R v Secretary of State for Employment ex parte
Equal Opportunities Commission [1992] 1 All ER 545,
[1991] IRLR 493, 10 October 1991; R v Dairy Produce
Quota Tribunal for England Ex parte Dent, Queen's Bench 
Division (Crown Office List), CO/0260/89, unreported 8 
July 1991; Kirklees Borough Council v Wickes Building 
Supplies Ltd; Mendip District Council v B & Q pic [1991] 
4 All ER 240, [1991] 3 WLR 985, 30 April 1991; R V
Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Commerzbank AG 
[1991] STC 271, 12 April 1991; Secretary of State for
Scotland & Greater Glasgow Health Board v Wright & 
Another, Employment Appeal Tribunal, [1991] IRLR 187, 11 
March 1991.
46. The four cases decided in the course of 1992 and
which cited Simmenthal are Kirklees Metropolitan Borough 
Council v. Wickes Building Services Ltd. [1992] 3 All ER 
717, 25 June 1992, HL; R. v International Stock Exchange
of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland Ltd., 




























































































By the end of 1992 Factortame had been cited on a 
total of twenty two occasions. 47 The case in 
its various stages has been cited to support two 
distinct general propositions.
One result of the Factortame 1 judgment was a
"firming up" of the idea as to what constituted 
the proper relationship between the executive and 
the judiciary in the United Kingdom. Thus
Factortame 1 has been cited as authority for the 
fact that injunctions cannot be granted against 
the Crown, and that the Crown is, in some ways, 
not fully subject to the supervisory jurisdiction 
of the courts, in matter which concern English
law alone. Such citation was made on sixteen
occasions. They are distributed thus:
FACTORTAME 1 YEAR OF DECISION NUMBER OF CITATIONS
1990 48 * 2 (3)
420, 16 October 1992, CA; AB and others v South West 
Water Services Ltd. [ 1993] 1 All ER 609, 16 November 
1992, CA; Rankin v. British Coal Corporation [1993] IRLR 
69, EAT 7 December 1992
47. This is the result of a Lexis search.
48. R. v. Secretary of State for Education and Science,
ex parte Avon County Council, [1991] 1 QB 558, [1991] 2 
WLR 7 02, 15 May 1990; R v. Secretary of State for the 
Environment, ex parte Doncaster Metropolitan Borough 

































































































The second proposition, drawn from the European 
Court and from the second House of Lords 
judgments in Factortame 2 is that, in matters 
touched by Community law, all measures to protect 
rights under Community law are available to the 
United Kingdom court - these measures include the 
disapplication of Acts of Parliament and the
49. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Wynne [1992] 1 QB 406, CA 19 December 1991; M. v. 
Home Office and Another [1992] 2 WLR 73, 29 November 
1991; R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Blackett Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) 
CO/2494/91 unreported 15 November 1991; Mbala v ■ Home 
Office and Another, Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office 
List) The Independent 6 August 1991, The Times 5 August 
1991 CO/910/9 unreported 26 July 1991; R v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, ex parte Muboyayi [1991] 1 
WLR 442, 25 June 1991; R. v. Secretary of State for 
Education and Science, ex parte Birmingham City Council, 
Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) CO/2633/90 
unreported 14 May 1991; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and Industry v. Vehicles and Supplies Ltd, and 
Another, Privy Council, [1991] 1 WLR 550, 13 May 1991; R 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Mbala, Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) 
unreported 3 May 1991; R v. Secretary of State for the 
Environment, ex part Knowsley Metropolitan Borough 
Council, Queen's Bench Division, (Crown Office List) 
CO/1720/90 unreported 12 February 1991.
50. Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and related
appeals, [1992] STC 898, [1993] 1 All ER 42, [1992] 3 WLR 
1032, 26 November 1992, HL; AB and others v South West 
Water Services Ltd, [1993] 1 All ER 609, 16 November 
1992, CA; R. v International Stock Exchange of the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland Ltd., ex parte Else 
(1982) and ex parte Thomas [1993] 1 All ER 420, 16
October 1992, CA; R v Secretary of State for Health ex 
parte Goldstein, Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office 
List), CO/1711/92, 16 October 1992; R v The Secretary of 
State for Health and The General Medical Council ex parte 
Goldstein, Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) 




























































































granting of injunctions against the Crown. Only 
in matters where Community law is relevant might 
Factortame 2 be applied to allow for the full 
judicial review of legislative and administrative 
action. Such citation was made on a total of 
sixteen occasions. In tabular form the 
distribution is as follows:
FACTORTAME 2 YEAR OF DECISION NUMBER OF CITATIONS
1990 51 2 (2)
199152 10 (10)
1992 53 4 (3)
51 R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 
ex parte Bostock, Queen's Bench Division [1991] 1 CMLR 
691, 26 July 1990; R v. Secretary of State for the
Environment, ex parte Hammersmith and Fulham London 
Borough Council, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [1991] AC 521, 3 July 1990
52. R, v. Secretary of State for Transport and Another 
ex parte Evans and Another Queen's Bench Division (Crown 
Office List) CO/1390/90) unreported 2 December 1991; M. 
v. Home Office and Another, Court of Appeal (Civil
Division) [1992] 2 WLR 73, 29 November 1991; R v
Secretary of State for Employment ex parte Equal 
Opportunities Commission Queen's Bench Division, [1991] 
IRLR 493, 10 October 1991; Mayor and Burgesses of the
London Borough of Hillingdon v RMC Homecare (East) Ltd,
Queen's Bench Division unreported 26 July 1991; R_v
Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England Ex parte Dent, 
Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List), CO/0260/89, 
unreported, 8 July 1991; Kirklees Borough Council v 
Wickes Building Supplies Ltd; Mendip District Council v B 
& Q pic. Court of Appeal, Civil Division, [1991] 4 All ER 
240, 30 April 1991; R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex 
parte Commerzbank AG, Queen's Bench Division (Crown 
Office List), [1991] STC 271, 12 April 1991; Secretary
of State for Scotland & Greater Glasgow Health Board v 
Wright & Another, Employment Appeal Tribunal, [1991] IRLR 
187, 11 March 1991; Chief Adjudication Officer and
Another v. Foster, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
[1992] 1 QB 31, 21 February 1991.
53. R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte




























































































All of the five cases in 1991 which cited 
Sinmtenthal after the European Court and House of 
Lords decision in Factortame 2 also made 
reference to Factortame 2. Of the four cases in 
1992 which cited Simmenthal, three of these also 
cited Factortame 2. ^4
It is clear that the decision in Factortame 2 has 
coincided with a substantial increase in the 
references made in the United Kingdom courts to 
Simmenthal. It is submitted that this
increasing reference to Simmenthal within the 
United Kingdom courts is indicative of a growing 
awareness among lawyers and judges of the 
implications of the doctrine of the supremacy of 
Community law for the United Kingdom. It may, 
indeed, be argued that the decision of the 
European Court of Justice on 19 June 1990 and its 
implementation by the House of Lords in 
Factortame 2 on 9 July 1990 represents the 
unequivocal reception of the Simmenthal doctrine 54
(Crown Office List), CO/1735/88, not yet reported, 16 
November 1992; Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council v. 
Wickes Building Services Ltd. [ 1992] 3 All ER 717, 25
June 1992, HL; Jones v Gwent County Council, [1992] IRLR 
521, 15 April 1992, Ch.D.; Fyfees pic and Another v. 
Chiquita Brands International Inc, and Another [1993] FSR 
83, 11 March 1992, Ch. D.
54. See the cases cited in note 46. The only case not 
to cite Factortame being Rankin v. British Coal 



























































































into the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and 
in particular, of the acceptance of possibility 
of the judicial review of legislation in the 
United Kingdom
7. CONCLUSION
The idea that the Courts in the United Kingdom 
are doing nothing more than realizing the will of 
Parliament is the shibboleth of constitutionalism 
as traditionally understood in the United 
Kingdom. It is, however, impossible to maintain 
this formula when the United Kingdom courts 
actively review and openly suspend Acts of 
Parliament as contrary to the higher law embodied 
in the Treaty of Rome.
The importance of the European Court's decision 
in Factortame 2 is firstly that it emphasises to 
the United Kingdom courts that it is their duty 
to apply Community law to national Acts of 
Parliament. Once this is done the proposition 
that in applying Community law national courts 
are doing no more than implementing the will of 
national Parliaments appears fictional. 
Factortame 2 forces the United Kingdom courts 
openly to acknowledge that, as Community courts, 




























































































goals of the Community. Factortame 2 has thus 
brought about the reception in the United Kingdom 
of the doctrines of supremacy and permeability as 
expounded by the European Court in Simmenthal.
Under Community law, it is the duty of every 
court in the United Kingdom to consider whether 
or not an Act of Parliament should be applied or 
disapplied in the case before it, depending upon 
that court's understanding of the requirements of 
Community law. As Mustill L.J. has stated: 55 
"Since [the accession of the United 
Kingdom to the European Communities] the 
courts have been obliged to read 
statutes of the United Kingdom in the 
light of the general principles laid 
down in the Treaty of Rome, as developed 
in instruments of the Council and 
Commission, and as expounded by the 
European Court of Justice. The
interaction between these instruments 
and the public and private rights of 
organisations and individuals in Member 
States is complex, but one thing must be 
taken as clear for the purposes of the 
present case; that if there is a 
collision ... the former must yield."
55. W.H. Smith Do-it-all Ltd and Another v. Peterborough 




























































































Further, no court within the national judicial 
hierarchies can properly seek to impose rules 
which restrict the right of lower courts within 
that same hierarchy to "disapply" Acts of 
Parliament since this is a power which derives 
from Community law. 56
Legal theory as developed by the European Court 
has lead inexorably to the complete and 
substantive review of acts of Parliament by the 
national courts. This development, which has 
been a, perhaps unforeseen, result of judicial 
activism on the part of the European Court, 
involves a substantive shift in the institutional 
balance among executive, legislature and 
judiciary. A silent revolution in the political 
structure of the United Kingdom, in particular to 
the traditional understanding of the separation 
of powers, has been effected by the activities of 
a foreign court. The implications of such a 
revolution for the primacy of national 
parliamentary democracy have yet to be realized.
56. Lord Goff in Factortame 2 [199 0] 3 WLR 818 at 871
does appear to attempt to limit the national courts by 
suggesting that their power to disapply Acts of 
Parliament should be used only in exceptional 
circumstances when there is a "strong prima facie case 




























































































No longer can the national government be 
confident of enforcing its own enacted laws 
within its own territory before its own courts, 
because the duty of the courts in the United 
Kingdom, while the United Kingdom remains a 
member of the European Communities, has become to 
apply the rules of English, Northern Irish or 
Scots law only insofar as these are compatible 
with Community law. 57
Factortame 2 marks the unambiguous acceptance of 
the supremacy of Community law by the United 
Kingdom courts and with it the general reception 
of the fact that the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice has had the effect of 
creating a truly federal legal system: the 
foundation treaties of the European Communities 
have been ascribed constitutional status; the 
acts of the central institutions are treated as a 
higher federal law; and the legislation of the 
Member States is permitted to stand insofar as it 
does not contravene or trespass upon Community 
law. It is the duty of national courts, under 
Community law, to realize this vision within 
their own jurisdictions.
57. See Koopmans, "Legislature and Judiciary: Present 
Trends”, in Cappelletti (ed), New Perspectives for a 




























































































The realization of this vision in the United 
Kingdom requires the introduction of the judicial 
review of national legislation by national 
courts. It is to this problem that I will turn 













































































































































































































































































































































































THE DIRECT RECEPTION OF COMMUNITY LAW
"The British have no more wish to be 
governed by judges than they have to be 
judged by administrators" 1
1. THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEG I SLAT I ON IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM
(i) Introduction
In Factortame 2 the European Court held that the 
principle of the full and effective protection of 
rights under Community law required that courts 
in the United Kingdom should be able to set aside 
any potentially conflicting national laws ad 
interim, pending a final decision by the European 
Court on the relevant Community law While 
opinions may differ as to the extent to which 
this decision represented any new development in 
Community law since Simmenthal,  ̂ the effect of 
the judgment in the United Kingdom has been to
1. Lord Devlin The Times 27/10/76, cited by Mackenzie- 
Stuart The European Communities and the Rule of Law 
(1977) at 78 2
2. See Akehurst "Parliamentary Sovereignty and the 
Supremacy of Community Law" (1990) British Yearbook of 
International Law 351; Gravells "Effective Protection of 
Community Law Rights: temporary disapplication of an Act 




























































































encourage the bringing of cases before the courts 
seeking the judicial review of United Kingdom 
legislation for its compatibility with Community 
law. ^
As we saw in the previous chapter, the idea of 
the judicial review of legislation is totally 
alien to the constitutional development of the 
United Kingdom since its creation as a unitary 
state in 1707 . Coke C.J.'s claims in 1610  ̂
that the English Common law could in many cases 
"controul acts of Parliament, and 
sometimes adjudge them to be utterly 
void: for when an Act of Parliament is
3. See for example W.H, Smith Do-it-All Ltd and Another 
v. Peterborough City Council [1990] 2 CMLR 577; B & Q pic 
v. Shrewsbury and Atcham Borough Council [1990] 3 CMLR 
535; Mendip District Council v. B & Q pic [1991] 1 CMLR 
113; R. v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 
ex parte Bostock [1991] 1 CMLR 681; Milk Marketing Board 
v. Cricket St. Thomas Estate [1991] 3 CMLR 123; Stoke on 
Trent City Council v. B & Q pic [1991] 2 WLR 42; Kirklees 
Metropolitan Borough Council v. Wickes Building Supplies
Ltd. [1991] 3 WLR 985, [1992] CMLR 765, HL; R__v̂ _
Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte the Equal 
Opportunities Commission [1992] 1 ALL ER 545; R v. Dairy 
Produce Quota Tribunal for England, ex parte Dent Queen1s 
Bench Division (Crown Office List) CO/0260/89, unreported 
8 July 1991; Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of 
Hillingdon v. RMC Homecare (East) Ltd. Queen's Bench 
Division, unreported 26 July 1991; Kier Ltd v The 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise, London VAT Tribunal 
LON/89/1743X, (Transcript) 31 December 1991; Wisebeck 
Construction Ltd v The Commissioners of Customs and 
Excise London VAT Tribunal LON/91/10202, (Transcript) 30 
October 1991; W Emmett & Son Ltd v The Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise, London VAT Tribunal, LON/90/1316Z, 
(Transcript), 7 October 1991 4





























































































against common right and reason, or 
repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will controul 
it and adjudge such Act to be void" 
did not survive the seventeenth century 
constitutional upheavals which culminated in 
victory for the partisans of Parliament's 
absolute supremacy and sovereignty.
Prior to the entry of the United Kingdom into the 
European Communities, the position regarding the 
possibility of the judicial review of legislation 
could be accurately summarised as follows: ®
"What the statute itself enacts cannot 
be unlawful, because what the statute 
says and provides is itself the law, and 
the highest form of law that is known in 
this country. It is the law which
prevails over every other form of law, 
and it is not for the court to say that 
a parliamentary enactment, the highest 
law of this country, is illegal."
Notwithstanding the fact that it is now generally 
accepted in the United Kingdom that "the Treaty 
of Rome is the supreme law of this country, 5





























































































taking precedence over Acts of Parliament" ® the 
centuries' long tradition of the courts' 
deference Parliament has resulted in some 
reluctance on the part of the courts to 
substitute their judgment for that of the 
democratically elected legislature, as appears at 
times required of them under Community law.
(ii) National judicial review of legislation as 
the interpretation and application of Community 
law
In considering whether or not to disapply an Act 
of Parliament, either ad interim or finally, the 
national courts are engaged in the act of 
applying Community law. The European Court has 
consistently affirmed the need for Community law 
to be applied throughout the Member States in a 
uniform manner, declaring that: 7 *
"[T]he purpose of article 177 of the EEC 
Treaty is to ensure that all provisions 
which form part of the legal order are 
applied uniformly within the Community 
so as to avoid any variation in their 
effects resulting from the
6. Hoffman J. in Stoke-on-Trent City Council v. B & Q 
pic [1990] 3 CMLR 31 at 34
7. Sevince v. Staatssecretaries van Justitie (C-192/89)



























































































interpretation given them in different 
Member States."
Given the high importance ascribed to the 
principle of uniformity in application and 
interpretation of Community law and the 
development by the European Court of article 5 of 
the EEC Treaty 8 which requires all national 
authorities, including national courts "to
take all appropriate measures ... to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this 
Treaty" and to "abstain from any measure which 
could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives 
of this Treaty", it is clear that the United 
Kingdom courts have to assess their own national 
law, in cases of potential conflict with 
Community law, on the same basis and principles 
as would the European Court. The European
Court has imposed an "interpretative obligation" 
on national courts to use the same principles and 
modes of reasoning as used by the European Court 
when faced with matters of Community law in order 
to ensure that advancement of the aims and
8. See Temple Lang "Community Constitutional Law: Article 
5 EEC Treaty” (1990) 27 Common Market Law Review 645
9. See Van Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (C—14/83) 
[1984] ECR 1891 10*
10. See generally Grossfeld "The Internal Dynamics of






























































































objectives of the Communities as outlined in the 
Treaties. ^  It is therefore the duty of all
judges in the United Kingdom to subject all 
legislation, Acts of Parliament as much as 
Statutory Instruments, to examination and review 
if and when they are challenged to determine the 
conformity of such legislation to the body of 
supreme law which applies in the United Kingdom, 
namely Community law.
Community law is not, however, simply a matter of 
particular regulations and directives, but 
includes a number of general principles of law as 
well as fundamental rights. 12 These principles 
include: proportionality 13 14; the protection of
legitimate expectations and the preservation of 
legal certainty the standard of formal
equality that like cases be treated alike 15 *;
11. See Prechal "Remedies after Marshall" (1990) 27 
Common Market Law Review 451; de Burca "Giving Effect to 
European Community Directives" (1992) 55 Modern Law 
Review 215
12. See Lasok & Bridge Law and Institutions of the
European Community (5th ed 1991) 179-203; Hartley The 
Foundations of European Community Law (2nd ed 1988) 129-
152; Wyatt & Dashwood The Substantive Law of the EEC (2nd 
ed 1987) 59-71
13. R. v. Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, 
ex parte Man (Sugar) (C-181/84) [1985] C.M.L.R. 759, 
[1986] 2 All E.R.
14. See Decker (C-99/78) [1979] ECR 101





























































































respect for fundamental rights 16; the rights of 
the defence including confidentiality of 
communications between client and lawyer 17, due 
process and considerations of natural justice 
the non-retroactivity of penal provisions
These principles, too, have to be applied and 
interpreted by United Kingdom courts in assessing 
the "constitutionality" of U.K. law against the 
free market regime provided for by the original 
treaties. 20 As one former member of the Court 
has stated: 21
"When judges apply Community law in 
national courts they must, as I see it, 
apply Community law as defined by the 
European Court of Justice. That Court 
has recognised that certain fundamental 
principles are part of such law 
proportionality, the protection of
16. Hauer v. Land Rheinland Pfalz (C—44/79) [ 1979] ECR
3727
17. AM & S Europe Ltd, v. Commission (C-155/79) [1982]
ECR 1575 at 1610-3
18. Transocean Marine Paint (C-17/74) [1974] ECR 1063
at 1079
19. R v, Kirk (C-63/83) [1984] ECR 2689
20. See Temple Lang "The Place of Legislation in
European Community Law" (1989) 10 Statute Law Review 37
at 46-8.
21. Slynn: "But in England there is no ..." Festschrift 
































































































retroactivity without just cause, to 
name only four."
(iii) Schema
A complete survey of the way in which these
principles have been applied in the United
Kingdom is obviously beyond the scope of this 
work. Accordingly, in this chapter I will
restrict myself to looking at the way in which 
the United Kingdom courts have dealt with the
application of the Community doctrine of 
proportionality in the judicial review of 
legislation. This doctrine, as we shall see, 
requires the national courts to assess the 
legislation from the point of view of its 
appropriateness, necessity and overall balance.
The application by United Kingdom courts of the 
principle of proportionality is of particular 
interest from the point of view of the analysis 
of the reception of laws because, unlike may of 
the aforementioned principles, ^  it is a 
principle which is without precedent or
22. See Usher "The influence of national concepts in 





























































































counterpart in the domestic law of the United 
Kingdom. It is also a principle of which
applies specifically to the judicial review of 
legislation.
There have been two areas of law in which the 
Community doctrine of proportionality has, thus 
far, been accepted and applied by the United 
Kingdom courts in the context of the judicial 
review of national legislation. The first is in 
the review of the English Sunday trading 
legislation as set out in the Shops Act 1950 . 
The second is in the application of the tests of 
indirect discrimination to the provisions 
relating to part-time workers contained in the 
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. 
I will look at both of these areas, but before 
doing so it is clearly necessary to examine the 
Community's doctrine of proportionality. 2
2. PROPORTIONALITY IN COMMUNITY LAW
Proportionality has been defined, by a British 
judge, as the general principle "that a steam 
hammer should not be used to crack a nut" 23 or, 
in other words, that excessive means should not





























































































be adopted in order to attain permissible 
objects.
( i) Proportionality in German law
Proportionality is a principle which was first 
developed in German administrative law (there 
termed Verhaeltnissmaessigkeit) 24 in the 
nineteenth century. As a principle of
administrative law it requires that 
administrative authorities should use
proportionate or non-excessive means in seeking 
to achieve some permissible end.
Although originally developed in the context of
administrative law, Verhaeltnissmaessigkeit has
subsequently been found to be a principle of
German Constitutional law. It is held to
underpin the Constitution and the Rule of Law in
Germany 25 and is accordingly applied by the
Federal Constitutional Court is assessing the
compatibility of legislation with the fundamental
rights protected in the Grundgesetz. 26
24. See M.P. Singh German Administrative Law in Common 
Law Perspective (1985) pp. 88-101 for an account of the 
history of the principle.
25 See Kommers Judicial Politics in West Germany: a
study of the Federal Constitutional Court, 1976 at 210-1
26. See Starck "Constitutional Definition and the
Protection of Rights and Freedoms" in Starck (ed.) Rights 
Institutions and Impact of International Law according to 




























































































For legislation to satisfy the constitutional 
principle of Verhaeltnissmaessigkeit it has to 
pass three tests. Firstly, it should be shown 
to be appropriately and effectively aimed at a 
legitimate end, in the sense that the 
relationship between means and ends is neither 
impossible or unlawful (Geeignetheit eines 
Mittels). Secondly, it should be demonstrated 
to be necessary, in the sense that there are no 
less restrictive means which might achieve the 
same purpose (Erforderlichkeit eines Mittels). 
Lastly it should be seen to be proportionate or 
balanced, in the sense that any injury or 
restriction on the individual caused by the act 
should be offset by the gain to the community as 
a whole (Verhaeltnissmaessigkeit im engener 
Sinne). 27 *
(ii) Proportionality appropriated by the 
European Court
Although finding its original source in German 
law, the proportionality test has been 
independently developed by the European Court in
27. See Koiraners The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the




























































































the course of its own case law. 28 In an early 
case, Fedechar 29, brought under the Coal and 
Steel Treaty, the European Court held that, to be 
lawful and valid under Community law, the 
reaction of the High Authority to an unlawful act 
must be proportionate to the scale of that act.
In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 30 the 
European Court applied the principle, which it 
saw as derived from the proportionality test, 
that "the individual should not have his freedom 
of action limited beyond the degree necessary for 
the public interest" in determining the validity 
of a system of forfeiture of deposits paid to the 
Commission when applying for import or export 
licences.
28. See Akehurst "The application of general principles 
of law by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities" (1981) 52 British Yearbook of International 
Law 28 at 39; Schmitthoff "The Doctrines of 
Proportionality and Discrimination” (1977) European Law 
Review 32; Herdegen "The relation between the principles 
of equality and proportionality” (1985) 22 Common Market 
Law Review 683-96; Lugato "Principio di proporzionalità e 
invalidità di atti comunitari nella giurisprudenza della 
Corte di Giustizia delle Comunità Europee" (1991) Rivista 
di Diritto Comunitario e Scambi Internazionali 269.
29. Federation Charbonniere de Belgique v. High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel (C-8/55) [1956] 
ECR 245 at 299.
30. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfur und 
Vorratsstelle fuer Getreide und Futtermittel (C-ll/70) 
[1970] ECR 1125; [ 1972] CMLR 225. See paragraph 20 of 
the judgement together with the opinion of Advocate 




























































































In a series of cases from Cassis de Dijon 
onward the European Court has applied the 
principle of proportionality in relation to 
article 30 of the EEC Treaty on the free movement 
of goods restricted by article 36 public policy 
derogations. The Court has held that such
derogation are valid only to the extent that they 
are proportionate, in the sense of there being no 
less restrictive alternative which might satisfy 
the same public policy aims, without being a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or disguised 
restriction on trade among the member states.
More recently, in FEDESA 22, the fifth chamber of 
the European Court stated the following:
31. See Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltunq fuer 
Branntwein ('Cassis de Dijon') (C-120-78) [1979] ECR 649; 
Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smidt PvbA (C-261/81) 
[1982] ECR 3691; Commission v. Denmark ('Danish Bottles') 
(C-302/86) [1988] ECR 4607 at 4629 para 6:
"In the absence of common rules relating to the 
marketing of the products in question, 
obstacles to free movement within the resulting 
from disparities between national laws must be 
accepted insofar as such rule, applicable to 
domestic and imported products without 
distinction, may be recognised as being 
necessary in order to satisfy the mandatory 
requirements recognized by law. Such rules 
must also be proportionate to the aim in view.
If a member state has a choice between various 
measures for achieving the same aim, it should 
choose the means which least restricts the free 
movement of goods." 32
32. R. v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
and another, ex parte Federation Europeene de _a Sante 
Animale (FEDESA) and others (C-331/88) [1990] ECR 4023; 




























































































"The Court has consistently held that 
the principle of proportionality is one 
of the general principles of law. By 
virtue of that principle, the lawfulness 
of the prohibition of an economic 
activity is subject to the condition 
that the prohibitory measures are 
appropriate and necessary in order to 
achieve the objectives legitimately 
pursued by the legislation in question; 
when there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures recourse must be 
had to the least onerous, and the 
disadvantages caused must not be 
disproportionate to the aims pursued."
(iii) Proportionality exported to the Member
States
In matters concerning Community law, the
principle of proportionality falls to be applied
by the national courts in the same manner as it
would be applied by the European Court. As
Advocate General Mancini has stated: ^3
"The general principles elicited by the
Court from the primary and secondary
33. In Jonqeneel Kaas v. Netherlands (C-237/82) [1984]
ECR 483 at 520, 522 It should be noted that this part 
of his Opinion did not form the basis of the Court's 



























































































provisions of Community law, and 
particular from those fundamental values 
which are common to the legal systems of 
the Member States, form part of the 
Community legal order and may therefore 
be relied upon by individuals before the 
national court which, as is well known 
is also a Community court .. . The 
general principles of law and, in 
particular, the principle of
proportionality have direct effect. 
Accordingly they must be applied by 
national courts if the circumstances in 
relation to which they are relied upon 
display a connection with the Community 
system."
Like the German doctrine, the principle of 
proportionality when applied under Community law 
to the "constitutional" judicial review of Member 
States' legislation is a complex test, involving 
three separate evaluations: (i) the national 
legislation should be appropriate or relevant in 
the sense that the substance of, and the 
relationship between, the means used and the ends 
sought in the national legislation is neither 
factually impossible nor unlawful in general 
Community law; (ii) the national legislation 




























































































sense that it constitutes a formulation which 
least restricts the general operation of 
Community law; (iii) the national legislation 
should be balanced or proportionate in the sense 
that it does not excessively adversely affect the 
four freedoms (of persons, services, goods and
capital) protected under the Community treaties. 
34
3. PROPORTIONALITY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM
The application of, particularly, the latter two 
tests included within the Community doctrine of 
proportionality involves the national courts in 
deciding large questions. Such matters as 
determining whether or not national legislation
34. See the Opinion of Advocate-General Van Gerven in 
SPUC v. Grogan (C-159/90) ECJ judgment of 4 October 1991, 
reported in [1991] 3 CMLR 689 at paragraph 27:
"The principle [of proportionality] has two 
aspects. First, in order for a national rule 
to be justified under law it must be
objectively necessary in order to help achieve 
the aim sought by the rule: that means it must 
be useful (or relevant) and indispensable, in 
other words it must not be capable of being 
replaced by an alternative rule which is 
equally useful but less restrictive of the 
freedom to supply services. Secondly if the 
national rule is useful and indispensable in 
order to achieve the aim sought, the member 
state must nevertheless drop the rule, or 
replace it with a less onerous one if the 
restrictions caused to intra-Community trade by 
the rule are disproportionate, that is to say 
of the restrictions caused are out of 
proportion to the aim sought by or the result 




























































































excessively affects Community and might be better 
and less restrictively formulated are not ones 
which the United Kingdom courts have 
traditionally seen themselves as competent to 
decide. Thus, in Gibson v. The Lord Advocate, 
35 a Scottish case in which a challenge was made 
to the validity of certain EEC fishing 
regulations on the grounds that they were 
contrary to Article XVIII of the Treaty of Union 
between Scotland and England which provided that 
"no alteration be made in laws which concern 
private right, except for the evident utility of 
the subjects within Scotland" Lord Keith of 
Kinkel stated: 3®
"The making of decisions upon what must 
essentially be a political matter is no 
part of the function of this court, and 
it is highly undesirable that it should 
be. The function of this court is to 
adjudicate upon the particular rights 
and obligations of individual persons, 
natural or corporate, in relation to 
other persons or, in certain 
circumstances, to the State. A general 
inquiry into the utility of certain 
legislative matters as regards the 35
35. Gibson v. Lord Advocate [1975] 1 CMLR 563.




























































































population generally is quite outside 
its competence."
More recently Hoffman J., in a judgment
concerning the compatibility of the English 
Sunday trading restriction with article 30 of the 
Treaty of Rome, called upon the European Court to 
exercise restraint in judicially reviewing 
legislation and in requiring national courts to 
do the same. He stated: 37
"In my judgment it is not my function to 
carry out a balancing exercise or to 
form my own view as to whether the 
legislative objects could be achieved by 
other means. These questions involve 
compromises between competing interests 
which in a democratic society must be 
resolved by the legislature. ... The 
function of this court is to review the 
acts of the legislature but not to 
substitute its own policies or values.
This is not an abdication of judicial 
responsibility. The primacy of the
democratic process is far more important 
than the question of whether our Sunday 
trading laws could or could not be 
improved."
37. In Stoke on Trent City Council v. B & Q pic [1991] 




























































































Notwithstanding Hoffman J.'s fears for the 
democratic process and Lord Keith's concerns as 
to the proper delimitation between politics and 
judging, Community law as it currently stands 
requires national courts to apply these tests in 
evaluating national legislation. 38
4. THE APPLICATION OF PROPORTIONALITY TO SUNDAY 
TRADING
In a series of cases which have resulted from 
challenges by large retailing concerns to the 
restrictions on Sunday trading in England and 
Wales laid down by Section 4 7 of the Shops Act 
1950 it has become clear that the national courts 
duty to "disapply" provisions of Acts of
Parliament held to violate Community law is not 
being used consistently across the country 
because the principle of proportionality is being 
interpreted in differing ways. The result of 
this confusion has been a lack of uniformity in 
the application of both the provisions of
38. See also the remarks of Sheriff J.R. Smith in
Walkinqshaw v. Marshall 1992 SLT 1167 at 1670 on the 
necessity for a court to conduct a full inquiry into all 
relevant facts before being able to pronounce on the 





























































































national law and the principles of Community law 
within one Member State.
(i) A history of litigation
Sunday trading cases have been coming before the
English courts as a result of what has been
termed a "war of attrition" conducted since 1987
by large retailers against the restrictions
imposed upon their trading on Sundays by the
Shops Act 1950. 39 The tactic of the campaign
against the Shops Act 1950 has been to find
"European defences" on which resist application
of the Act in the particular case. The favoured
defence to date has been to claim that the
restrictions on trading on a Sunday contravene
article 30 of the EEC Treaty by constituting an
quantitative restriction on imports from other
member states of the Community. Evidence is
produced to show that retailers who are required
to close on a Sunday lose a proportion of their
potential turnover, some of which would be
attributable to imports from ether EEC countries.
Further, Sunday shopping is claimed to have
39. See Diamond: "Dishonourable Defences: the use of
injunctions and the EEC Treaty - case study of the Shops 
Act 1950" (1991) 54 Modern Law Review 72 for a useful
account of the history of the legislation and the 
campaign currently being conducted against it by large 
retailers. For an alternative slant on the Shops Act 
provisions see Arnull "What shall we do on a Sunday ?" 




























































































particular social characteristics which mean that 
the loss of sales occasioned by being closed on 
the Sunday is not made up by the retail outlet 
being open in the other six days.
(ii) Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q pic
References were made to the European Court of 
Justice by a number of courts before whom this 
defence was presented. The European Court 
considered the merits of this Article 30 defence 
in one test case, Torfaen Borough Council v. B & 
Q pic. 40 The Court held that a restriction on 
trade which applied without distinction of origin 
within one member state was a justifiable 
derogation from the principle of the free 
movement of goods if the trade restriction was 
intended to achieve some objective acceptable in 
law and that the means chosen were proportionate 
to that end.
The European Court considered that it was clearly 
"a legitimate part of economic and social policy, 
consistent with the objectives of public interest 
pursued by the Treaty" for a member state to lay 
down national rules regulating the opening hours
40 Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q pic (C-145/88)
[1989] ECR 3851; [1990] 1 CMLR 337; [1990] 1 All ER 129;




























































































of retail premises so as to accord with "national 
or regional socio-cultural characteristics". 
Thus the end at which the laws were aimed was, in 
principle, acceptable in Community law.
However, such national rules would only be 
compatible with Community law if their adverse 
effect on the free movement of goods in the 
Community was outweighed by their beneficial 
effects in reflecting the particular socio­
cultural characteristics of the nation or region 
in which they applied. The European Court
concluded that "the question whether the effect 
of specific national rules do in fact remain 
within that limit is a question of fact to be 
determined by the national court."
In effect the European Court of Justice was 
instructing the national courts in the United 
Kingdom to apply the doctrine of proportionality 
^  to the provisions of the Shops Act 1950 to 
determine whether or not the Act's provisions 
should be applied to the circumstances of the 
case before. 412
41. Paras 12-16 of the judgement of the Court.
42. As set out in, inter alia, article 3 of the 
Commission Directive 70/50/EEC of 22 December 1969 on the 
abolition of measures having an equivalent effect to 



























































































(iii) W.H. Smith Do-it-all Ltd and Another v. 
Peterborough City Council
125
In one of the first cases following the European 
Court's judgement in Torfaen, W.H. Smith Do-it- 
all Ltd and Another v. Peterborough City Council 
43, this notion of proportionality was considered 
in certain obiter dicta of Mustill L.J. He
noted that one interpretation of the concept of 
proportionality might lead the Courts into a type 
of cost benefit analysis whereby weight would be 
attributed,, for example, to the aim of realizing 
the free movement of goods as against the weight 
to be given to the achievement of particular 
socio-cultural object (assuming that this could 
be identified) implicit in the challenged 
national measure. The learned judge thought
that such a weighing exercise would, in general, 
be too difficult a matter for the courts. It 
was political choice which decided the precedence 
to be given to different aims in society. Even 
if values could be given to these different aims, 
there remained the problem of incommensurability. 
He asked, rhetorically: 43 4
"How could (say) a desire to keep the 
Sabbath holy be measured against the
43. See note 23.




























































































free-trade economic premises of the 
Common Market ?"
Instead Mustill L.J. favoured an alternative 
approach to the determination of whether or not 
the restrictive effect of a national rule on 
trade exceeded the effects intrinsic to that 
rule. This approach involved breaking the 
question down to a series of judgements. The 
national court was first to determine whether or 
not the measure in question could be said to be 
equivalent to a quantitative restriction on 
imports. Having answered 'yes' to that 
question, the court had then to consider whether 
or not the objective of the national measure was 
one which Community law accepted as a justifiable 
one. If the answer to this question were in the 
affirmative, then the national court could go on 
to determine whether or not the national measure 
went further than was necessary to achieve its 
legitimate purpose.
It is clear that Mustill J. is only applying the 
appropriateness and necessity tests, and avoids 
the last test, proportionality in a strict sense 
whereby he should consider whether or not the 
restrictions to intra-Community trade caused by 




























































































sought by or the result brought about by that 
national rule
(iv) Stoke on Trent City Council v. B & Q pic
Hoffman J. in Stoke on Trent City Council v. B & 
Q pic 45 was, when granting an injunction against 
illegal Sunday trading, was even more restrictive 
in his understanding of proportionality.
He was hostile to the idea that the doctrine of 
proportionality might involve the courts in some 
sort of balancing exercise between the value of 
relatively shopping free Sundays against the 
value of free movement of goods within the 
Community. Neither did he think it appropriate 
for the court to consider whether or not the 
legislative objective (which he identified as the 
ensuring, so far as possible, that shopkeepers 
and shop assistants did not have to work on 
Sundays) could be achieved by other less- 
restrictive means. He stated 4®
"Is this court to apply its own opinion 
of the importance of ensuring that shop 
workers do not have to work on Sundays 
and weight that against its opinion of
45. Stoke on Trent Borough Council v. B & Q pic [1990] 
3 CMLR 31 at 34; [1991] Ch 48; [1991] 2 WLR 43. 46




























































































the importance of selling more Dutch 
bulbs or Italian furniture ? If the 
legislature has declined to adopt any 
modifications of the existing 
exceptions, is the court to say that 
modifications should nevertheless be 
introduced because in its opinion they 
would not detract from the legislative 
object and would mean that the Act was 
less of a hindrance to trade ?"
The answer to these questions is that in 
Community law that is precisely his duty. On 
Hoffman J.'s understanding, however, the doctrine 
of proportionality is to be limited to a 
consideration of the first test only, that of a 
rational connection between the aim sought and 
the means used in the legislation. Thus, per 
Hoffman J. the court could only hold a measure to 
be disproportionate if it considered that no 
reasonable legislature could have held the view 
that the aim of this legislation justified the 
reduction in trade consequent upon its 
application and that that aim could not have been 
achieved by other, less trade-restrictive, 
measures. The rationale for this limitation of 
the court' s function was that for the court to 
substitute its own view as to other less-trade 




























































































adopted in order to achieve the same end would be 
for the court to subvert the democratic process 
by usurping the function of the legislature.
The approach which Hoffman J. appears to be 
applying in considering the proportionality of 
legislation is that of "Wednesbury
unreasonableness", 47 which is a standard 
developed in English administrative law whereby 
only decisions which might be described as 
completely unreasonable, outrageous or absurd 
decisions might be struck down by the courts. 
However, as we have seen, the concept of 
reasonableness implicit within the
proportionality test is not "that which is not 
absurd or outrageous". Rather, the standard 
applied in the proportionality tests is that of 
ordinary reasonableness: that is to say, that
which constitutes the most efficient and least 
restrictive thing to do in the circumstances.
Hoffman J.'s approach assimilates the test of
proportionality with existing standards applied
in English administrative law. Having been
instructed by the European Court to apply the
tests of proportionality, he attempts to
interpret the test in a manner which renders it
47. The concept of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" is 




























































































consistent with the "proper" role of judges, at 
least as this has been understood since the post- 
1689 constitutional settlement in the United 
Kingdom. The equation of proportionality with 
"Wednesbury unreasonableness" is justified on the 
basis of broad appeals to constitutional 
legitimacy and democracy as these have been 
traditionally understood- in the United Kingdom. 
In particular he seeks to preserve the 
traditional diffidence shown by United Kingdom 
judges in relation to political matters.
To back up his understanding of proportionality 
as containing within it the standards of 
"Wednesbury unreasonableness", Hoffman J. quoted 
from a number of cases from Canada and the United 
States of America. 4® It is noteworthy that 
reference was made to proportionality as applied 
to the judicial review of legislation in other 
common law countries, rather than to the case-law 
of the European Court of Justice. 49 It is not
48. He refers to the Canadian cases Ackroyd v . 
McKechnie (1986) 161 CLR 60, Reference re anti-inflation 
Act (1976) 68 DLR (3rd) 425 Edward Books and Art Ltd, v. 
The Queen (1986) 35 DLR (4th) 1 and to the American 
Supreme Court decision on Sunday trading legislation 
McGowan v, Maryland (1961) 366 U.S. 420, 507.
49. It is interesting to note that the courts in Canada 
appear to have adopted the three-fold test of 
proportionality developed in German and Community law 
when assessing legislation for its conformity with 
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
In R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 in considering whether 
legislation limiting the rights and freedoms set out in 




























































































self-evident that common law countries, with a 
tradition of a certain judicial self-restraint, 
should have developed the notion of 
proportionality in the same way as those civilian 
systems with specific constitutional courts whose 
jurisprudence provided the basis for the adoption 
by the European Court of Justice of 
proportionality as a general principle of law.
The fundamental flaw in Hoffman J.'s approach is 
that proportionality is not a test developed 
within English law. As we shall see 50 the 
House of Lords has shown hostility to the 
proposed reception of the test of proportionality 
within the general administrative law of the 
United Kingdom. Proportionality has been
developed by courts which do not necessarily 
share that particular British vision of the
democratic society, the Canadian Supreme Court stated (at 
139) :
First, the measures adopted must be carefully 
designed to meet to achieve the objective in 
question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair 
or based on irrational considerations. In
short they must be rationally connected to the 
objective. Second, the means, even if
rationally connected to the objective in this 
first sense, should impair 'as little as 
possible' the right or freedom in question. ...
Third there must be proportionality between the 
effects of the measures which are responsible 
for limiting the Charter rights or freedom, and 
the objective which has been identified as of 
sufficient importance."
R v . Oakes was not cited by Hoffman J. in his 
consideration of proportionality.




























































































polity and of the requirements of the rule of law 
as regards the proper balance between judges and 
legislators. Judges in the United Kingdom are 
not being asked to apply an English law test of 
proportionality, but in acting as Community 
courts, to apply a Community law test. They 
have to act as Community judges.
(v) B & Q Ltd, v. Shrewsbury and Atcham Borough 
Council
A contrasting approach to that of Hoffman J. 
which does not seek to restrict proportionality 
to existing standards of national administrative 
law is illustrated by a Crown Court judgement 
dated 20 July 1990, only two days after the 
Hoffman judgement, which appears not to have been 
cited to that court. In an appeal from
magistrates to the Crown Court in B & Q Ltd, v. 
Shrewsbury and Atcham Borough Council, 51 Judge 
Northcote applied the "least restrictive
alternative test", the second requirement of the 
proportionality doctrine, and decided that this 
required that the offending provisions of the 
Shops Act be disapplied. He stated:
"The question for the court was
therefore in our judgement: 'Could the




























































































objective, namely of employee protection 
with regard to Sunday employment, be 
achieved by other means which are less 
of a hindrance to trade?'
The appellant, through his professional 
witnesses, suggested the following:
1. A contractual requirement that no 
employee should be required to work on 
Sundays against their will.
2. Extension of the fifth Schedule of 
the Act to include items the appellant 
desires to sell on Sundays ...
3. Some limitation on the hours of 
opening for Sunday trading.
4. Licensing by local authorities.
We do not have to say which alternative 
we favour, but it is clear in our 
judgement that one or other of these 
means would achieve the desired object 
with considerable less of a hindrance to 
trade in general - to trade in goods 
having an origin in another Member State 
in particular."
(vi) Alternative Notions of Proportionality in 
English Sunday Trading Laws
It is clear that there are conflicting notions of 




























































































United Kingdom courts in the judicial review of 
legislation under Community law. Both Hoffman 
J. and Judge Northcote were agreed as to the 
purpose of the Shops Act 1950 and both accepted 
that this end was one which was justified under 
law, provided that the measure was proportionate 
to that end. However, the view of Hoffman J. 
was that, in applying the proportionality test to 
legislation the courts should assume that 
Parliament had considered the legislation to be 
proportionate in passing the measure. 
Accordingly the court should only substitute its 
own judgement as to the legislation's 
disproportionality if the court could hold that 
the legislation was such that no reasonable 
legislature could in fact have considered it to 
be proportionate.
By contrast, the approach taken by Judge 
Northcote involves the court actively considering 
the possibility of a "less-restrictive 
alternative" to the existing legislation once the 
aim of that legislation has been identified. 
Hence, despite being agreed as to the aim of the 
legislation, in applying two different tests the 





























































































In an effort to prevent precisely this piecemeal 
application of the Shops Act throughout England 
and Wales, Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C 
expressly approved of the approach of Hoffman J. 
and stated that it was to be held to be a 
definitive judgement as far as courts of first 
instance were concerned on the question of the 
proportionality of Section 47 of the Shops Act 
1950. 52 However Hoffman J.'s judgement in
Stoke on Trent City Council v, B & Q pic was 
appealed directly to the House of Lords which, 
having heard argument on the matter, decided on 
20 May 1991 to make an Article 177 reference to 
the European Court of Justice for clarification 
of the European law applicable to the issue.
(vii) A new approach to proportionality from
the European Court
Partly in response to the English courts' 
confused response to the matter, there appears to 
have been a re-formulation of the position of the 
European court on the question of the application 
of proportionality by national courts. In a 
conjoined Opinion in two cases, Sidef Conforama 
and Marchandise, dealing with the validity of 
French and Belgian Sunday employment restrictions
52. Stoke on Trent Borough Council v. Toys 'R' Us Ltd. 




























































































^  Advocate General Van Gerven suggested a change 
of approach with regard to proportionality. He 
challenged the decision of the European court in
Torfaen to leave the question of the
proportionality of a national measure to the 
national courts on the grounds that such an
approach might lead to non-uniform application of 
the law throughout the Community. He state1? 
"Clearly, it is not a matter for the 
Court to pronounce on the validity of a 
national rule, in the course of article 
177 procedure; nevertheless, the Court 
has always insisted on the fact that to 
achieve the collaboration with national 
courts envisaged by this provision, it 
is competent to extract the matters of 
law whose interpretation is necessary to 
allow the national court to decide the 
case before it in accordance with law.
Only this method allows the safeguarding 
of the principle objective of the 
preliminary ruling procedure which is to 
ensure the uniform application 
throughout the of the provisions of law 53
53. Opinion of 22 November 1990 in Union departementale 
des syndicats CGT de l'Aisne v. Sidef Conforama and other 
(C-312/89) and Criminal Proceedings v. Andre Marchandise 
and others (C-332/89) reported in [1991] ECR 1007 at para 
5 [Author's translation].



























































































so as to avoid that their effect vary 
according to the interpretation given 
them in different member states."
Van Gerven almost appeared to be suggesting that 
national courts were incapable of understanding 
how to apply the Community's proportionality 
test, and that the European Court should simply 
state the result they see as required by 
Community law.
More radically, however, Van Gerven went on to 
re-interpret the Community's test of 
proportionality. He suggested that there were 
in fact two distinct tests in the one principle 
of proportionality. The first was that a
national measure must be shown to be in fact 
aimed at some aim accepted in Community law and 
to be the least restrictive alternative in 
pursuing that aim. This is the test Van Gerven 
calls "necessity". However, even where a
national measure is shown to be "necessary" in 
this sense, it may yet be struck down as 
"disproportionate" if the European Court feels 
that it adversely affect a Community freedom to 
too great a degree. He state** ^5
137




























































































"The criterion of proportionality 
requires that a measure, even if it is 
appropriate and constitutes the least 
restrictive alternative, is nevertheless 
incompatible with article 30 (and must 
therefore be abandoned or replaced with 
a less efficient rule) because the 
restriction on intra-Community trade are 
disproportionate in relation to the goal 
sought to be achieved."
According to Van Gerven's re-interpretation, 
while national courts might be competent to 
decide upon the "necessity" of a measure, it is 
for the European Court alone to evaluate the 
balance between the pursuit of the justified 
objective and the restrictions caused thereby 
when called upon to interpret articles 30 and/or 
36 in the light of a particular national rule 
described in an article 177 reference. 56
There would appear to be no reason why this 
development should be restricted to national 
legislation which has Article 30 implications; 
that is to say, which has the effect of creating 
constitutive restrictions on the import of goods 
from other parts of the Community. Van Gerven's




























































































approach would seem to apply to any case in which 
one it could be argued that one of the 
fundamental principles of the Community order is 
affected by national legislation. In such a 
situation, it might be claimed that the question 
of that national act's "proportionality - the 
strict sense" in relation to Community law is 
also a matter solely for the judgment of the 
European court.
Van Gerven's re-defined test of "proportionality 
in the strict sense", applied after the tests of 
appropriateness and necessity have been satisfied 
appears to be precisely the broad "cost-benefit" 
interpretation of proportionality which was 
rejected by both Mustill L.J. and Hoffman J. as 
being unacceptable encroachment by the judiciary 
into the political sphere. Clearly Van Gerven 
does not share this diffidence.
The Van Gerven re-defined hurdle of
"proportionality in the strict sense" appears to
leave the European Court with unfettered
discretion to strike down any measure as being
"disproportionate" despite being aimed the least
restrictive alternative pursuing an end
recognised as legitimate in European law. ^7
57. This second hurdle approach is strikingly
parallelled also in the way in which the Court has 




























































































Oddly enough, it seems to be the creation of a 
catch-all "Wednesbury unreasonableness" type of 
test, whereby national legislation can be 
dismissed as unacceptable within the Community, 
although seeming to pass the formal tests for its 
acceptance.
Somewhat surprisingly Van Gerven's approach to 
the doctrine of proportionality appears to have 
the support of the United Kingdom government. 
In its intervention, as set out in the Reports 
for the Hearing, in Reading Borough Council v. 
Payless DIY Ltd. the United Kingdom
government submitted that:
"The Torfaen judgment left the 
impression in British judicial circles 
that there must be a doubt to be 
resolved concerning the compatibility of 
the [Sunday trading] legislation at 
issue with Article 30.
Specifically, the immediate practical
difficulties arising from the situation
... can be resolved along the lines
suggested by Mr. Advocate-General Van *58
national measures in recent cases. See O ’Neill and
Coppel "The European Court of Justice : taking rights
seriously ?" [1992] Common Market Law Review 366





























































































Gerven in the Conforama and Marchandise 
cases . . . where he concluded that the 
task of assessing the necessity and 
proportionality of the legislation 
should not be left to the national 
courts and that those issues can be 
resolved 'easily' in favour of the 
validity of the legislation."
Advocate-General Van Gerven and the United 
Kingdom government appear to be agreed that 
proportionality is not a suitable doctrine to be 
applied by national courts - the former 
presumably from a fear that national courts would 
be too respectful of national interests and 
insufficiently communautaire, the latter because 
of the fear that national courts will be 
enthusiastically communautaire and usurp the 
function of the national legislature.
However, for the European Court to arrogate to 
itself the task of determining the 
proportionality of national legislation would be 
for the Court unequivocally to vest in itself the 
power to harmonize national legislation, which is 
quite clearly beyond the scope of Article 177 of 




























































































The European Court has stated on numerous 
59occasions
"Although it is not open to the Court to 
pass judgment in the context of Article 
177 of the Treaty on the validity or the 
interpretation of a national law, none 
the less, for the purpose of assisting 
national courts, it is within its powers 
to extract the matters of Community law 
the interpretation of which is necessary 
to enable the national court to give 
judgment on the dispute before it in 
accordance with Community rules."
The provisions of the Shops Act 1950, with its 
long and apparently random lists of goods and 
shops excepted or covered by the Act seems almost 
designed to prevent the usual approach of the 
Court of Justice which is to describe a 
hypothetical national law in general terms which 
would, or would not, be compatible with Community 
law. The sheer specificity of the provisions of 
the Shops Act make it difficult to be described 
in general terms.
In the House of Lords reference in Stoke on Trent
the European Court was faced directly with the
59. See for example Attorney General v. Burqoa (C- 




























































































task of either leaving the assessment of 
proportionality of national legislation with the 
national courts and thereby face the risk of the 
non-uniform interpretation and application of a 
Community law doctrine and consequently of 
Community law, or, in the interests of uniformity 
to take upon itself the task of assessing 
national legislation's proportionality and hence 
validity. The latter approach is in line with 
previous cases in which the Court has declared 
its competence to rule on the meaning to be 
attributed to provisions of national law when 
these make reference to Community law. and
where it has accepted references from national 
courts outside the scope of article 177. 61
(viii) The ECJ judgement in Stok-on-Trent
The European Court of Justice replied to this 
reference on 16 December 1992 62 and found as a 
matter of fact that the provisions regarding 
Sunday opening contained in Section 47 of the 
Shops Act 1950 did not disproportionately affect
60. See Dzodzi v. Belgium (C-197, 297/88) [1990] ECR
3763; Gmurzynska-Bscher v. Oberfinanzdirektion Koeln (C- 
231/89) [1990] ECR 4003
61. Criminal Proceedings against J. J. Zwartveld and 
others (C-2/88) [1990] ECR 3365
62. Stoke on Trent Borough Council v, B & Q pic (C- 
169/91), 16 December 1992, European Court of Justice 




























































































intra-Community trade. In the face of the 
difficulties of the English courts in applying 
the test of proportionality, the Court of Justice 
took it upon itself to determine the 
proportionality of national legislation, in the 
sense of ruling on the aim of the legislation, 
assessing the restrictive effects of the 
legislation in practice, and weighing the 
national interest in attaining the aim of the 
legislation against the Community interest in 
ensuring the free movement of goods. In doing 
the very same exercises with which the English 
courts found themselves in such difficulty, the 
European Court was ruling directly and 
unequivocally on the validity of national 
legislation, without even the pretence of 
advising national courts about questions of 
Community law. As we have seen this was, 
somewhat paradoxically, a course urged on the 
European Court by the United Kingdom government 
itself. The justification given by the European 
Court for taking on this role appears to have 
been that it was necessary for it to do so in 
order to ensure the uniform application of 
Community law. As the Commission argued in the 
associated case of Reading Borough Council v. 
Payless Ltd, and others: 63
63. Reading Borough Council v. Payless Ltd, and others 




























































































[Examination of the proportionality of 
the possible barriers to intra-Community 
trade in relation to the aims pursued 
. . . cannot be left to be determined by 
national courts, in view of the danger 
that different national courts will 
reach different conclusions on cases 
which are similar.
Proportionality becomes, then, a test of general 
principle rather than one the result of which 
might vary with different findings of fact made 
by individual courts in particular cases.
(vii) Sunday Trading - the Constitutional 
Implications
It is clear that the matters raised by Torfaen 
and Stoke on Trent go far beyond the limited 
question as to whether or not the restrictions on 
Sunday retailing contained in the Shops Act 1950 
might be acceptable in Community law. In 
Torfaen the European Court instructed national 
courts to assess national legislation which 
derogated from the free movement of goods on the 
basis of the principle of proportionality. In 
this way the doctrine of proportionality has been





























































































introduced into the courts of the United Kingdom. 
Henceforth, national legislation in derogation 
from Community fundamental freedoms would seem to 
fall to be reviewed by every court within the 
United Kingdom on the basis of standards of 
"ordinary reasonableness".
Secondly there is the question of the proper 
relationship between the European Court and 
national courts - the notion of judicial 
subsidiarity. The task of the European Court 
under article 164 of the EEC treaty is simply to 
see that in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaty the law is observed. Its concern is 
with Community law. The Court has no
jurisdiction or right to rule on questions of 
national law.
The European Court emphasised the importance of 
the principle of the co-operation of national 
courts to ensure the full and effective
protection of rights acquired under Community law 
in each member state. In emphasising the
superiority of Community law over national law, 
it has insisted that national courts apply 
Community principles in assessing national 64
64. See Ward "National remedies after Factortame and




























































































legislation. However, as has been seen in case 
of the proportionality, the application of these 
principles has led to non-uniform interpretations 
and applications of national law.
In the drive for uniform application of Community
leads the European Court now claims that it alone
can determine the question as to the
proportionality of national law in relation to
Community objectives. As Advocate General Van
Gerven stated in Stoke on Trent: 65
"With regard to the assessment of
proportionality it is in my view for the
[European] court and for the [European]
court alone, clearly and imperatively to
indicate in its case law the criteria to
be used in that assessment. It is then
the joint task of the [European] court
and the national court to apply those
criteria drawn from existing case law to
the concrete legal and factual context.
... If it appear from the findings of
the national court and the arguments
submitted to the [European] Court that
there is no room for any doubt, the
[European] Court itself ... will state
65. Stoke on Trent Borough Council v. B & Q pic (C- 
169/91), 16 December 1992, European Court of Justice 




























































































the results of the assessment under 
Community law... If the [European] Court 
has not itself made an assessment on the 
basis of the information provided to it 
... then the national court, where 
necessary after further examination of 
the legislative and factual context, and 
in the light of the [European] Court's 
reply to the preliminary question, must 
arrive at its own decision regarding the 
application of the proportionality 
requirement."
Notwithstanding Van Gerven's qualifications and 
nods to judicial co-operation, in applying the 
proportionality test to provisions of national 
legislation the European Court is uneqiovocally 
asserting its competence and right to interpret 
and determine the validity of national rather 
than Community law. This represents a 
fundamental shift in the judicial polity within 
the Community as set out in the original 
treaties. Others might argue that it is simply 
the lifting of a veil and is a necessary 
consequence of the creation by the European Court 
of Justice of a European federal legal system.
To rule openly and directly on the 
proportionality of a national law might be 




























































































extension of the Court's jurisdiction as nothing 
more than the logical recognition of the 
principle of the uniformity of Community law 
which has lain behind the Court's decisions since 
Costa v. ENEL.
However, a properly federal legal system cannot 
ultimately be founded on judicial co-operation 
but must, in the last analysis, involve the 
assertion of formal legal hierarchy, in which the 
Federal supreme court which the European Court of 
Justice aspires to be, may pronounce on the 
legality of all laws, Member State and Community, 
applied throughout the territory of the 
Communities. Once the European Court openly 
reviews and strikes down, or indeed sustains or 
upholds, the legislation of Member States as 
contrary or conform to the spirit of the 
Treaties, its relationship to the national courts 
of member states becomes one of hierarchy rather 
than the co-operation of co-equals. The Court 
of Justice of the European Communities becomes, 




























































































5 PROPORTIONALITY AMD INDIRECT SEX
DISCRIMINATION
(i) Indirect sex discrimination in Community 
Law
The European Court has adopted and adapted from 
the United States race relations legislation the 
concept of "indirect discrimination" whereby the 
fact that certain (apparently neutral or gender- 
blind) criteria required by an employer 
disproportionately and adversely affects 
employees of one sex rather than the other is 
held to establish prima facie the existence of 
sex discrimination, notwithstanding the absence 
of any evidence of intent to engage in sex 
discrimination. 66 In the face of such evidence 
of disparate impact of such measures as between 
men and women, the onus is placed on the party 
seeking to uphold the validity of those measures 
to justify them on objective grounds, unrelated 
to discrimination on grounds of sex. .
Failure of the party seeking to uphold measures 
to adduce evidence justifying the measures to the
66. See Jenkins v. Kinqsqate Ltd (C-96/80) [1981] ECR
911, in particular the Opinion of Advocate General Warner 
at 936-7 referring to Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971) 
401 US 424. 67
67. See Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber von Hartz (C- 




























































































satisfaction of the court will lead to the Court 
to conclude that the measures are a form of 
unacknowledged sex discrimination and fall to be 
declared to be unlawful.
In the case of an allegedly discriminatory 
practice by an individual employer the European 
court has stated that objective justification of 
disparate impact practices will be established if 
the measures can be said to be appropriately and 
necessarily aimed at meeting some "real need on 
the part of the undertaking" 68, unrelated to any 
discrimination on the grounds of sex.
(ii) Indirect sex discrimination in U.K. law
The concept of indirect sex discrimination 
already existed in domestic United Kingdom law, 
having been introduced into United Kingdom law by 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. Section 
1(1)(b) of the Act is in the following terms:
"1(1) A person discriminates against a 
women in any circumstances relevant for 
the purposes of this Act if - ...
(b) he applies to her a requirement or 
condition which applies or would apply 
equally to a man but -



























































































(i) which is such that the proportion of
women who can comply with it is
considerably smaller than the proportion 
of men who can comply with it, and
(ii) which he cannot show to be
justified irrespective of the sex of the 
person to whom it is applied, and
(iii) which is to her detriment because 
she cannot comply with it.
(iii) Indirect sex discrimination and the review 
of national legislation
The European Court has extended the notion of 
indirect sex discrimination beyond that
contemplated in the British legislation. 
European indirect discrimination is held to be 
applicable not only to the practices of
individual employers, but also to the provisions 
of national legislation of Member States.
In Rinner-Kuehn 69 German legislation provided
that six weeks sick pay be paid by employers to
employees who worked more than 10 hours a week or
45 hours a month. The requirement of a minimum
working period before being covered by the sick
pay provisions gave rise to disparate impact of
69. Rinner-Kuehn v. FWV Spezial Gebaudereiniqunq GmbH &





























































































the provisions as between men and women. The 
European Court held that in the case of national 
legislation which is shown to have a disparate 
impact as between men and women, such legislation 
will fall foul of the general principle in 
Community law of equal treatment unless it can 
be shown to be aimed at achieving some "necessary 
aim of [a Member State's] social policy". 7® 
Further such measures will also have to be shown 
to be "appropriate and necessary" means to 
achieving the intended objective. 70 1 This last 
proviso appears to be a re-statement of the test 
of proportionality, which, as we have seen, has 
been developed by the European court as a general 
principle of law in relation, inter alia, to the 
lawfulness of Member States' prohibitions of 
economic activities protected by the European 
Treaties. 72
As with the Sunday trading legislation the 
European Court has consistently stated that the 
question as to whether or not a measure is 
objectively justified according to the criteria
70. Rinner-Kuehn note 16 at para 14 p 2761
71. loc cit.
72. See for example Commission v. Denmark ('Danish 
Bottles') (C-302/86) [1988] ECR 4607 at 4629 para 6 and R 
v. Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte 
Federation Europeene de la Sante Animale (FEDESA) and 




























































































set out by it is a matter of fact for national 
courts to establish and is not a matter for the 
European Court.
Thus, the task for the national court when 
national legislation is challenged on the grounds 
of its causing indirect sex discrimination is to 
consider firstly whether or not the legislation 
is aimed at some necessary aim of the State's 
social policy and, secondly, whether or not the 
legislative means chosen to achieve that end pass 
the test of proportionality as developed by the 
European Court. The current state of Community 
law requires national judges to take a view as to 
whether or not national legislative provisions 
which can be shown, statistically, to have a 
disparate impact as between men and women can or 
cannot be justified on the basis of some 
national social policy. Further, as we have 
seen, the judges then have to assess the utility, 
necessity and appropriateness of such national 
legislation in achieving that policy.
Thus in R v. Secretary of State for Employment, 
ex parte Schaffter the court stated: 73 4
73. Bilka note 14 at para 36 p 1628.
74. R v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte 




























































































"The principle of equal treatment 
enshrined in the [equal treatment] 
directive is prima facie not being 
observed if, in a situation where there 
is an equal number of men and women in 
the population , one sees a practice 
working in reality in such a way that 
many more women are adversely affected 
by it. ...
The Secretary of State must show that 
the advantages of the distinction drawn 
[by the law] are such that, giving due 
weight to the principle of 
proportionality the unequal treatment of 
women which I have found to occur is in 
fact justified."
The presumption appears to be that national 
legislation having disparate impact will be held 
to be invalid unless shown to be justified by 
national policy. The onus is on the national 
authorities to appear before their national 
courts to defend the legislation. In one way 
those courts' task is easier when legislation is 
challenged on the grounds of its allegedly 
discriminatory impact than simply on its general 
incompatibility with Community law because the 




























































































before the court to specify what policy the 
legislation is aimed at. In other cases, such 
as the Sunday trading challenges, the courts have 
been required to come to their own views as to 
the policy behind the Shops Act 1950 before
determining its compatibility with European law. 
75
6. THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION CASE
(i) EOC - indirect sex discrimination and the 
justification of national policy
The implications of the European Court's decision 
in Rinner-Kuehn have only recently come to be 
realised in the United Kingdom. The first case 
requiring national authorities to justify 
legislation which has disparate impact was 
brought before the national courts in October 
1991. In R. v. Secretary of State for 
Employment, ex parte the Equal Opportunities 
Commission and Another an action for judicial
75. See for example the Sunday trading cases applying 
the European Court ruling in Torfaen Borough Council v. B 
& Q pic (C-145/88) [ 1989] ECR 3851 viz.: W.H. Smith Do-
it-All Ltd and Another V . Peterborough Citv Council
[1990] 2 CMLR 577 ; Stoke on Trent City Council v. B & Q
pic [1991] 2 WLR 42 ; B & 0 pic V. Shrewsbury and AtchamBorough Council [1990] 3 CMLR 535; Mendip District
Council v. B & Q pic [19911 1 CMLR 113, Kirklees Borough
Council v. Wickes Building Supplies Ltd. [1991] 3 WLR
985, [1992] CMLR 765 HL.




























































































review was brought by the Equal Opportunities 
Commission (EOC) of a statement made by the 
Secretary of State for Employment in 
correspondence with the EOC to the effect that 
the extant United Kingdom law contained in the 
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 
relating to unfair dismissal and redundancy 
payments was not contrary to European law.
The EOC argued that the fact that part-time 
workers were only entitled under the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 to bring an 
unfair dismissal complaint and/or claim for a 
statutory redundancy payment after five years 
continuous working, in comparison to the two 
years required for full time employees 
constituted indirect discrimination against women 
workers, contrary to article 119 of the Treaty of 
Rome as developed in the case law of the European 
Court of Justice. Statistical evidence was 
quoted to the effect that by far the greater 
proportion of part-time employees, some 90%, were 
women.
The court at first instance was quite clear that 
proceedings might have been brought by individual 
employees adversely affected by the part- 
time/full-time threshold before an industrial 




























































































existence of indirect discrimination to be 
justified, would be entitled to disapply the 
United Kingdom legislation as inconsistent with 
the direct rights of that individual employee 
under Community law. However, given the public 
nature of the duties of the Equal Opportunities 
Commission it was appropriate that judicial 
review proceedings be brought.
"If as a matter of primary legislation 
the employment arrangements for a 
substantial number of part-time 
employees in the United Kingdom are 
operating in a way which creates 
improper discrimination in the field of 
employment contrary to the basic 
principles of United Kingdom and 
European Community law that men and 
women should be treated equally while at 
work, and the Secretary of State 
responsible for employment arrangements 
throughout the United Kingdom wrongly 
decides that he will not take any steps 
to reduce or extinguish such wrongful 
discrimination, an issue of public law 
is raised in which, having regard to its 
statutory duties, it seems clear to us 
that the Equal Opportunities Commission 
has sufficient interest." ''




























































































The court at first instance accepted that the 
different qualifying thresholds for full-time and 
part-time work adversely affected a greater 
proportion of women than men. Given the fact 
that the vast majority of part-time workers in 
the United Kingdom are women and hence 
disproportionately affected by legislative 
differences between full-time and part-time 
workers, the legislation was , on the basis of 
European Court case law, potentially indirectly 
discriminatory. Accordingly, the national 
authorities were required under European law to 
justify the different thresholds for employment 
protection between full-time and part-time work 
contained in the Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) Act 1978 to the Court. Before 
the Court could uphold the legislation as valid, 
it required to find that it pursued a necessary 
aim of social policy in the United Kingdom and 
was proportionate in relation to that aim. In 78
78. Nolan LJ stated:
"Although it may appear somewhat strange that 
legislation which is not intended or worded to 
create discrimination on the grounds of sex 
should be liable to be treated as
discriminatory simply on the basis that a large 
proportion of those affected by it happen, as a 
result of particular social considerations, to 
belong to one sex rather than the other, it has 
been held [by the European Court] that an 
arrangement which has a disproportionate effect 




























































































the absence of proper justification, the 
offending provisions of the Act would be declared 
not to be applicable because contrary to the 
basic principle of Community law that men and 
women should be treated equally while at work.
The court at first instance also accepted the 
claim of the Secretary of State that the 
differential between full and part-time 
employments was aimed at ensuring that "as many 
individuals throughout the country should be able 
to work and to do so for as long as and in the 
circumstances which they choose." The court
accepted that any reduction in employment 
opportunities would be socially undesirable, 
perhaps indeed unacceptable. Accordingly the
aim of the Employment Protection legislation was 
accepted to be a legitimate one.
(ii) EOC - indirect discrimination and
proportionality
Turning to the question as to whether the 
legislative means were appropriate and necessary 
for the attainment of the stated objective, the 
Secretary of State claimed that abolition of the 
full-time/part-time distinction would lead to an 
increased burden on employers and consequently to 





























































































available. These claims were criticised by the 
EOC as "general unspecific and speculative", but 
the court found the Secretary of State's position 
to be "inherently logical". As a result, rather 
than require the Secretary of State to produce 
positive evidence to show how the differential 
maintains and/or encourages employment 
opportunities, the court turned the matter around 
and sought conclusive evidence from the EOC to 
show that, contrary to the assertions of the 
civil servants within the Department of 
Employment, the abolition of the differential 
between full- and part-time would not, in fact, 
lead to any reduction in employment 
opportunities. Perhaps unsurprisingly the court 
found such evidence as was produced to it 
inconclusive of that matter. Nolan LJ stated:
"As the evidence of the experience and 
arrangements in the other Member States 
was more closely analysed it became 
increasingly apparent that it was 
impossible to make satisfactory 
comparisons between the Member States or 
to reach the conclusion that an 
alteration or removal of qualifying 




























































































effect on opportunities for women in the 
United Kingdom to work part-time."
The court at first instance did not go on to 
consider the other aspects of the proportionality 
test, namely whether or not there was any less 
restrictive alternative to the present 
legislation and whether or not the claimed 
protection of employment opportunities was 
sufficiently great as to outweigh the negative 
impact of the continuing discrimination against 
part-time, which is to say principally women, 
workers.
(iii) EOC - the Constitutional Implications
The EOC intially sought a battery of remedies 
from the court. In addition to a declaration to 
the effect that the distinction between full and
79. In a conjoined application for judicial review, the 
EOC also argued that, given that redundancy payments are 
to be regarded as a form of deferred payment for working 
(On which see Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Group 
Ltd. (C-262/89) [1990] ECR 1889 para 13), U.K. statutory 
redundancy payments which were calculated, in part, on 
the basis of the employee's pay immediately before 
dismissal, discriminated against workers who had 
transferred to part-time work after a period of working 
full-time. The vast majority of such workers were 
women, and hence this statutory mode of calculating 
redundancy payments also constituted indirect sex 
discrimination. The Court was sceptical as to whether 
or not this could be called indirect discrimination 
against women and in any event found the statutory scheme 
to be objectively justified as a clear, simple and direct 
scheme for providing protection to employees, regardless 




























































































part-time employees contained in the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 should be 
disapplied on the basis of Community law, they 
also sought a declaration that the United Kingdom 
was in breach of its obligations under article 
119 of the Treaty of Rome and EEC directives 
75/117 and 7 6/207 on equal pay and equal 
treatment respectively as well as a declaration 
that the Secretary of State's failure to
introduce amending legislation before Parliament 
constituted a breach of the United Kingdom’s 
obligations under Community law. Finally the 
EOC sought an order of mandamus to require the 
Secretary of State to introduce appropriate
amending legislation before Parliament to ensure 
the conformity of United Kingdom law with the 
requirements of Community law.
In the event, the court at first instance held
that it had no jurisdiction to ordain the
Secretary of State to introduce rectifying 
legislation had the United Kingdom statute been 
found by the court not to conform to European 
law. It would be unconstitutional for a court 
in the United Kingdom to order either the 
Secretary of State or Parliament to fulfil
obligations under European law, or to make any 
declaration to that effect. The function of the 




























































































rights and obligations of the parties before it 
under the law which presently applied within the 
United Kingdom. As Nolan LJ stated:
"It is plain enough that Section 2 of 
the [European Communities] Act 1972 
alters the traditional relationship 
between the Courts and Parliament in 
this country in that it obliges the
courts to disregard the laws made by 
Parliament in so far as they conflict 
with directly enforceable Community law. 
Further than that it does not go. 
Domestic legislation remains a matter 
for Parliament, not for the Courts. ... 
Rights and duties which have become part 
of English law by virtue of Section 2 of 
the 1972 Act, or by virtue of
subordinate legislation made under that 
section are matters for us; the 
obligations of the United Kingdom under 
the EEC Treaty are not."
(iv) EOC - the judgment of the Court of Appeal
When the whole matter was appealed to the Court 
of Appeal a majority of the Court, Dillon L.J.
80. ibid, p 561
81. In an judgment handed down on 6 November 1992, 




























































































dissenting, dismissed the EOC1s applications in 
their entirety on the grounds that (i) there was 
no actual decision of the Secretary of State 
which was sought to be reviewed (ii) the EOC had 
no locus standi to bring judicial review 
proceedings. The whole Court of Appeal was 
agreed, however, that in the case of claims 
brought by an individual the appropriate forum in 
which the matter might be resolved was by way of 
private law claims before the industrial 
tribunals.
In dismissing the appeals on essentially 
procedural grounds, the Court of Appeal found it 
unnecessary to make any decision on the 
substantive issues raised by the case Only Dillon 
L.J. dealt with some of the substantive issues 
and found that the Secretary of State had failed 
to discharge the onus laid upon him to justify 
the different thresholds as between full and 
part-time workers for the application of 
employment protection legislation.
The Court of Appeal was very wary about the idea 
of judicial review of legislation. While 
conceding the European law might require this to 
be done, the court appeared unwilling to allow 
for existing judicial review in administrative 




























































































for fast-track "constitutional" review of U.K. 
legislation. Hirst L.J. stated: 82
"[W]here an individual ... is seeking to 
enforce directly effective rights under 
Article 119 [of the Treaty of Rome], the 
appropriate forum for their enforcement 
is unquestionably the Industrial 
Tribunal. This Tribunal will be
obliged under Section 2(1) of the 
[European Communities] Act of 1972 to 
disapply domestic legislation if and 
insofar as it is inconsistent with 
Community law, thus ensuring that 
Community law will prevail.”
Hirst L.J. was in any event not happy with the 
general proposition that national courts might 
submit national legislation to judicial scrutiny 
as regards its (non)- conformity with Community 
law, stating: 88
"Proceedings aimed at impleading the 
Government, or a Minister, for failure 
to fulfil their obligations under the 
Treaty to amend legislation inconsistent 
with the EEC law or Directives should in 
my judgment be brought not by the EOC or
82.
83.
ibid, at 23, para 128 




























































































any equivalent body in the English 
courts, but by the Commission, who are 
the guardians of the Treaty, in the ECJ 
under the machinery laid down in the 
Treaty itself in Article 169. In the 
light of the past record of the UK 
Government, ... any adverse ruling by 
the ECJ will quickly result in the 
introduction of amending legislation."
(v ) EOC summary
All of the judges in EOC, both at first instance 
on in the Court of Appeal, showed an 
unwillingness to carry out their duty to review 
national legislation under Community law. With 
the EOC case it has become clear that apparently 
indirectly discriminatory legislation is to be 
applied only insofar as considered justified by 
the court. There is therefore presumption that 
certain legislation is illegal, unless it can be 
shown to be justified. However, the judges in 
EOC appeared to operated under an equally strong 
presumption that legislation is to be considered 
justified if the Secretary of State says that it 
is justified, or unless and until the Commission 





























































































In concluding that legislation is justified if 
supported by the executive, the judges failed to 
carry out the whole new series of duties imposed 
upon them under the proportionality test. Where 
national legislation is challenged under 
Community law, the courts now have to check its 
aim, verify its proportionality, weigh the 
overall good achieved by it and think of less 
restrictive alternatives to the present 
arrangement. The judges at first instance in 
EOC appeared only to consider whether the aims of 
the legislation were legitimate and failed to 
carry out the other tests required by the 
proportionality doctrine. The judges of the 
Court of Appeal appeared to feel that such 
complex legal tests are best applied at the 
lowest possible level fo the judicial hierarchy, 
by the "industrial juries" of the Industrial 
Tribunal system, consisting of one legally 
qualified chairman sitting together with one 
representative of each of the "social partners", 
employers and employees.
7. CONCLUSION
In both the Sunday trading cases and the EOC 
judgments, it is clear that the validity or 
"Euro-constitutionality" of legislation is now to 




























































































assessing whether or not the policy choices of 
the Secretary of State and/or of Parliament are 
objectively justified and proportionate in their 
implementation. As a result the courts and
tribunals in the United Kingdom are forced to 
adopt a teleological approach to the
interpretation of certain national legislation. 
Such broad purposive readings of Acts of 
Parliament contradicts the traditional techniques 
of close analysis of the final texts of Acts of 
Parliament (specifically excluding any reference 
to such Parliamentary debates as preceded and led 
up to the law’s formal enactment) which has
characterised the approach, to date, of the 
United Kingdom courts to national statutes. 84
It is clear that the United Kingdom courts have
experienced difficulty in adopting the new
approaches required by Community law. In
particular, the principle of proportionality does
not yet appear to have been properly appreciated
or applied by the courts in the United Kingdom.
The reception of the doctrine is not yet
complete, but it is clear, given the way in which
Community law has developed of itself and as
regards proportionality that the doctrine will
84. See Bankowski and MacCormick "Statutory
Interpretation in the United Kingdom" in MacCormick and 
Summers (eds) Interpreting Statutes: a comparative study, 
1991; Twining and Miers How to do things with rules, 



























































































have to be accepted and applied by the national 
courts in matters covered by Community law, if 
the European Court of Justice finds itself with 
insufficient information to assess the question 
itself
The interesting question then become whether or 
not the doctrine will be accepted and applied by 
the United Kingdom courts in areas in which 
Community law does not yet apply. It is to that 

























































































































































































BRIND AND THE INDIRECT RECEPTION OF COMMUNITY LAW
1. THE IDEA OF THE INDIRECT RECEPTION OF LAW
In the previous chapter we have looked at the way 
in which Community law has required courts in the 
United Kingdom to apply concepts derived from 
Community law, in particular the principle of 
proportionality, to provisions of national law. 
This phenomenon might be termed the direct 
reception of Community law doctrines, in that it 
has occurred as a direct result of the acceptance 
by the United Kingdom courts of the supremacy of 
European law over conflicting national law 
provisions.
In this chapter I intend to examine whether or 
not there is any evidence in the case law of the 
United Kingdom courts for what might be termed 
the "indirect" influence and reception of 
Community law doctrines. The matter to be 
examined is whether or not the influence of 
Community law over the national system has become 
so strong as to have a "spillover effect" into 
areas of national law which are not, as yet, 




























































































1In M v. Home Office the Court of Appeal
considered the question as to whether or not a 
Minister of the Crown, in this instance the Home 
Secretary, could be found guilty of contempt of 
court. The High Court had ordered the Home 
Secretary to procure the return of an applicant 
for political asylum to the High Court's 
jurisdiction so that his application for judicial 
review of the refusal of political asylum could 
be given due consideration. The question of 
possible contempt of court arose from the fact 
that the Home Secretary had, on legal advice, 
decided not to comply with this order of the High 
Court but instead to challenge it as irregular on 
the grounds that it purported to grant a 
mandatory interim injunction against an officer 
of the Crown, contrary to Section 21 of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1947 and the decision of the 
House of Lords in the Factortame 1. ^
The Court of Appeal held that orders of the High 
Court fell to be complied with unless and until 
they had been set aside and that deliberate and 
wilful failure by ministers of the Crown and 
civil servants to comply with such order might 12
1. M v. Home Office [1992] 2 WLR 73
2. R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame Ltd. (No. 1) [1990] 2 AC 85. See infra 




























































































constitute contempt of court. Lord Donaldson MR 
went on, however as follows: ^
"It is anomalous, and in my judgment 
wrong in principle, that whereas the law 
gives the courts comprehensive power to 
preserve rights and to "hold the ring" 
pending a final decision in a dispute 
between citizens (including companies) 
or between citizens and local 
authorities, its powers where central 
government is involved are more 
circumscribed. It is even more 
anomalous that as a result of R. v. 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex 
parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 2) (Case C- 
213/89) 1 AC 603 and the operation of 
European Community law, they now have 
comprehensive powers even where central 
government is involved, but only in 
relation to rights under Community law."
Lord Donaldson’s remarks ("anomalous and wrong in 
principle") appear to show the inherent 
instability of the existence of two separate 
paradigms of legal reasoning and two distinct 
sets of rights and remedies within the same legal 
structure. However, his remarks do not show




























































































that any spillover has yet taken place, but 
merely point to the existence of tendencies which 
might promote such indirect influence of 
Community law principles and approaches.
Again the possibility of "spillover" from
European Community law is alluded to in Woolwich
Equitable Building Society v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners 4, where the House of Lords was
required to decide on the question as to whether
or not interest was repayable on monies which had
been paid to the Inland Revenue on the basis of
regulations which were subsequently declared to
be unlawful. The pre-existing common law had
allowed for recovery of monies paid to a public
authority only where there had been a mistake of
fact or where the monies had been extracted under
compulsion, but not where there had been a
voluntary payment made because of a mistake in
law. However, a majority of their Lordships
decided to extend the categories under which
recovery of interest was permitted to include the
situation where money was paid pursuant to an
ultra vires demand from a public authority.
Both of the Scottish judges on the Bench
dissented from this majority decision. One of
the factors which apparently persuaded the
4. Woolwich Equitable Building Society v. Inland Revenue 




























































































English judges to alter the common law was the 
position in European Community law. Lord Goff 
of Chieveley stated: ®
"[T]he decision of the European Court of 
Justice in Amministrazione delle Finanze 
dello Stato v. S.p.A San Giorgio (C- 
199/82) [1983] ECR 3595 ... establishes
that a person who pays charges levied by 
a Member State contrary to the rules of 
Community law is entitled to repayment 
of the charge, such right being regarded 
as a consequence of and an adjunct to, 
the rights conferred on individuals by 
the Community provisions prohibiting the 
relevant charges. ... I only comment
that, at a time when Community law is 
becoming increasingly important, it 
would be strange if the right of the 
citizen to recover overpaid charges were 
to be more restricted under domestic law 
than it is under European law."
Further, in response to a "flood gates" argument 
that to allow the principle to be established in 
this case would open up an infinite number of 
claims for interest in past cases, Lord Slynn of 
Hadley suggested 6 that the United Kingdom courts
5. Ibid, at page 177




























































































should be given the power to limit the effects of 
any order for recovery which they might make in 
the same way that the European Court of Justice 
can, under article 174 of the Treaty of Rome, 
state which of the effects of a regulation which 
it has declared void shall be considered 
definitive.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
If there is indeed spillover or indirect 
reception of European Community law in the United 
Kingdom it would appear most likely to be in the 
area of administrative law. Administrative law 
covers the area of the relationship between 
public bodies and persons, whether real or 
corporate. In that it deals primarily with 
matters relating to the internal organisation of 
the State and apart from agricultural matters 
does not have, in general, any intra-Community 
implications, 7 it is an area which, at the
7. Certain administrative decisions, for example the 
granting of export licences as in R. v. Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Roberts and 
others [1991] 1 CMLR 555 or the designation of licensed 
ports for particular imports in R. v. Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Bell Lines Ltd. 
and another [1984] 2 CMLR 502 might have implications for 
Community trade and could therefore come within the field 





























































































present phase of Community law, remains in the 
province of the national legislature and is 
relatively autonomous of Community law which has 
its own developed system. 8 9*
The European Court of Justice has developed a 
system of administrative law, inspired by both 
French and German law, and characterized by the 
application of the general principles of law 
noted in Chapter 3 as part of its duty 8 under 
article 164 to ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of the Treaty the law is 
observed. The European Court is charged with 
the task of seeing that both the Member States 
and the institutions of the Community respect the 
Community treaties and therefore seeks to ensure 
the proper administration of the Community order 
within a legal framework. Thus, one of the 
Court's fundamental concerns has always been to
8. For an brief survey of factors which tend to pull 
either toward or away from a common approach as between 
different systems of administrative law see John Bell 
"Convergences and Divergences in European Administrative 
Law" [1992] 2 Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico 
Comunitario 3.
9. See Akehurst "The Application of General Principles 
of Law by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities" 1982 British Year-book of International Law
29 at 38; Vacca: "L'integrazione dell'Ordinamento 
Comunitario col diritto degli stati membri e con i 
principi generali di diritto." (1991) Rivista di Diritto 
Europeo 339-349. For a magisterial survey of 
administrative law throughout the Community see Schwarze 




























































































guarantee the proper exercise of the powers of 
the various central Community institutions and to 
protect the rights and interests of persons, 
whether natural or corporate, affected by them 10
By contrast with the Community systems, 
administrative law in the United Kingdom is at an 
early stage of development. The legal systems 
of Scotland, Ireland and England all developed 
without reference to the trend toward 
systematization and codification which was common 
to the legal systems of west continental Europe 
during and after Napoleon. ^  In particular in 
none of those legal systems, which for 
convenience we might call Anglo-Celtic, did there 
grow up a separate judicial hierarchy for the 
review of administrative acts. Without the 
separate systems of courts a body of 
administrative, law distinct from the remedies 
provided for in private law, was slow in 
developing. As the Scottish judge. Lord Reid 
stated in 1964 in a House of Lords case relating
10. See Schwarze "Tendencies towards a common 
administrative law in Europe" [1991] European Law Review 
3 at 5-14 for a full survey of the European Court's 
development of Community administrative law. 1
11. For a general historical overview of the two 
systems see Sabino Cassese "Il problema della convergenza 
dei diritti amministrativi: verso un modello 
amministrativo europeo ?" (1992) 2 Rivista italiano di 




























































































to the dismissal of a Chief Constable without the 
benefit of a hearing: 12
"[W]e do not have a developed system of 
administrative law - perhaps because 
until fairly recently we did not need 
it. So it is not surprising that in 
dealing with new types of cases the 
courts have had to grope for solutions 
and have found that old powers, rules 
and procedures are largely inapplicable 
to cases which they were never designed 
to deal with."
It is a commonplace that in the last thirty years 
in the United Kingdom, notwithstanding the lack 
of any specialised administrative law tribunals, 
there has been an exponential growth in the 
development of a separate body of administrative 
law with its own remedies principles and
doctrines, distinct from those which apply to the 
sphere of private law. 13
In the absence of a separate judicial hierarchy 
for administrative law, what has been developed 
in both England and Scotland have been new legal 
procedures, distinct from the procedures which
12. Ridge v, Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40 at 72
13. See Woolf C.J., Protection of the Public - a new 




























































































apply to ordinary private law actions. The new 
English procedure for judicial review, known as 
Order 53, was introduced by the courts in England 
in 1977 ^  and was given statutory backing by
Sections 29 and 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
15 In Scotland the simplified judicial review 
procedure was created by a 1985 Act of Sederunt 
and is now contained in Rule of Court 260B. 
Under these new procedures the High Court in 
England and the Court of Session in Scotland can 
more readily and expeditiously exercise their 
existing supervisory jurisdiction over the 
proceedings and decisions of lower courts, 
(quasi)-judicial tribunals and of any other 
bodies charged, in England, with the performance
of public acts and duties or, in Scotland, to
which jurisdiction, power or authority had been 
delegated or entrusted by statute, agreement or 
any other instrument. 16 *
In Scotland, in contrast to the position in
England, the competency of an application for 
judicial review has been held not to rest on any
14. S.I. 1977 No. 1955
15. See Louis Blom-Cooper Q.C. "The New Face of
Judicial Review: Administrative Changes in Order 53" 1982 
Public Law 250.
16. See also Himsworth "Public Employment and the
Supervisory Jurisdiction" (1992) Scots Law Times (News)
123; Woolfe "The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Court of




























































































distinction between public and private law, but 
rather on the existence of a tripartite 
relationship among the decision maker, his 
jurisdiction to make a decision and the interests 
of the person affected by the decision. ^
These new procedures have encouraged an rapid 
growth in the applications to the courts for 
judicial review. 18 As a result of this 
explosive growth in applications for judicial 
review, the law itself has developed markedly. 18 
The development of this new body of law has been 
judge led, rather than by any act of the national 
legislature in the United Kingdom. One of
17. The relevancy tests for the exercise of the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session have 
been set out by the Lord President in West v. Secretary 
of State for Scotland [1992] IRLR 399 at 409; 1992 SLT 
636 at 640
"to ensure that the decision maker does not 
exceed or abuse his powers or fail to perform 
the duty which has been delegated or entrusted 
to him."
18. From 1981 to 1985 there was a doubling in the
number of applications made annually to the English High 
Court under Order 53. See Woolf L.J. "Public Law - 
Private Law: Why the Divide ? A Personal View" [1986]
Public Law 220 at 222.
19. For surveys of developments to date and proposals 
for future development see Jowell and Lester "Beyond 
Wednesbury: substantive principles of administrative law” 
[1987] Public Law 368; Oliver "Is the ultra vires rule 
the basis of judicial review ?" 1987 Public Law 543 20
20. See Lord Scarman "The Development of Administrative
Law: obstacles and opportunities" [1990] Public Law 490
at 491:
" [A]dministrative law has to be a developing 
legal science which it is the duty of judges 




























































































the areas of administrative which the judiciary 
in the United Kingdom have developed most 
creatively has been that of the requirements of 
"natural justice".
In Lloyd v. McMahon ^1 Lord Bridge of Harwich 
stated:
"[T]he so-called rules of natural
justice are not engraved on tablets of
stone. To use the phrase which better
expresses the underlying concept, what
the requirements of fairness demand when
any body, domestic, administrative or
judicial, has to make a decision which
will affect the rights of individuals
depends on the character of the decision
making body, the kinds of decisions it
has to make and the statutory or other
framework in which it operates. In
particular, it is well established that
when a statute has conferred on any body
the power to make decisions affecting
individuals, the courts will not only
require the procedures prescribed by the
statute to be followed, but will readily
imply so much and no more to be 21
abreast with the pace of change in  public 
administration.”




























































































introduced by way of additional 
procedural safeguards as will ensure the 
attainment of fairness."
One of the matters currently being considered by 
the United Kingdom has been the question as to 
whether or not the requirements of natural 
justice or general fairness can be extended to
create a general duty on the part of
administrators and decision makers to give
reasons for their particular decisions, even
where this is no statutory requirement or
customary practice to do so.
The European Court of Justice has already 
developed the notions of procedural fairness and 
the concept of the rights of the defence in 
European Community law to the extent that these 
form the basis, inter alia for a duty on both 
national 22 23 and Community 24 administrative 
authorities to give reasons for their decisions. 
The European Court has held that a right to a 
fair hearing implies the ability to test the
22. See generally Herberg "The Right to Reasons: Palm
Trees in Retreat ?" [1991] Public Law 340; Reid "An
Expectation of Explanation ?" 1990 SLT News 133
23. UNECTEF v. Heylens (C-222/86) [1987] ECR 4097
24. Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company (SAMAD) v. Council (C- 




























































































legality of a decision which in turn requires 
that reasons be given for that decision.
Although the relevant European case law appears 
not to have been cited to the court, this
European line of argumentation is strikingly 
parallelled in the approach of the English Court 
of Appeal in R. v. Civil Service Appeal Board, ex 
parte Cunningham 2&here Leggat LJ stated:
"[F]or the same reason of fairness that 
an applicant is entitled to know the 
case he has to meet, so should he be
entitled to know the reasons for an 
award of compensation, so that in the 
event of error he may be equipped to 
apply to the court for judicial review.
For it is only by judicial review that 
the Board's award can be challenged."
It is clear that the developing body of
administrative law in the United Kingdom is 
extraordinarily open to outside influences, 
particularly from other jurisdictions which have 
had a longer period in which to develop and
25. See generally Louis Dubois "A propos de deux 
principes generaux du droit communautaire" (1988) Revue 
française de droit administratif 691 26
26. R. y. Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte 




























































































refine their notions of administrative law. 
Given the predominant influence that Community 
law has already exercised in areas of national 
law which fall within the scope of Community law, 
it is to be expected that the system of 
administrative law of the European Community 
would be particularly influential also in this 
area. 27 8
3. PROPORTIONALITY AS A GROUND FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW - THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNITY
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(i) Proportionality: a door left open
In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister 
for the Civil Service 29 Lord Diplock re­
classified the principles of administrative law 
which were then accepted by the courts in the 
United Kingdom as grounds for challenging 
executive acts. Lord Diplock stated that an
27. See generally the essays in Jowell & Oliver (eds.) 
New Directions in Judicial Review, London 1988
28. See Slynn "But in England there is no ..." 
Festschrift fuer Wolfgang Zeidler, 1987 Vol 1, 397; Lord 
Mackenzie-Stuart "Recent Developments in English 
Administrative Law - the impact of Europe ?" in F. 
Capotorti et al. (eds.) Du droit international au droit 
de l'integration; Liber Amicorum P. Pescatore 1987, 411




























































































executive act might be susceptible to judicial 
review on the following grounds: its
"illegality", that is to say that the decision 
maker did not correctly understand the law that 
regulated his decision making power and/or did 
not give effect thereto; its "procedural
impropriety" where there was failure by the 
executive or administrative tribunal to observe 
the appropriate procedural norms; and its
"irrationality", if the decision which was so 
outrageous as to be outwith the bounds of the 
rational.
Lord Diplock accepted that future cases might 
lead to further development of the grounds upon 
which an administrative action might be subject 
to judicial review.
"I have in mind particularly the 
possible adoption in the future of the 
principle of 'proportionality' which is 
recognised in the administrative law of 
several of our fellow members of the 
European Economic Community."
In leaving the door open to further development 
in this way, Lord Diplock would appear to have 
been responding to calls made in academic 
literature for the notion of proportionality to




























































































be accepted by the courts and taken up as an 
independent ground for judicial review. 31
(ii) Proportionality: already implicit in U.K. 
law ?
In a useful short survey of European law on 
proportionality, 32 Jowell and Lester suggest 
that the principle of proportionality has already 
been implicitly accepted in English law, and cite 
a number of authorities from 1911 onward in which 
the notion that a punishment or benefit awarded 
by a body should be in proportion to the wrong or 
good done in order to be upheld by the Court. 
They argue that the time is ripe for the explicit 
recognition of proportionality as a general 
principle of English administrative law in the 
interests of greater legal certainty.
The explicit acceptance of the doctrine of 
proportionality is seen as an important symbol, 
being understood as part of a general 
"Europeanisation" of the national laws of the 
United Kingdom. The idea is that there will in
31. For an example of such academic advocacy, see
Jowell and Lester "Beyond Wednesbury: substantive
principles of administrative law" (1987) Public Law 368
32. Jowell and Lester "Proportionality: neither novel
or dangerous" in Jowell and Oliver (eds.) New Directions 




























































































time develop a common law of Europe by osmosis. 
The model is one of the mutual influence and a 
natural tendency toward integration of the legal 
systems of the member states of the European 
Community. ^3 Given the already noted openness 
of administrative law in the United Kingdom to 
judicial development, it would appear to be in 
this area that any signs of the beginnings of 
such organic integration would be most likely to 
be detected. Proportionality has thus become a 
touchstone of the extent to which the legal 
systems of the United Kingdom are becoming more 
"European".
(iii) Proportionality: the case for explicit 
adoption
The case in favour of the adoption of 
proportionality as a separate ground of judicial 
review of administrative action proceeds by way 
of a series of arguments. The first step is to 
present proportionality as something 
commonsensical, and as no more than a specific 
application of existing standards applied in 3*
33. See in particular Koopmans "The Birth of European Law
at the Crossroads of Legal Traditions" (1991) 39 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 493; Koopmans "European Public 
Law: Reality and Prospects" (1991) Public Law 53; 
Grossfeld "The Internal Dynamics of European Community 




























































































administrative law. Thus Jowell and Lester have 
stated 34 :
"It seems so characteristically English 
to require that the means employed by 
the decision maker must be no more than 
is reasonably necessary to achieve his 
legitimate ends ... that there should be 
no difficulty in absorbing the concept 
of proportionality into the English 
judicial process."
On this argument, proportionality would seem to 
be nothing more than a particular application of 
standards contained in the broad notion of 
"Wednesbury unreasonableness" 35 *, whereby the 
courts will strike down a decision which they 
consider to be so utterly unreasonable that it 
could not have been taken by any reasonable 
authority acting in good faith.
The second stage of the argument in favour of 
proportionality's adoption is to point out that
34. Jowell and Lester "Beyond Wednesbury: substantive
principles of administrative law" (1987) Public Law 368 
at 375-6
35. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. 
Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 230. In R v.
Birmingham City Council, ex parte Wesson, Queen's Bench 
Division (Crown Office List) CO/546/91, unreported 16 
December 1991 proportionality was argued to be synonymous 
with "Wednesbury unreasonableness". This argument was




























































































the existing category of "Wednesbury 
unreasonableness" already allows the courts to 
look at the substance of a decision, and not 
simply at the decision making process. However 
the test of "Wednesbury unreasonableness", it is 
claimed, is not really suitable for the task of 
reviewing the merits of a decision. It is 
unrealistically high, imprecise and self- 
referential. It is not so much an objective 
test of the decision itself as a test which looks 
to the subjective reactions of the judges to the 
decision. If the judges describe a decision as 
"so absurd that no sensible person could ever 
dream that it lay within the powers of the 
authority" 38 or "so wrong that no reasonable 
person could sensibly take that view" 37 or "so 
outrageous in defiance of logic or of accepted 
moral standards that no sensible person ... could 
have arrived at it" 38 they are doing no more 
than stating their strong disapproval of the 
decisions in question, without giving reasons for 
this. Words like "absurd", "outrageous" are seen 
as simply emotive words of disapproval as
36. Wednesbury [1948] 1 KB 223 at 229 per Lord Greene MR
37. Secretary of State for Education and Science v. 
Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014, 
1026 per Lord Denning MR




























































































contrasted with the approbation expressed in the 
use of the words "reasonable" and "sensible".
The third step in the argument is to contrast the 
emotivism of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" with 
the apparently cool and dispassionate objectivity 
of determining the suitability of means to ends, 
implicit in the proportionality test. Further, 
the standards by which decisions are to be 
measured are made explicit in the proportionality 
test. They are public standards of a scientific 
rationality which can be understood and adhered 
to by administrators. Indeed, in comparison to 
"Wednesbury unreasonableness", proportionality 
actually renders the judiciary more accountable, 
given that it involves them in an explicit 
process of comparison of means and ends, of 
weighing and balancing of different objectives. 
No longer will decisions be struck down on the 
basis of non-articulated judicial prejudices, 
hidden in such catch-all phrases "absurd" or 
"outrageous".
Given these arguments, the conclusion in favour 
of the adoption of proportionality as a 
substantive and independent principle of judicial 
review appears to follow irresistibly. 
Surprisingly, however, despite Lord Diplock's 




























































































judicial resistance to the principle of 
proportionality.
(iv) Proportionality; the case for explicit
rejection
The, principally, judicial arguments against 
proportionality would appear to be the following. 
Firstly, the idea that proportionality is already 
implicit within the doctrine of "Wednesbury 
unreasonableness" is accepted and while lack of 
proportionality would not of itself render a 
decision unlawful, extreme disproportionality 
might be one factor pointing to the decision 
being so perverse as could not have been taken by 
any reasonable authority. 39
As regards the attack of "Wednesbury
unreasonableness", the test is presented as
checking only "abuse or misuse of power" and
"excesses in the exercise of discretion". It is
not a general mode for reviewing the merits of a
decision but comes into play only in exceptional
circumstances when a decision can only be
described as utterly unreasonable, despite
seeming to have been taken in accordance with the
applicable procedures and without violating the
39. R. v. General Medical Council, ex parte Colman




























































































relevant regulations. The Wednesbury test is 
set at a high level to preserve the idea that the 
courts are doing no more than supervising the 
administration's exercise of power and are not 
seeking to replace it. In applying the
Wednesbury tests the courts are not referring to 
any general standard of what the reasonable man 
might have done. It is decidedly not a carte 
blanche for the judiciary to substitute their own 
opinion for that of the decision maker if they 
should happen to disagree with him or her. 40
Finally, the idea the proportionality test itself
is rejected outright precisely because it does
involve a lowering in the standard of the
Wednesbury test "extraordinary unreasonableness"
to considerations of "ordinary reasonableness".
This is because proportionality requires judges
to decide whether or not there existed any
reasonable relation between a decision, its
objectives and the circumstances in which the
decision was applied in the particular case. It
also requires judges to consider whether or not
there were any significant alternative courses of
action which might achieve the same end less
oppressively. Accordingly, application of the
proportionality test would mean that the judges
40. Brind v. Secretary of State for the Home Department



























































































applied their own standards of what they regarded 
as the reasonable thing to do in the 
circumstances and strike down any decision which 
did not accord with that.
195
4. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SUBSTANTIVE APPEALS
The application of the proportionality tests 
would involve judges looking at the merits of 
every decision challenged on those grounds. 
However, it has been repeatedly emphasised that 
judicial review should not be seen as an appeal 
to the judges to consider the substantive merits 
of a decision anew For the courts to go
beyond their general supervisory jurisdiction of 
ensuring that the law was respected by decision 
makers would be to usurp the functions of public 
authorities. In any event, such involvement in 
administrative decision making would be highly 
inappropriate given the judges' lack of time, of 
experience and expertise, and of democratic 
accountability.
Once again, Community law may require such
"undemocratic' behaviour on the part of the
judiciary. Thus, in R. v. Minister of
41. Chief Constable of North Wales Police v, Evans 




























































































Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Bell 
Lines Ltd, and another 42 a Ministerial decision 
to restrict the import of milk into the United 
Kingdom to certain specified ports was challenged 
in an action for judicial review. Prior to the 
Milk Ports Order, the only milk imported into the 
United Kingdom had been shipped from Ireland via 
two ports on the Irish Sea. The ministerial 
decision did not include these or any other ports 
on the Irish sea among the newly designated "milk 
ports". This decision was challenged on the
grounds that it introduced an unreasonable 
restriction on intra-Community trade (contrary to 
Article 30 and unjustifiable under Article 36 of 
the Treaty of Rome) and a declaration was sought 
from the Court that the two Irish Sea ports also 
be designated ports of entry for milk. Article 
36 falls to be interpreted in the light of the 
doctrine of proportionality. The declaration
was granted by the Court The Court held that in 
considering the justifiability of the decision 
under Article 36 it was not limited to the 
criteria set out in Wednesbury, namely: whether
the Minister had taken into account matter he 
should not have done; or failed to take into 
account matters he should have done; or whether 
the decision could be described as "utterly



























































































unreasonable". Rather, if it were plain to the 
court that the decision constituted, under 
Community law criteria, an impermissible (which 
is to say, disproportionate) restriction on 
Community trade it therefore contravened one 
party's rights arising from Community law, and it 
was open to the court to substitute its decision 
for that of the Minister.
5. BRIND - THE REJECTION OF PROPORTIONALITY
In R, v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Brind and others ^  the 
House of Lords examined the validity of the 
British Government's ban on the broadcasting of 
the voices of members of certain political 
organisations, in particular Sinn Fein. 
Arguments were presented to the effect that the 
use of executive power in this regard was 
disproportionate to its proclaimed objective of 
"starving the terrorist of the oxygen of
publicity". These arguments were given short 
shrift. Lord Ackner stated:
"Unless and until Parliament
incorporates the [European] convention 
[on Human Rights and Fundamental




























































































Freedoms ] into domestic law . .. there 
appears to me to be at present no basis 
on which the proportionality doctrine 
applied by the European Court [of Human 
Rights] can be followed by the courts of 
this country."
Lord Lowry declared :
"In my opinion proportionality and the 
other phrases are simply intended to 
move the focus of discussion away from 
the hitherto accepted criteria for 
deciding whether the decision maker has 
abused his power and into an area in 
which the courts will feel more at 
liberty to interfere ... [T]here is no  
authority for saying that 
proportionality in the sense in which 
the appellants have used it is part of 
English common law and a great deal of 
authority the other way. This, so far 
as I am concerned, is not a cause for 
regret..."
The idea of an organic reception of the doctrine 
of proportionality into the administrative law of 
the United Kingdom seems to have been decisively 
rejected by the Lords in Brind. The rejection




























































































constitutional grounds, in particular on a view 
of the separation of powers which requires judges 
to show restraint before the decisions of the 
executive.
Ironically however, as we have seen, Community 
law does already require the United Kingdom 
courts to apply the doctrine of proportionality 
in an even more sensitive constitutional area - 
namely the judicial review of legislation in the 
wake of Factortame 2. 44 As a result of the 
Lords decision in Brind in the absence of any 
Community law element the reasonableness of 
decisions of the executive and of administrative 
authorities can still only be challenged on the 
basis of "Wednesbury unreasonableness”. Acts of 
Parliament against which a plausible "European 
defence" can however be challenged on the grounds 
that, inter alia, they could have been drafted 
less restrictively, which is to say in a more 
reasonable way. This latter is a test of 
"ordinary reasonableness".
6. PROPORTIONALITY AFTER BRIND
The anomaly of creating two paradigms of
"reasonableness" in judicial review and, in
particular, the fact that Community law requires
44. Factortame Ltd, v. Secretary of State for Transport 




























































































that the relatively low standard of "ordinary 
reasonableness" be applied in the judicial review 
of Acts of Parliament does not seem to have been 
addressed (or perhaps realized ?) by their 
Lordships in Brind. In the light of this
apparent constitutional anomaly, it seems likely 
that pressure for the unequivocal acceptance of 
proportionality in the administrative law of the 
United Kingdom will continue.
Thus, in R v. Secretary of State for the
Environment and Another, ex parte National and 
Local Government Officers Association (NALGO) ^  
regulations which sought to restrict the
political activities of officers and staff of 
local authorities were challenged as unlawful on 
the grounds, inter alia, of their lack of 
proportionality. It was argued that it was open 
to the judge to consider the proportionality
test, notwithstanding the lack of any apparent 
Community element in the case and despite the 
rejection of proportionality in Brind.
The basis for this argument was that (it was
claimed) a majority of the judges in Brind, while
rejecting the applicability of proportionality in
that case, still accepted Lord Diplock's
45. High Court, Queen's Bench Division, unreported



























































































expressed view in Council of Civil Service Unions 
v. Minister for the Civil Service to the effect 
that proportionality might some day be accepted 
in English administrative law. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the judge refused to accept this 
line of argument or to apply the proportionality 
doctrine stating:
"Ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, [1991]
1 All ER 720 was decided only a few 
months ago. There is nothing in Lord 
Roskill's speech to suggest that he was 
encouraging judges to accept that there 
was now a sort of open season for them 
to introduce the doctrine of 
proportionality. Rather ... he was 
contemplating that, with the gradual 
encroachment of European law, a time 
might come when the courts of this 
country would feel that it was 
appropriate to adopt the principle. 
However fast or slowly that tide runs, 
it has not in my view risen perceptibly 
in the short interval since the decision 
in Ex parte Brind."
One development which had occurred in Community 
law between the decision of the House of Lords in 
Brind and that of High Court in NALGO has been




























































































legislation may be assessed by that Court for its 
conformity with the fundamental rights recognized 
and protected under Community law. In Elleniki 
Radiophonia Tielorasi v. Dimotiki Etairia 
Pliroforissis 4£he European Court stated:
" [ A ] s soon as any such legislation 
enters the field of application of 
Community law, the European Court, as 
sole arbiter in this matter, must 
provide the national court with all the 
elements of interpretation which are 
necessary in order to assess the 
compatibility of that legislation with 
the fundamental rights - as laid down in 
particular in the European Convention on 
Human Rights - the observance of which 
the Court ensures."
From this it would appear arguable that Community 
law concepts, which would include the doctrine of 
proportionality as well as concern with 
fundamental rights, are to be applied in the 
assessment of national legislation not only in 
areas of the Community's exclusive competence or 
when there exist rules of Community which are 
directly relevant to the matter at hand, but also 
when national laws can be said to apply or to




























































































have effects in any field or area in which the 
Community has also (exercised) jurisdiction.
Thus in W Emmett & Son Ltd v The Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise the argument was put
forward that the fixed penalties provided for in 
Section 14 of the Finance Act 1985 were contrary
to Community law in offending against, _inter
alia, the principle of proportionality. 
Notwithstanding the absence of any principle of 
proportionality in United Kingdom law, it was 
argued that the fact that the Community had 
issued various directives in relation to the 
harmonisation of tax laws, specifically VAT 
throughout the Community meant that the general 
principles of Community law, including 
proportionality, should be employed in relation 
to the interpretation and application of the 
national laws implementing these directives.
The VAT tribunal held, however, that with the
complete implementation of the relevant
directives by and in national law and the fact
that the article 22(8) of the Sixth VAT directive
allowed the Member States to impose other
obligations in relation to the correct levying
and collection of the tax, the only relevant





























































































general principles in the interpretation and 
application of that law would be those which are 
already found in the domestic system. The 
Tribunal concluded that Article 5 of the Treaty 
of Rome allowed Member State to choose measures 
which they considered appropriate, including 
criminal sanctions to ensure the fulfilment of 
obligations arising from Community action. In 
any event, the Tribunal considered that for the 
Tribunal or courts to assess whether the penalty 
laid down by Parliament was either appropriate or 
strictly necessary would involve such detailed 
inquiry of administrative matters as to be 
unsuitable for courts and that, in any event to 
interfere with Parliament's discretion in the 
matter would be wholly unconstitutional.
7. CONCLUSION
It is clear that there exists strong pressure for 
the introduction of the principle of 
proportionality in areas of United Kingdom law 
which are not directly effected or covered by 
Community law. This pressure results, in part, 
from academic writers seeking the general 
harmonisation of laws throughout the member 
states of the Community. Pressure also exists 
from the fact that judges in the United Kingdom 




























































































principle of proportionality to national
legislation which, potentially conflict with 
Community law norms. The dynamic of the law 
tends to the introduction of the concept.
The debate over the introduction of
proportionality is particularly interesting from
the point of view of the indirect reception of
law precisely because of the strong judicial
resistance to the concept. It shows that
indirect reception is not necessarily judge led 
4 8, but may have a dynamic of its own. Indeed 
the judges in Brind appear to be fighting a rear­
guard action against proportionality. Their 
principal concern appears to be proportionality 
appears to require national courts to substitute 
their own judgment of what is needed to achieve a 
particular objective for the judgment of the 
executive, or indeed the legislature. The 
spectre raised is that of the establishment of a 
" gouvernement des juges" which is seen not
only as alien to the traditions of the United 
Kingdom Constitution, but also as politically and 
morally undesirable because undemocratic.
48. Though it can be judge led, as is the case for the
reception of the concept of legitimate expectation in the 
administrative law of the United Kingdom. This was
introduced by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service 
Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374
49. See Davis "A Government of Judges: an historical
review" (1987) 55 American Journal of Comparative Law 559 











































































































































































































































































































































































1. TWO VISIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW
The European Court has stated that the Community 
is based on and governed by the Rule of Law. 1 
However, it is clear that judges of the European 
Community have a different view of the rule of 
law from the traditional United Kingdom approach. 
They would appear to operate within a broad 
system of judicial review which looks into the 
merits of decisions and of legislation. They
clearly do not regard the acts of national 
executives and legislatures with the same 
deference as that traditionally accorded by the 
judges of the United Kingdom. National
legislative measures are subordinated to 
Community measures. National laws have to be 
interpreted in the light of Community law and, if 
necessary, disapplied. The primary concern of 
the European Court for the uniform application of 
Community law throughout the Community. The
European Court has consistently held that it has 
a duty to ensure uniformity in the interpretation 
and application of Community law throughout the 
Community.
1 ■ Parti Ecoloqiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament 




























































































Thus, when acting in matters touched by Community 
law, the traditional deference shown by United 
Kingdom courts to Acts of the United Kingdom 
Parliament should be transferred to the Acts of 
the central Community institutions. The 
European Court has declared that national courts 
of Member States have no competence to declare 
the acts of Community institutions invalid 3 
except in cases of absolute necessity when a 
national court may suspend a Community measure ad 
interim pending a final decision on its validity 
by the European Court. 3 In considering the 
validity of Community measures as opposed to 
national measures, the European Court would seem 
to show these a certain deference. In FEDESA 
the European Court stated: *
2. Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Luebeck-Ost 314/85 
[1987] E.C.R. 4199, [1988] C.M.L.R. 57, paras 15, 19. 
This is a ruling which stands contrary to the plain 
wording of Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, although 
perhaps more faithful to earlier drafts of this provision 
which specifically stated that the Court of Justice alone 
was competent to decide questions of interpretation or 
validity. See Neri and Perl, eds. Travaux 
Préparatoires, Traite Institutant la CEE 376-77 Cour de 
Justice, Luxembourg, 1960.
3. See Zuckerfabrik Suederdithmarschen A.G. C-143/88, 
C-92/89, [1991] ECR unreported judgement of 21 February 
1991, E.C.J. 4
4. R. y. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
and another, ex parte Federation Europeene de la Sante 
Animale (FEDESA) and others (C-331/88) [1990] ECR 4023; 




























































































”[W]ith regard to the judicial review of 
compliance with those conditions [of 
proportionality] it must be stated that 
in matters concerning the Common 
Agricultural Policy the Community 
legislature has a discretionary power 
which corresponds to the political 
responsibilities given to it by Articles 
40 and 43 of the Treaty. Consequently, 
the legality of a measure adopted in 
that sphere can be affected only if the 
measure is manifestly inappropriate 
having regard to the objective which the 
competent institutions pursues, (see in 
particular case Schraeder (C-265/87) 
[1989] ECR 2237 paras 21-2)"
This reference to the test of proportionality 
applying only to what is "manifestly 
inappropriate" when considering is remarkably 
like Hoffman J.'s understanding in Stoke on Trent 
v. B & Q pic 5 of the application of the 
proportionality test when considering legislation 
in an area in which the national Parliament still 
retains discretionary power and political 
responsibility. However, in areas touched by 
Community law, national courts have to treat




























































































their own legislatures and executives as 
subordinate tribunals, whose acts should 
affecting matters concerning Community law should 
be treated with no more deference than the 
European court would show them.
The judicial review of national legislative 
action in the United Kingdom as imposed by 
Community law requires a fundamental revision of 
the understanding of the proper relationship 
between judges and the legislature within the 
country. It seems clear that Hoffman J.'s 
understanding of the proportionality test is 
wrong, because it refuses to address the ordinary 
reasonableness test implicit in the concept of 
proportionality. However, as we have seen, 
standing the decision in Ex parte Brind ® one is 
left with the paradoxical situation within the 
United Kingdom that whereas the high standard of 
"Wednesbury unreasonableness" continues to be 
applied to executive and administrative 
decisions, when considering the validity of 
legislation challenged under Community law the 
national courts are required by Community law to 
apply standards of ordinary reasonableness and to 
substitute their judgment for that of the




























































































democratic legislature when they think Community 
law requires it.
2. TOWARDS A COMMON EUROPEAN LAW
In acceding to the European Communities, the 
United Kingdom transferred its national courts to 
a distinct supra-national judicial hierarchy, 
under the authority of a Supreme court, European 
Court of Justice. National courts thereby
became Community courts charged with implementing 
Community law in the national sphere. While the 
United Kingdom remains a member of the European 
Communities, and its courts consequently part of 
the European court system, the power (and 
sovereignty) of the national Parliament has been 
fettered in that it is unable to enforce or to 
enact legislation which is contrary to Community 
law, since such legislation will not be
recognized by its own national courts. Since no 
man can serve two masters, as the judges of the 
European Court of Justice were keen to emphasize 
in the first Opinion on the draft Treaty on the 
European Economic Area, it would appear that the 
more accurate statement of the primary duty of 
national courts in the United Kingdom is not to 
ensure the realization of Parliament's will, but 




























































































Communities, as discovered in the Treaties and as 
interpreted by the European Court of Justice.
It is evident that in matters concerning 
Community law, the United Kingdom Courts are 
required to adopt the interpretative techniques 
and approaches to legislation which have been 
developed in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court. A number of these techniques, for 
example teleological reasoning and 
proportionality, involve the courts taking a 
quite new and for the United Kingdom legal 
systems totally alien approach to legislative 
enactments.
It would seem that there are then two paradigms 
for the United Kingdom courts' approach to 
legislation of the United Kingdom Parliament. 
In non-Community matters the courts should 
continue to take a classic legal positivist 
approach of strict interpretation and application 
of the authoritative texts enacted by Parliament. 
In matters where questions of Community law 
arise, however, a more "natural law" approach 
would appear to have to be taken by the courts in 
that they are required to ascertain the purpose 
of national legislation and assess its 



























































































ends of a higher law set out in the Treaties and 
the judgments of the European Court.
This would result in two models of law: one in 
which courts are supreme in matters of Community 
law, one in which the national legislature is 
supreme in matters untouched by European law. 
But as one former judge of the European Court of 
Justice has noted: 7
"[T]he progress of Community law will 
necessarily have an important impact on 
the national laws of the Member States.
How can one deny, for example, that the 
decision [of the European Court of 
Justice] in Johnston v. RUC [1986] ECR 
1663 will clearly weaken the British 
system of ministerial certificates being 
seen as constituting conclusive 
statements of lawfulness. This system 
has now been demolished in all areas 
where Community law confers justiciable 
rights on individuals. Is it realistic 
to suppose that it can continue to exist 
in other [non-Community] areas, with the 
result that a variable speed system of
7. Yves Galmot "Reflexions sur le recours au droit 
compare par le Cour de justice des Communautés 
europeenes" (1990) 6 Revue française de droit 




























































































guarantees of the rights of individual 
litigants would be established ?"
Factors which would militate against the idea 
that two paradigms of law might be maintained 
include the ever-expanding remit of the
Commission and the Court of Justice to apply 
Community law in new areas, and the bare fact 
that there is no separate national court 
structure to apply Community law (such as
formerly existed in England with the Common Law 
and Equity Courts and still exists in France with 
the distinction between Ordinary Courts and 
Administrative Court) which might allow two 
separate bodies of law to grow up within the same 
national jurisdiction.
Whereas the judicial review of administrative 
action is the preserve of specialist judges in 
the High Court of England and the Court of 
Session in Scotland, the judicial review of 
legislation is a matter for every court in the 
Kingdom, from Magistrate’s and District Courts 
upward to apply its standards of reasonableness 
to the actings of Parliament. Community law
clearly requires the courts in the United Kingdom 
to take on the role of a gouvernement des juges 




























































































It is equally clear that the judges in the United 
Kingdom are hostile to the idea that they should 
be required to make policy judgments and 
substitute their own assessments for that of 
administrators as well as of the executive and 
legislature. If and when the Community doctrine 
of proportionality is "indirectly" received into 
the administrative law of the United Kingdom, 
notwithstanding this judicial hostility, this 
will mark the clear acceptance of the idea of the 
permeation of Community law throughout the 
national legal system.
Such acceptance of the indirect influence of 
Community law must eventually mean that the 
European Court's vision of the rule of law, 
implicit within its specific judgments and the 
general approach, will come to dominate, and 
eventually to supplant the native traditions. 
In this way the law of the United Kingdom will be 
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